11 December 2010
Last year’s recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize escalated the war in Afghanistan a few weeks after receiving the prize. The award surprised even Obama. This year the Chinese government were foolish to make a martyr of the president of Chinese PEN and neo-con Liu Xiaobo. He should never have been arrested, but the Norwegian politicians who comprise the committee, led by Thorbjørn Jagland, a former Labour prime minister, wanted to teach China a lesson. And so they ignored their hero’s views. Or perhaps they didn’t, given that their own views are not dissimilar. The committee thought about giving Bush and Blair a joint peace prize for invading Iraq but a public outcry forced a retreat.
For the record, Liu Xiaobo has stated publicly that in his view:
(a) China’s tragedy is that it wasn’t colonised for at least 300 years by a Western power or Japan. This would apparently have civilised it for ever;
(b) The Korean and Vietnam wars fought by the US were wars against totalitarianism and enhanced Washington’s ‘moral credibility’;
(c) Bush was right to go to war in Iraq and Senator Kerry’s criticisms were ‘slander-mongering’;
(d) Afghanistan? No surprises here: Full support for Nato’s war.
He has a right to these opinions, but should they get a peace prize?
The Norwegian jurist Fredrik Heffermehl argues that the committee is in breach of the will and testament left behind by the inventor of dynamite whose bequests fund the prizes: ‘The Nobel committee has not received prize money for free use, but was entrusted with money to give to the pivotal element in creating peace, breaking the vicious circle of arms races and military power games. From this point of view the 2010 Nobel is again an illegitimate prize awarded by an illegitimate committee.’
more comments
Thursday 16 December 2010
Wednesday 15 December 2010
what an asshole, this ben brown
BBC Anchor Attacks Abused Disabled Protestor As “Revolutionary Cyber-Radical”
DARRYL MASON
Your New Reality
Dec 14, 2010
You don’t need to know too much background to get the full horror of what this BBCNews host is doing to a young man with cerebral palsy, who is unable to operate his wheelchair independently, simply because he dared to turn up at a recent student protest in London:
The blood-chillingly unemphatic journalist actually asks a severely disabled man if he was hurling chunks of concrete at police, and asks him again even after Jody says he can’t operate his wheelchair without the help of his brother.
Note the way interference or the host manage to cut off Jody every time he starts making valid, vital points about the police brutality inflicted on him and hundreds of other students in the streets of London, some students beaten by police, and charged with horses, were as young as 12 years old.
Note also the way the BBCNews host tries to get Jody to admit on air to things that may prejudice his official complaint later on.
Scary stuff.
Jody is becoming a hero of the what’s called the UKUncut student movement, who are opposing massive cuts to education and public services to protect the wealth of England’s richest, and for good reason. He has a lot of powerful things to say.
But after that interview, and the powerful reaction from the thousands who found it through Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and began complaining to the BBC, you probably won’t be seeing Jody back on BBCNews anytime soon.
They don’t like ‘student leaders’ or ‘revolutionaries’ to be quite so articulate, and in control of what they’re saying.
England under austerity is a powderkeg, and when the public sees police are prepared to assault even people in wheelchairs, well, everything changes.
DARRYL MASON
Your New Reality
Dec 14, 2010
You don’t need to know too much background to get the full horror of what this BBCNews host is doing to a young man with cerebral palsy, who is unable to operate his wheelchair independently, simply because he dared to turn up at a recent student protest in London:
The blood-chillingly unemphatic journalist actually asks a severely disabled man if he was hurling chunks of concrete at police, and asks him again even after Jody says he can’t operate his wheelchair without the help of his brother.
Note the way interference or the host manage to cut off Jody every time he starts making valid, vital points about the police brutality inflicted on him and hundreds of other students in the streets of London, some students beaten by police, and charged with horses, were as young as 12 years old.
Note also the way the BBCNews host tries to get Jody to admit on air to things that may prejudice his official complaint later on.
Scary stuff.
Jody is becoming a hero of the what’s called the UKUncut student movement, who are opposing massive cuts to education and public services to protect the wealth of England’s richest, and for good reason. He has a lot of powerful things to say.
But after that interview, and the powerful reaction from the thousands who found it through Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and began complaining to the BBC, you probably won’t be seeing Jody back on BBCNews anytime soon.
They don’t like ‘student leaders’ or ‘revolutionaries’ to be quite so articulate, and in control of what they’re saying.
England under austerity is a powderkeg, and when the public sees police are prepared to assault even people in wheelchairs, well, everything changes.
LSE在纪念费孝通，这里贴篇关于他的旧文章
费孝通诞辰100周年纪念活动在其母校英国伦敦经济学院刚刚举行，估计是那里的中国学者搞的。这里转一片说费孝通这个中国社会学泰斗的网文，说他老人家也是个“唐骏”。建议方舟子去调查哈：
铁木：大民族要有大民族的胸襟
January 31, 2004 16:01:49:
民族问题文章许多不能摆脱定居农业民族中心论，蒙古人（和许多其他非汉民族）最反感就是流行的所谓“中华民族多元一体”的那种牵强附会。尽管如此，这些文章比网上丰年这类文章还是高很多，因为人家的观点/理论后面有史料，有逻辑。
费孝通先生作为早一辈海龟，把西洋人类学/社会学理论，包装了借来的观点。梁漱溟1921年《东西文化及其哲学》，1935年《中国民族自救运动之最后觉悟》，1937年《乡村建设理论》当中的主要观点，都被老费用西洋学术语言做了包装，零星地写在自己1948的《乡土中国》和《乡土重建》当中（李达）。
梁的“伦理本位”，说亲情关系为基础的社会秩序，就是费说的“礼治社会”；梁说“安分知足，摄生，寡欲”是中国物质文明不发达的原因，到费那里，就成了匮乏经济。梁说过“凭借农业翻身”，“从农业引发工业”的主张，到费那里就成了“乡土工业”。 梁涑溟比较中西文化说，中国人的意欲的方向是“向里用力”，一切“反求诸己”，因此不向自然界和社会争取，故科学和民主不发达；而西人的意欲是“外向用力”。这种中西对比的理论完全反映在费的中西文化观中，也被后来人反复抄袭。
上面是题外话，再看丰年这类文章，每段开头都是“有很多迹象表明”，“还有迹象表明”，“ 可以遇见”，“ 千年以来”和“ 必须指出”这类，后面接着就是自己的一些臆断。这么连续写下去（自己说是还要出系列文章），无疑对作者想象力是个挑战。该文中把历史上农耕民族同游牧民族的贸易战争，想象成单方面的掠夺战争。把蒙古独立虚构成精英阴谋，把平民因素排除在外。试问没有平民，如何能叫做民族主义呢。汉族可以有民族主义，蒙古人就不能有吗？
另外，文章还想象出古今中外，前后左右，强大的敌对“精英”，表现出对莫须有精英的巨大仇恨。而讽刺的是，内蒙古的政治民族精英们，自治区主席在讲话连宪法规定的“自治”二字都不敢提；民族“精英”们因为没有汉名而不能当第一把手；蒙古人身份证件包括护照，不能根据宪法规定的权利，按照自己民族语言拼写姓名，被迫使用汉语拼音。过去贵为国家领导人的乌兰夫生前回内蒙古都不能随便成行，死后葬礼想回内蒙古举行，老邓一给脸色，就泡了汤。
这种妖魔化少数民族的网文，不出一个套路：想象出一个大救星，再想象出一个大坏蛋。这种思维导致极端政治，被中共无数次历史运动证明。就像反犹主义能够把散布全世界犹太人想象成一个大阴谋，妖魔化少数民族的网文也表现出相同的想象力，把形形色色的所谓敌对因素串联起来：美国，台独，日本，俄罗斯，达赖喇嘛…世界其他民族如果也有同样的想象力，估计也能把走西口，闯关东，汉民草原挖发菜，福建人蛇偷渡，大量境内和境外移民，中国边疆地区沙漠化，全球气候变暖，萨斯，禽流感，同中国巨大人口相联系，得出华人霸占地球的结论。
有政治始，就有阴谋论，妖魔化少数民族由来已久，华夷之辨从生理区分进化到文化区分，从肉体上消灭到文化上消灭，也算是进步。不过进步不是绝对的，60年代末在内蒙古挖肃“内人党”，就是肉体消灭的反复。双手沾满数万蒙古人鲜血的滕海清将军，“拨乱反正”后官运亨通照旧（老邓拨乱反正仅对自己的冤家对头，不对自己的部下）。好像即使如此，蒙古人也没有搞出个类似的阴谋论，即把明朝扫荡蒙古人，实行三光政策，清朝对西部蒙古人搞种族灭绝，挖肃内人党，内蒙古生产建设兵团，大量移民，打压蒙古族学生和知识分子，串联成一个大阴谋。
在认识路程上，中国从种族/文化的中心观到懂得有世界民族之林，进步过程十分艰难漫长。保持多民族国家的繁荣稳定，大民族理应负有更多责任，表现出更大的胸襟。反复出现这种妖魔化少数民族的网络蛊惑，说明实现民族平等任重道远，说明人的认识不是直线进步，难免出现反复，就像物种进化中有变异，偶尔会出现返祖的丑类。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
费孝通诞辰100周年纪念活动在其母校英国伦敦经济学院落下帷幕
一个主题：理解中国、与中国人沟通
两个特点：一是多学科的参与，演讲者分别来自社会学、人类学、民族学、汉学、经济 史、农业经济学和管理学等学科；二是各种形式的比较法的演练，如：
* 中文与英文的写作、
* 中国的“谋略”的概念与西方相关的概念
* 费孝通与毛泽东对中国社会的不同影 响
* 费孝通的“差序格局”概念与其更新版“礼尚往来”概念
* 中日农村家产的区别
* 费孝通与霍华德对移民流动和城市化研究的异同
* 城乡社区研究之比较
* 以及 江村的在不同时期收入和社会分层的纵向的比较
三项意义：
* 它呼唤了国际学术界从田野、方法到理论等方面重新审 视费孝通对人类知识的学术贡献；
* 它聚集了中国与其他国家和地区的学者，通过对费孝通的学术思想的研究来加深对中国社会的理解；
* 这次活动是把中 国社会科学研究的精神产品推介到人类的社会科学殿堂中来的一项积极的尝试。
请打开附件阅读深度报道、欣赏50多幅照片，并了解更多的相关信息（中英文各一），或者索性登陆中国比较研究网站：
Chinese: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCPN/ICRB/Fei_Xiaotong/FeiEvenNews_cn.htm
English: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCPN/ICRB/Fei_Xiaotong/FeiEventNews_en.htm
预祝各位及其亲朋好友圣诞节和新年快乐！
铁木：大民族要有大民族的胸襟
January 31, 2004 16:01:49:
民族问题文章许多不能摆脱定居农业民族中心论，蒙古人（和许多其他非汉民族）最反感就是流行的所谓“中华民族多元一体”的那种牵强附会。尽管如此，这些文章比网上丰年这类文章还是高很多，因为人家的观点/理论后面有史料，有逻辑。
费孝通先生作为早一辈海龟，把西洋人类学/社会学理论，包装了借来的观点。梁漱溟1921年《东西文化及其哲学》，1935年《中国民族自救运动之最后觉悟》，1937年《乡村建设理论》当中的主要观点，都被老费用西洋学术语言做了包装，零星地写在自己1948的《乡土中国》和《乡土重建》当中（李达）。
梁的“伦理本位”，说亲情关系为基础的社会秩序，就是费说的“礼治社会”；梁说“安分知足，摄生，寡欲”是中国物质文明不发达的原因，到费那里，就成了匮乏经济。梁说过“凭借农业翻身”，“从农业引发工业”的主张，到费那里就成了“乡土工业”。 梁涑溟比较中西文化说，中国人的意欲的方向是“向里用力”，一切“反求诸己”，因此不向自然界和社会争取，故科学和民主不发达；而西人的意欲是“外向用力”。这种中西对比的理论完全反映在费的中西文化观中，也被后来人反复抄袭。
上面是题外话，再看丰年这类文章，每段开头都是“有很多迹象表明”，“还有迹象表明”，“ 可以遇见”，“ 千年以来”和“ 必须指出”这类，后面接着就是自己的一些臆断。这么连续写下去（自己说是还要出系列文章），无疑对作者想象力是个挑战。该文中把历史上农耕民族同游牧民族的贸易战争，想象成单方面的掠夺战争。把蒙古独立虚构成精英阴谋，把平民因素排除在外。试问没有平民，如何能叫做民族主义呢。汉族可以有民族主义，蒙古人就不能有吗？
另外，文章还想象出古今中外，前后左右，强大的敌对“精英”，表现出对莫须有精英的巨大仇恨。而讽刺的是，内蒙古的政治民族精英们，自治区主席在讲话连宪法规定的“自治”二字都不敢提；民族“精英”们因为没有汉名而不能当第一把手；蒙古人身份证件包括护照，不能根据宪法规定的权利，按照自己民族语言拼写姓名，被迫使用汉语拼音。过去贵为国家领导人的乌兰夫生前回内蒙古都不能随便成行，死后葬礼想回内蒙古举行，老邓一给脸色，就泡了汤。
这种妖魔化少数民族的网文，不出一个套路：想象出一个大救星，再想象出一个大坏蛋。这种思维导致极端政治，被中共无数次历史运动证明。就像反犹主义能够把散布全世界犹太人想象成一个大阴谋，妖魔化少数民族的网文也表现出相同的想象力，把形形色色的所谓敌对因素串联起来：美国，台独，日本，俄罗斯，达赖喇嘛…世界其他民族如果也有同样的想象力，估计也能把走西口，闯关东，汉民草原挖发菜，福建人蛇偷渡，大量境内和境外移民，中国边疆地区沙漠化，全球气候变暖，萨斯，禽流感，同中国巨大人口相联系，得出华人霸占地球的结论。
有政治始，就有阴谋论，妖魔化少数民族由来已久，华夷之辨从生理区分进化到文化区分，从肉体上消灭到文化上消灭，也算是进步。不过进步不是绝对的，60年代末在内蒙古挖肃“内人党”，就是肉体消灭的反复。双手沾满数万蒙古人鲜血的滕海清将军，“拨乱反正”后官运亨通照旧（老邓拨乱反正仅对自己的冤家对头，不对自己的部下）。好像即使如此，蒙古人也没有搞出个类似的阴谋论，即把明朝扫荡蒙古人，实行三光政策，清朝对西部蒙古人搞种族灭绝，挖肃内人党，内蒙古生产建设兵团，大量移民，打压蒙古族学生和知识分子，串联成一个大阴谋。
在认识路程上，中国从种族/文化的中心观到懂得有世界民族之林，进步过程十分艰难漫长。保持多民族国家的繁荣稳定，大民族理应负有更多责任，表现出更大的胸襟。反复出现这种妖魔化少数民族的网络蛊惑，说明实现民族平等任重道远，说明人的认识不是直线进步，难免出现反复，就像物种进化中有变异，偶尔会出现返祖的丑类。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
费孝通诞辰100周年纪念活动在其母校英国伦敦经济学院落下帷幕
一个主题：理解中国、与中国人沟通
两个特点：一是多学科的参与，演讲者分别来自社会学、人类学、民族学、汉学、经济 史、农业经济学和管理学等学科；二是各种形式的比较法的演练，如：
* 中文与英文的写作、
* 中国的“谋略”的概念与西方相关的概念
* 费孝通与毛泽东对中国社会的不同影 响
* 费孝通的“差序格局”概念与其更新版“礼尚往来”概念
* 中日农村家产的区别
* 费孝通与霍华德对移民流动和城市化研究的异同
* 城乡社区研究之比较
* 以及 江村的在不同时期收入和社会分层的纵向的比较
三项意义：
* 它呼唤了国际学术界从田野、方法到理论等方面重新审 视费孝通对人类知识的学术贡献；
* 它聚集了中国与其他国家和地区的学者，通过对费孝通的学术思想的研究来加深对中国社会的理解；
* 这次活动是把中 国社会科学研究的精神产品推介到人类的社会科学殿堂中来的一项积极的尝试。
请打开附件阅读深度报道、欣赏50多幅照片，并了解更多的相关信息（中英文各一），或者索性登陆中国比较研究网站：
Chinese: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCPN/ICRB/Fei_Xiaotong/FeiEvenNews_cn.htm
English: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCPN/ICRB/Fei_Xiaotong/FeiEventNews_en.htm
预祝各位及其亲朋好友圣诞节和新年快乐！
Monday 13 December 2010
奥斯陆诺贝尔和平奖颁奖
中国说闹剧有点过，煽情剧还是蛮恰当的。好莱坞的演员，挪威的演员，中国民运舞台上的老演员聚集一堂。我并不赞同来自中共当局和民运内部对刘晓波的批评，但也没多看好诺贝尔和平奖的完美和正确，因为这种奖能给鸡性格这样的坏人，能给奥八马这样穷兵黩武的人，真不能太当真。数来比较名副其实的和平奖获得者要算越南的黎德寿。
铁木：英国学生抗议让我想起6-4
英国学生抗议让我想起6-4 (48 reads) 时间: 2010-12-14 周二, 下午4:34
作者：铁木 在 罕见奇谈 发贴, 来自 http://www.hjclub.info
都可以被报道成“支持民主的学生遭到残酷镇压”，可主流媒体报道却截然不同，从cnn和bbc的报道可以看出。这边抗议者的暴行不过是砸了财政部和最高法院的几扇门窗，有个小伙在英国的人民英雄纪念碑上抓住国旗荡秋千，另外一个小伙在丘吉尔的纪念碑下撒了泡尿。
那天晚上（周四，12月9日）当查尔斯王子夫妇的坐驾被抗议者投掷了油漆，受到轻微损毁后，媒体报道一下子变得歇斯底里。虽然说没到如丧考妣的地步，也和火山爆发，天要塌下来差球不多。
咱不禁想起当初89年夏天在北京，那时候的人民英雄纪念碑是随便让人爬上爬下。那时候广场上的人在人民英雄纪念碑及周围人民英雄的塑像周围随地大小便的有的是。那时候的西方媒体在中国的记者，没有哪位报道说，中国学生在毁坏公物，是无政府主义分子或暴徒。
如果上周在英国的抗议发生在北京，莫斯科或德黑兰，你可以啃腚西方媒体会报道说，是广大要求民主的学生遭到警察残酷镇压。
作者：铁木 在 罕见奇谈 发贴, 来自 http://www.hjclub.info
都可以被报道成“支持民主的学生遭到残酷镇压”，可主流媒体报道却截然不同，从cnn和bbc的报道可以看出。这边抗议者的暴行不过是砸了财政部和最高法院的几扇门窗，有个小伙在英国的人民英雄纪念碑上抓住国旗荡秋千，另外一个小伙在丘吉尔的纪念碑下撒了泡尿。
那天晚上（周四，12月9日）当查尔斯王子夫妇的坐驾被抗议者投掷了油漆，受到轻微损毁后，媒体报道一下子变得歇斯底里。虽然说没到如丧考妣的地步，也和火山爆发，天要塌下来差球不多。
咱不禁想起当初89年夏天在北京，那时候的人民英雄纪念碑是随便让人爬上爬下。那时候广场上的人在人民英雄纪念碑及周围人民英雄的塑像周围随地大小便的有的是。那时候的西方媒体在中国的记者，没有哪位报道说，中国学生在毁坏公物，是无政府主义分子或暴徒。
如果上周在英国的抗议发生在北京，莫斯科或德黑兰，你可以啃腚西方媒体会报道说，是广大要求民主的学生遭到警察残酷镇压。
Monday 6 December 2010
Monday 15 November 2010
Why Vietnam loves and hates China
Why Vietnam loves and hates China
By Andrew Forbes
For more than 2,000 years, Vietnam's development as a nation has been marked by one fixed and immutable factor - the proximity of China. The relationship between the two countries is in many ways a family affair, with all the closeness of shared values and bitterness of close rivalries.
No country in Southeast Asia is culturally closer to China than Vietnam, and no other country in the region has spent so long
fending off Chinese domination, often at a terrible cost in lives, economic development and political compromise.
China has been Vietnam's blessing and Vietnam's curse. It remains an intrusive cultural godfather, the giant to the north that is "always there". Almost a thousand years of Chinese occupation, between the Han conquest of Nam Viet in the 2nd century BC and the reassertion of Vietnamese independence as Dai Viet in AD 967, marked the Vietnamese so deeply that they became, in effect, an outpost of Chinese civilization in Southeast Asia.
While the other countries of Indochina are Theravada Buddhist, sharing cultural links with South Asia, Vietnam derived its predominant religion - a mix of Mahayana Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism popularly known as tam giao or "Three Religions"- from China. Until the introduction of romanized quoc ngu script in the 17th century, Vietnamese scholars wrote in Chinese characters or in chu nho, a Vietnamese derivative of Chinese characters.
Over the centuries, Vietnam developed as a smaller version of the Middle Kingdom, a centralized, hierarchical state ruled by an all-powerful emperor living in a Forbidden City based on its namesake in Beijing and administered by a highly educated Confucian bureaucracy.
Both countries are deeply conscious of the cultural ties that bind them together, and each is still deeply suspicious of the other. During the long centuries of Chinese occupation, the Vietnamese enthusiastically embraced many aspects of Chinese civilization, while at the same time fighting with an extraordinary vigor to maintain their cultural identity and regain their national independence.
During the Tang Dynasty (6th-9th centuries AD), Vietnamese guerrillas fighting the Chinese sang a martial song that emphasized their separate identity in the clearest of terms:
Fight to keep our hair long,
Fight to keep our teeth black,
Fight to show that the heroic southern country can never be defeated.
For their part, the Chinese recognized the Vietnamese as a kindred people, to be offered the benefits of higher Chinese civilization and, ultimately, the rare privilege of being absorbed into the Chinese polity.
On the other hand, as near family, they were to be punished especially severely if they rejected Chinese standards or rebelled against Chinese control. This was made very clear in a remarkable message sent by the Song Emperor Taizong to King Le Hoan in AD 979, just over a decade after Vietnam first reasserted its independence.
Like a stern headmaster, Taizong appealed to Le Hoan to see reason and return to the Chinese fold: "Although your seas have pearls, we will throw them into the rivers, and though your mountains produce gold, we will throw it into the dust. We do not covet your valuables. You fly and leap like savages, we have horse-drawn carriages. You drink through your noses, we have rice and wine. Let us change your customs. You cut your hair, we wear hats; when you talk, you sound like birds. We have examinations and books. Let us teach you the knowledge of the proper laws ... Do you not want to escape from the savagery of the outer islands and gaze upon the house of civilization? Do you want to discard your garments of leaves and grass and wear flowered robes embroidered with mountains and dragons? Have you understood?"
In fact Le Hoan understood Taizong very well and, like his modern successors, knew exactly what he wanted from China - access to its culture and civilization without coming under its political control or jeopardizing Vietnamese freedom in any way. This attitude infuriated Taizong, as it would generations of Chinese to come.
In 1407, the Ming Empire managed to reassert Chinese control over its stubbornly independent southern neighbor, and Emperor Yongle - no doubt, to his mind, in the best interests of the Vietnamese - imposed a policy of enforced Sinicization. Predictably enough, Vietnam rejected this "kindness" and fought back, expelling the Chinese yet again in 1428.
Yongle was apoplectic when he learned of their rebellion. Vietnam was not just another tributary state, he insisted, but a former province that had once enjoyed the benefits of Chinese civilizationand yet had wantonly rejected this privilege. In view of this close association - Yongle used the term mi mi or "intimately related" - Vietnam's rebellion was particularly heinous and deserved the fiercest of punishments.
China on top
Sometimes a strongly sexual imagery creeps into this "intimate relationship", with Vietnam, the weaker partner, a victim of
Chinese violation. In AD 248, the Vietnamese heroine Lady Triu, who led a popular uprising against the Chinese occupation, proclaimed: "I want to ride the great winds, strike the sharks on the high seas, drive out the invaders, reconquer the nation, burst the bonds of slavery and never bow to become anyone's concubine."
Her defiant choice of words was more than just symbolic. Vietnam has long been a source of women for the Chinese sex trade. In Tang times, the Chinese poet Yuan Chen wrote appreciatively of "slave girls of Viet, sleek, of buttery flesh", while today the booming market for Vietnamese women in Taiwan infuriates and humiliates many Vietnamese men.
It's instructive, then, that in his 1987 novel Fired Gold Vietnamese author Nguyen Huy Thiep writes, "The most significant characteristics of this country are its smallness and weakness. She is like a virgin girl raped by Chinese civilization. The girl concurrently enjoys, despises and is humiliated by the rape."
This Chinese belief that Vietnam is not just another nation, but rather a member of the family - almost Chinese, aware of the blessings of Chinese civilization, but somehow stubbornly refusing, century after century, to become Chinese - has persisted down to the present day.
During the Second Indochina War, Chinese propaganda stressed that Vietnam and China were "as close as the lips and the teeth". After the US defeat, however, Vietnam once again showed its independence, allying itself with the Soviet Union, in 1978-79, invading neighboring Cambodia and overthrowing China's main ally in Southeast Asia, the Khmer Rouge.
Once again Chinese fury knew no bounds, and Beijing determined to teach the "ungrateful" Vietnamese a lesson. Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader, openly denounced the Vietnamese as "the hooligans of the East". According to one Thai diplomat: "The moment the topic of Vietnam came up, you could see something change in Deng Xiaoping.
"His hatred was just visceral. He spat forcefully into his spittoon and called the Vietnamese 'dogs'." Acting on Deng's orders, the Chinese army invaded Vietnam in 1979, capturing five northern provincial capitals before systematically demolishing them and withdrawing to China after administering a symbolic "lesson".
But who taught a lesson to whom? Beijing sought to force Hanoi to withdraw its frontline forces from Cambodia, but the Vietnamese didn't engage these forces in the struggle, choosing instead to confront the Chinese with irregulars and provincial militia. Casualties were about equal, and China lost considerable face, as well as international respect, as a result of its invasion.
Over the millennia, actions like this have taught the Vietnamese a recurring lesson about China. It's there, it's big, and it won't go away, so appease it without yielding whenever possible, and fight it with every resource available whenever necessary.
Just as Chinese rulers have seen the Vietnamese as ingrates and hooligans, so the Vietnamese have seen the Chinese as arrogant and aggressive, a power to be emulated at all times, mollified in times of peace, and fiercely resisted in times of war.
In 1946, 1,700 years after Lady Triu's declaration, another great Vietnamese patriot, Ho Chi Minh, warned his Viet Minh colleagues in forceful terms against using Chinese Nationalist troops in the north as a buffer against the return of the French: "You fools! Don't you realize what it means if the Chinese remain? Don't you remember your history?
"The last time the Chinese came, they stayed a thousand years. The French are foreigners. They are weak. Colonialism is dying. The white man is finished in Asia. But if the Chinese stay now, they will never go. As for me, I prefer to sniff French shit for five years than to eat Chinese shit for the rest of my life."
Yet Ho was an ardent admirer of Chinese civilization, fluent in Mandarin, a skilled calligrapher who wrote Chinese poetry, a close friend and colleague of Chinese leaders Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Ho wasn't as much anti-Chinese as he was pro-Vietnamese. It was his deep understanding of and respect for China that enabled him to recognize, clearly and definitively, the menace that "a close family relationship" with the giant to the north posed, and continues to pose, for Vietnam's independence and freedom.
It's ironic, then, that as the current Vietnamese leadership strive to develop their economy along increasingly capitalist lines while at the same time retaining their monopoly on state power, the country they most admire and seek to emulate is, as always, the one they most fear.
Andrew Forbes is editor of CPA Media as well as a correspondent in its Thailand bureau. He has recently completed National Geographic Traveler: Shanghai , and the above is an excerpt from his forthcoming book A Phoenix Reborn: Travels in New Vietnam.
(Copyright 2007 Andrew Forbes.)
By Andrew Forbes
For more than 2,000 years, Vietnam's development as a nation has been marked by one fixed and immutable factor - the proximity of China. The relationship between the two countries is in many ways a family affair, with all the closeness of shared values and bitterness of close rivalries.
No country in Southeast Asia is culturally closer to China than Vietnam, and no other country in the region has spent so long
fending off Chinese domination, often at a terrible cost in lives, economic development and political compromise.
China has been Vietnam's blessing and Vietnam's curse. It remains an intrusive cultural godfather, the giant to the north that is "always there". Almost a thousand years of Chinese occupation, between the Han conquest of Nam Viet in the 2nd century BC and the reassertion of Vietnamese independence as Dai Viet in AD 967, marked the Vietnamese so deeply that they became, in effect, an outpost of Chinese civilization in Southeast Asia.
While the other countries of Indochina are Theravada Buddhist, sharing cultural links with South Asia, Vietnam derived its predominant religion - a mix of Mahayana Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism popularly known as tam giao or "Three Religions"- from China. Until the introduction of romanized quoc ngu script in the 17th century, Vietnamese scholars wrote in Chinese characters or in chu nho, a Vietnamese derivative of Chinese characters.
Over the centuries, Vietnam developed as a smaller version of the Middle Kingdom, a centralized, hierarchical state ruled by an all-powerful emperor living in a Forbidden City based on its namesake in Beijing and administered by a highly educated Confucian bureaucracy.
Both countries are deeply conscious of the cultural ties that bind them together, and each is still deeply suspicious of the other. During the long centuries of Chinese occupation, the Vietnamese enthusiastically embraced many aspects of Chinese civilization, while at the same time fighting with an extraordinary vigor to maintain their cultural identity and regain their national independence.
During the Tang Dynasty (6th-9th centuries AD), Vietnamese guerrillas fighting the Chinese sang a martial song that emphasized their separate identity in the clearest of terms:
Fight to keep our hair long,
Fight to keep our teeth black,
Fight to show that the heroic southern country can never be defeated.
For their part, the Chinese recognized the Vietnamese as a kindred people, to be offered the benefits of higher Chinese civilization and, ultimately, the rare privilege of being absorbed into the Chinese polity.
On the other hand, as near family, they were to be punished especially severely if they rejected Chinese standards or rebelled against Chinese control. This was made very clear in a remarkable message sent by the Song Emperor Taizong to King Le Hoan in AD 979, just over a decade after Vietnam first reasserted its independence.
Like a stern headmaster, Taizong appealed to Le Hoan to see reason and return to the Chinese fold: "Although your seas have pearls, we will throw them into the rivers, and though your mountains produce gold, we will throw it into the dust. We do not covet your valuables. You fly and leap like savages, we have horse-drawn carriages. You drink through your noses, we have rice and wine. Let us change your customs. You cut your hair, we wear hats; when you talk, you sound like birds. We have examinations and books. Let us teach you the knowledge of the proper laws ... Do you not want to escape from the savagery of the outer islands and gaze upon the house of civilization? Do you want to discard your garments of leaves and grass and wear flowered robes embroidered with mountains and dragons? Have you understood?"
In fact Le Hoan understood Taizong very well and, like his modern successors, knew exactly what he wanted from China - access to its culture and civilization without coming under its political control or jeopardizing Vietnamese freedom in any way. This attitude infuriated Taizong, as it would generations of Chinese to come.
In 1407, the Ming Empire managed to reassert Chinese control over its stubbornly independent southern neighbor, and Emperor Yongle - no doubt, to his mind, in the best interests of the Vietnamese - imposed a policy of enforced Sinicization. Predictably enough, Vietnam rejected this "kindness" and fought back, expelling the Chinese yet again in 1428.
Yongle was apoplectic when he learned of their rebellion. Vietnam was not just another tributary state, he insisted, but a former province that had once enjoyed the benefits of Chinese civilizationand yet had wantonly rejected this privilege. In view of this close association - Yongle used the term mi mi or "intimately related" - Vietnam's rebellion was particularly heinous and deserved the fiercest of punishments.
China on top
Sometimes a strongly sexual imagery creeps into this "intimate relationship", with Vietnam, the weaker partner, a victim of
Chinese violation. In AD 248, the Vietnamese heroine Lady Triu, who led a popular uprising against the Chinese occupation, proclaimed: "I want to ride the great winds, strike the sharks on the high seas, drive out the invaders, reconquer the nation, burst the bonds of slavery and never bow to become anyone's concubine."
Her defiant choice of words was more than just symbolic. Vietnam has long been a source of women for the Chinese sex trade. In Tang times, the Chinese poet Yuan Chen wrote appreciatively of "slave girls of Viet, sleek, of buttery flesh", while today the booming market for Vietnamese women in Taiwan infuriates and humiliates many Vietnamese men.
It's instructive, then, that in his 1987 novel Fired Gold Vietnamese author Nguyen Huy Thiep writes, "The most significant characteristics of this country are its smallness and weakness. She is like a virgin girl raped by Chinese civilization. The girl concurrently enjoys, despises and is humiliated by the rape."
This Chinese belief that Vietnam is not just another nation, but rather a member of the family - almost Chinese, aware of the blessings of Chinese civilization, but somehow stubbornly refusing, century after century, to become Chinese - has persisted down to the present day.
During the Second Indochina War, Chinese propaganda stressed that Vietnam and China were "as close as the lips and the teeth". After the US defeat, however, Vietnam once again showed its independence, allying itself with the Soviet Union, in 1978-79, invading neighboring Cambodia and overthrowing China's main ally in Southeast Asia, the Khmer Rouge.
Once again Chinese fury knew no bounds, and Beijing determined to teach the "ungrateful" Vietnamese a lesson. Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader, openly denounced the Vietnamese as "the hooligans of the East". According to one Thai diplomat: "The moment the topic of Vietnam came up, you could see something change in Deng Xiaoping.
"His hatred was just visceral. He spat forcefully into his spittoon and called the Vietnamese 'dogs'." Acting on Deng's orders, the Chinese army invaded Vietnam in 1979, capturing five northern provincial capitals before systematically demolishing them and withdrawing to China after administering a symbolic "lesson".
But who taught a lesson to whom? Beijing sought to force Hanoi to withdraw its frontline forces from Cambodia, but the Vietnamese didn't engage these forces in the struggle, choosing instead to confront the Chinese with irregulars and provincial militia. Casualties were about equal, and China lost considerable face, as well as international respect, as a result of its invasion.
Over the millennia, actions like this have taught the Vietnamese a recurring lesson about China. It's there, it's big, and it won't go away, so appease it without yielding whenever possible, and fight it with every resource available whenever necessary.
Just as Chinese rulers have seen the Vietnamese as ingrates and hooligans, so the Vietnamese have seen the Chinese as arrogant and aggressive, a power to be emulated at all times, mollified in times of peace, and fiercely resisted in times of war.
In 1946, 1,700 years after Lady Triu's declaration, another great Vietnamese patriot, Ho Chi Minh, warned his Viet Minh colleagues in forceful terms against using Chinese Nationalist troops in the north as a buffer against the return of the French: "You fools! Don't you realize what it means if the Chinese remain? Don't you remember your history?
"The last time the Chinese came, they stayed a thousand years. The French are foreigners. They are weak. Colonialism is dying. The white man is finished in Asia. But if the Chinese stay now, they will never go. As for me, I prefer to sniff French shit for five years than to eat Chinese shit for the rest of my life."
Yet Ho was an ardent admirer of Chinese civilization, fluent in Mandarin, a skilled calligrapher who wrote Chinese poetry, a close friend and colleague of Chinese leaders Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Ho wasn't as much anti-Chinese as he was pro-Vietnamese. It was his deep understanding of and respect for China that enabled him to recognize, clearly and definitively, the menace that "a close family relationship" with the giant to the north posed, and continues to pose, for Vietnam's independence and freedom.
It's ironic, then, that as the current Vietnamese leadership strive to develop their economy along increasingly capitalist lines while at the same time retaining their monopoly on state power, the country they most admire and seek to emulate is, as always, the one they most fear.
Andrew Forbes is editor of CPA Media as well as a correspondent in its Thailand bureau. He has recently completed National Geographic Traveler: Shanghai , and the above is an excerpt from his forthcoming book A Phoenix Reborn: Travels in New Vietnam.
(Copyright 2007 Andrew Forbes.)
Chinese Invasion of Vietnam
Chinese Invasion of Vietnam
February 1979
China's relations with Vietnam began to deteriorate seriously in the mid-1970s. After Vietnam joined the Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (Comecon) and signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1978, China branded Vietnam the "Cuba of the East" and called the treaty a military alliance. Incidents along the Sino-Vietnamese border increased in frequency and violence. In December 1978 Vietnam invaded Cambodia, quickly ousted the pro-Beijing Pol Pot regime, and overran the country.
China's twenty-nine-day incursion into Vietnam in February 1979 was a response to what China considered to be a collection of provocative actions and policies on Hanoi's part. These included Vietnamese intimacy with the Soviet Union, mistreatment of ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam, hegemonistic "imperial dreams" in Southeast Asia, and spurning of Beijing's attempt to repatriate Chinese residents of Vietnam to China.
In February 1979 China attacked along virtually the entire Sino-Vietnamese border in a brief, limited campaign that involved ground forces only. The Chinese attack came at dawn on the morning of 17 February 1979, and employed infantry, armor, and artillery. Air power was not employed then or at any time during the war. Within a day, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) had advanced some eight kilometers into Vietnam along a broad front. It then slowed and nearly stalled because of heavy Vietnamese resistance and difficulties within the Chinese supply system. On February 21, the advance resumed against Cao Bang in the far north and against the all-important regional hub of Lang Son. Chinese troops entered Cao Bang on February 27, but the city was not secured completely until March 2. Lang Son fell two days later. On March 5, the Chinese, saying Vietnam had been sufficiently chastised, announced that the campaign was over. Beijing declared its "lesson" finished and the PLA withdrawal was completed on March 16.
Hanoi's post-incursion depiction of the border war was that Beijing had sustained a military setback if not an outright defeat. Most observers doubted that China would risk another war with Vietnam in the near future. Gerald Segal, in his 1985 book Defending China, concluded that China's 1979 war against Vietnam was a complete failure: "China failed to force a Vietnamese withdrawal from [Cambodia], failed to end border clashes, failed to cast doubt on the strength of the Soviet power, failed to dispel the image of China as a paper tiger, and failed to draw the United States into an anti-Soviet coalition." Nevertheless, Bruce Elleman argued that "one of the primary diplomatic goals behind China's attack was to expose Soviet assurances of military support to Vietnam as a fraud. Seen in this light, Beijing's policy was actually a diplomatic success, since Moscow did not actively intervene, thus showing the practical limitations of the Soviet-Vietnamese military pact. ... China achieved a strategic victory by minimizing the future possibility of a two-front war against the USSR and Vietnam."
After the war both China and Vietnam reorganized their border defenses. In 1986 China deployed twenty-five to twenty-eight divisions and Vietnam thirty-two divisions along their common border.
The 1979 attack confirmed Hanoi's perception of China as a threat. The PAVN high command henceforth had to assume, for planning purposes, that the Chinese might come again and might not halt in the foothills but might drive on to Hanoi. The border war strengthened Soviet-Vietnamese relations. The Soviet military role in Vietnam increased during the 1980s as the Soviets provided arms to Vietnam; moreover, Soviet ships enjoyed access to the harbors at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay, and Soviet reconnaissance aircraft operated out of Vietnamese airfields. The Vietnamese responded to the Chinese campaign by turning the districts along the China border into "iron fortresses" manned by well-equipped and well-trained paramilitary troops. In all, an estimated 600,000 troops were assigned to counter Chinese operations and to stand ready for another Chinese invasion. The precise dimensions of the frontier operations were difficult to determine, but its monetary cost to Vietnam was considerable.
By 1987 China had stationed nine armies (approximately 400,000 troops) in the Sino-Vietnamese border region, including one along the coast. It had also increased its landing craft fleet and was periodically staging amphibious landing exercises off Hainan Island, across from Vietnam, thereby demonstrating that a future attack might come from the sea.
Low-level conflict continued along the Sino-Vietnamese border as each side conducted artillery shelling and probed to gain high spots in the mountainous border terrain. Border incidents increased in intensity during the rainy season, when Beijing attempted to ease Vietnamese pressure against Cambodian resistance fighters.
Since the early 1980s, China pursued what some observers described as a semi-secret campaign against Vietnam that was more than a series of border incidents and less than a limited small-scale war. The Vietnamese called it a "multifaceted war of sabotage." Hanoi officials have described the assaults as comprising steady harassment by artillery fire, intrusions on land by infantry patrols, naval intrusions, and mine planting both at sea and in the riverways. Chinese clandestine activity (the "sabotage" aspect) for the most part was directed against the ethnic minorities of the border region. According to the Hanoi press, teams of Chinese agents systematically sabotaged mountain agricultural production centers as well as lowland port, transportation, and communication facilities. Psychological warfare operations were an integral part of the campaign, as was what the Vietnamese called "economic warfare"--encouragement of Vietnamese villagers along the border to engage in smuggling, currency speculation, and hoarding of goods in short supply.
February 1979
China's relations with Vietnam began to deteriorate seriously in the mid-1970s. After Vietnam joined the Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (Comecon) and signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1978, China branded Vietnam the "Cuba of the East" and called the treaty a military alliance. Incidents along the Sino-Vietnamese border increased in frequency and violence. In December 1978 Vietnam invaded Cambodia, quickly ousted the pro-Beijing Pol Pot regime, and overran the country.
China's twenty-nine-day incursion into Vietnam in February 1979 was a response to what China considered to be a collection of provocative actions and policies on Hanoi's part. These included Vietnamese intimacy with the Soviet Union, mistreatment of ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam, hegemonistic "imperial dreams" in Southeast Asia, and spurning of Beijing's attempt to repatriate Chinese residents of Vietnam to China.
In February 1979 China attacked along virtually the entire Sino-Vietnamese border in a brief, limited campaign that involved ground forces only. The Chinese attack came at dawn on the morning of 17 February 1979, and employed infantry, armor, and artillery. Air power was not employed then or at any time during the war. Within a day, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) had advanced some eight kilometers into Vietnam along a broad front. It then slowed and nearly stalled because of heavy Vietnamese resistance and difficulties within the Chinese supply system. On February 21, the advance resumed against Cao Bang in the far north and against the all-important regional hub of Lang Son. Chinese troops entered Cao Bang on February 27, but the city was not secured completely until March 2. Lang Son fell two days later. On March 5, the Chinese, saying Vietnam had been sufficiently chastised, announced that the campaign was over. Beijing declared its "lesson" finished and the PLA withdrawal was completed on March 16.
Hanoi's post-incursion depiction of the border war was that Beijing had sustained a military setback if not an outright defeat. Most observers doubted that China would risk another war with Vietnam in the near future. Gerald Segal, in his 1985 book Defending China, concluded that China's 1979 war against Vietnam was a complete failure: "China failed to force a Vietnamese withdrawal from [Cambodia], failed to end border clashes, failed to cast doubt on the strength of the Soviet power, failed to dispel the image of China as a paper tiger, and failed to draw the United States into an anti-Soviet coalition." Nevertheless, Bruce Elleman argued that "one of the primary diplomatic goals behind China's attack was to expose Soviet assurances of military support to Vietnam as a fraud. Seen in this light, Beijing's policy was actually a diplomatic success, since Moscow did not actively intervene, thus showing the practical limitations of the Soviet-Vietnamese military pact. ... China achieved a strategic victory by minimizing the future possibility of a two-front war against the USSR and Vietnam."
After the war both China and Vietnam reorganized their border defenses. In 1986 China deployed twenty-five to twenty-eight divisions and Vietnam thirty-two divisions along their common border.
The 1979 attack confirmed Hanoi's perception of China as a threat. The PAVN high command henceforth had to assume, for planning purposes, that the Chinese might come again and might not halt in the foothills but might drive on to Hanoi. The border war strengthened Soviet-Vietnamese relations. The Soviet military role in Vietnam increased during the 1980s as the Soviets provided arms to Vietnam; moreover, Soviet ships enjoyed access to the harbors at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay, and Soviet reconnaissance aircraft operated out of Vietnamese airfields. The Vietnamese responded to the Chinese campaign by turning the districts along the China border into "iron fortresses" manned by well-equipped and well-trained paramilitary troops. In all, an estimated 600,000 troops were assigned to counter Chinese operations and to stand ready for another Chinese invasion. The precise dimensions of the frontier operations were difficult to determine, but its monetary cost to Vietnam was considerable.
By 1987 China had stationed nine armies (approximately 400,000 troops) in the Sino-Vietnamese border region, including one along the coast. It had also increased its landing craft fleet and was periodically staging amphibious landing exercises off Hainan Island, across from Vietnam, thereby demonstrating that a future attack might come from the sea.
Low-level conflict continued along the Sino-Vietnamese border as each side conducted artillery shelling and probed to gain high spots in the mountainous border terrain. Border incidents increased in intensity during the rainy season, when Beijing attempted to ease Vietnamese pressure against Cambodian resistance fighters.
Since the early 1980s, China pursued what some observers described as a semi-secret campaign against Vietnam that was more than a series of border incidents and less than a limited small-scale war. The Vietnamese called it a "multifaceted war of sabotage." Hanoi officials have described the assaults as comprising steady harassment by artillery fire, intrusions on land by infantry patrols, naval intrusions, and mine planting both at sea and in the riverways. Chinese clandestine activity (the "sabotage" aspect) for the most part was directed against the ethnic minorities of the border region. According to the Hanoi press, teams of Chinese agents systematically sabotaged mountain agricultural production centers as well as lowland port, transportation, and communication facilities. Psychological warfare operations were an integral part of the campaign, as was what the Vietnamese called "economic warfare"--encouragement of Vietnamese villagers along the border to engage in smuggling, currency speculation, and hoarding of goods in short supply.
越南的幸福指数
刚到越南24小时就感觉到了越南市井生活的悠闲和自在。河内街道熙熙攘攘，老建筑比比皆是，处处点缀着祠堂和小庙，门脸牌楼都写着中国字。踏板摩托车满大街乌央乌央地，像蝗虫一样，走路的行人一般都是像我这样的外来人口。
我在美国走在街上就算个“瘦子”，但走在河内大街上，绝对算吨位级的。这里路口都有越南人开小摩托车拉人的“摩的”。他们招呼我的时候，我心里想，等我坐到后座上，就根本性地改变了前后重量比，摩的是否能开走、保持平衡都成问题。
说这里熙熙攘攘，那感觉就像80年代在中国的广州和上海，那时候还没有大批的城市改造和重建，大资本还没有进来搞城市开发。老城虽然破旧，但是有人气，有传统特色，这是中国城市已经消失的东西。
在河内的朋友说，越南的幸福指数在世界的排名相当高，143个国家当中排第五。幸福指数是广大劳动人民的感受，虽然是主观的，但感受的人多了，就具有了客观性。据说这种幸福指数衡量了越南人民把自然资源转化成公民长远幸福生活的效率。
河内满大街的小摩托，我不知道世界那个城市拥有小摩托车的数量能够超过河内。这里的马路没有划什么单黄线，双黄线或红线这类的限制。河内的踏板摩托车在必要的时候可以逆行，可以上人行道，随便停车不用担心罚款。在欧美游客看来，乱是乱点，但似乎也没见什么交通事故。有惊无险，一切在越南人民掌控之中。
傍晚出去散步，城市到处是繁华的集市和摊贩。路边小馆子比比皆是，路边摆开桌椅，各种如美价廉物美的小吃和当地的啤酒。虽然没有奢华，但简陋中显得其乐融融。难怪有调查说，除了哥斯达黎加和加勒比海诸岛，就数越南人生活优哉游哉了。
我问了越南朋友，他们对我讲，并非他们不像搞像中国那样的城市改造，主要原因是没能像中国那样大规模招商引资，另外就是越南采取了不同的策略，即越南在保留老城区的基础上开辟新城和新开发区。
我在美国走在街上就算个“瘦子”，但走在河内大街上，绝对算吨位级的。这里路口都有越南人开小摩托车拉人的“摩的”。他们招呼我的时候，我心里想，等我坐到后座上，就根本性地改变了前后重量比，摩的是否能开走、保持平衡都成问题。
说这里熙熙攘攘，那感觉就像80年代在中国的广州和上海，那时候还没有大批的城市改造和重建，大资本还没有进来搞城市开发。老城虽然破旧，但是有人气，有传统特色，这是中国城市已经消失的东西。
在河内的朋友说，越南的幸福指数在世界的排名相当高，143个国家当中排第五。幸福指数是广大劳动人民的感受，虽然是主观的，但感受的人多了，就具有了客观性。据说这种幸福指数衡量了越南人民把自然资源转化成公民长远幸福生活的效率。
河内满大街的小摩托，我不知道世界那个城市拥有小摩托车的数量能够超过河内。这里的马路没有划什么单黄线，双黄线或红线这类的限制。河内的踏板摩托车在必要的时候可以逆行，可以上人行道，随便停车不用担心罚款。在欧美游客看来，乱是乱点，但似乎也没见什么交通事故。有惊无险，一切在越南人民掌控之中。
傍晚出去散步，城市到处是繁华的集市和摊贩。路边小馆子比比皆是，路边摆开桌椅，各种如美价廉物美的小吃和当地的啤酒。虽然没有奢华，但简陋中显得其乐融融。难怪有调查说，除了哥斯达黎加和加勒比海诸岛，就数越南人生活优哉游哉了。
我问了越南朋友，他们对我讲，并非他们不像搞像中国那样的城市改造，主要原因是没能像中国那样大规模招商引资，另外就是越南采取了不同的策略，即越南在保留老城区的基础上开辟新城和新开发区。
Friday 12 November 2010
Question : What is globalization?
Question : What is globalization?
Answer : Princess Diana's death
Question : How come?
Answer :
An English princess with an
Egyptian boyfriend crashes in a
French tunnel, driving a
German car with a
Dutch engine, driven by a
Belgian who was high on
Scottish whiskey, followed closely by
Italian Paparazzi, on
Japanese motorcycles, treated by an
American doctor, using
Brazilian medicines!
And this is sent to you by a
Canadian, using
Bill Gates' technology which he got from the
Japanese.
And you are probably reading this on
one of the IBM clones that use
Philippine-made chips, and
Korean made monitors, assembled by Bangladeshi
workers in a Singapore plant, transported by lorries
driven by Indians, hijacked by Indonesians and finally
sold to you by a Chinese!
That's Globalization!!!
Answer : Princess Diana's death
Question : How come?
Answer :
An English princess with an
Egyptian boyfriend crashes in a
French tunnel, driving a
German car with a
Dutch engine, driven by a
Belgian who was high on
Scottish whiskey, followed closely by
Italian Paparazzi, on
Japanese motorcycles, treated by an
American doctor, using
Brazilian medicines!
And this is sent to you by a
Canadian, using
Bill Gates' technology which he got from the
Japanese.
And you are probably reading this on
one of the IBM clones that use
Philippine-made chips, and
Korean made monitors, assembled by Bangladeshi
workers in a Singapore plant, transported by lorries
driven by Indians, hijacked by Indonesians and finally
sold to you by a Chinese!
That's Globalization!!!
Tuesday 9 November 2010
中国的微博，也就是中国的twitter
去新浪微博注册后看了些名人用户，文娱明星和名人，粉丝有好几百万的很随便。国内互联网发展迅猛，起码在数量上已经是世界独一无二。海外华文媒体和网站拿点击算成功，跟国内同行较劲，纯粹一帮2B二鬼子。按中国流行语，那叫输在起跑线上。
艾未未就算不被封，他吸引的点击估计不会超过芙蓉姐姐和黄健祥。文化名人估计和中国产业一样，可能有内向型和外向型两种。前者立足国内，吸引国内粉丝；后者面向世界，猛学英语，迎合西洋口味，制造国际轰动效应。
互联网上的博客和微博虽然有竞争的自由，但争取点击和粉丝，仍然要靠各种推手，也就是组织的力量。万类霜天竞自由似的民主，其中主宰或胜出的，仍然要依赖某种结构性力量。民主当中自由的个体性的虚幻破灭，民主也就烟消云散。
爱拿民主说事情的柿油党，特别是那些没有生活在西方民主制度下的空想柿油党，幻想民主的程度不亚于狂热大跃进中对共产主义的向往和迫不及待。
艾未未就算不被封，他吸引的点击估计不会超过芙蓉姐姐和黄健祥。文化名人估计和中国产业一样，可能有内向型和外向型两种。前者立足国内，吸引国内粉丝；后者面向世界，猛学英语，迎合西洋口味，制造国际轰动效应。
互联网上的博客和微博虽然有竞争的自由，但争取点击和粉丝，仍然要靠各种推手，也就是组织的力量。万类霜天竞自由似的民主，其中主宰或胜出的，仍然要依赖某种结构性力量。民主当中自由的个体性的虚幻破灭，民主也就烟消云散。
爱拿民主说事情的柿油党，特别是那些没有生活在西方民主制度下的空想柿油党，幻想民主的程度不亚于狂热大跃进中对共产主义的向往和迫不及待。
马悲鸣: 刘晓波领取诺贝尔和平奖之我见
一、索尔壬尼琴的先例
苏联作家亚力山大·索尔壬尼琴的《伊凡·捷尼索维奇一生中的一天》受到赫鲁晓夫的推崇，让他从此出名。该书有英译本，是本很薄的小册子。不管从艺术上，还是人文关怀上，都不如帕斯捷尔纳克的《日瓦格医生》。而《日瓦格医生》又比不上萧洛霍夫《静静的顿河》。
1964年赫鲁晓夫下台，“蘑菇云升起红戈壁”。1967年索尔壬尼琴给苏联第四次作家代表大会的代表们散发要求停止书报检查制度的「公开信」；之后他的作品难以在国内发表。1969年他被开除出苏联作家协会。同年四月，他和川端康成一起被选为美国艺术文艺学会的名誉会员。1970年10月“因他在追求俄罗斯文学不可缺少的传统时所具有的道德力量”获诺贝尔文学奖。当年索尔仁尼琴没有去领奖。1974年2月13日他被强行押上飞机，驱逐出境到西德，并被开除国籍。他也顺便前往斯德哥尔摩领取了四年前给他的诺贝尔奖金和奖状。美国政府也于同年授予他“美国荣誉公民”称号 。
1978年6月8日索尔壬尼琴在哈佛大学发表演讲，痛批西方社会的功利主义和自由主义。从此他不断指责西方道德堕落，甚至批评美国现代音乐令人难以忍受，并批评新闻媒体不加节制地侵犯个人隐私。他在《红轮三部曲》中阐述的理想是“以农业和手工业为基础”，依靠东正教，恢复“古老的俄罗斯生活方式”。
上世纪八十年代末期以后，苏联国内陆续出版了索尔仁尼琴原来遭禁的一些作品。1994年5月27日，索尔仁尼琴从美国佛蒙特州抵达海参崴，重返俄罗斯。可这时的苏联已经分裂成十九个国家。索尔仁尼琴回国后开始指责民主化以后的俄罗斯物欲横流和无法遏止的腐败；并对两千万平方公里的前苏联四分五裂痛心疾首。
晚年索尔仁尼琴对当年不遗余力地诋毁斯大林时代似有悔意，含糊承认当年斯大林同志是在带领整个苏联奔向前方。2008年8月3日深夜，索尔仁尼琴在莫斯科逝世，享年89岁。此时，他所愤怒抨击，并因此被开除国籍的苏联已经消失了17年之久。
有人说“索尔仁尼琴是上一代作家中最后一位代表良知的作家”。西方人则视其为与苏联当权者斗争的英雄和伟大文学家。但索尔仁尼琴同时抨击所有的民主派、资本家、个人消费者和自由主义者。美国国务卿基辛格曾在索尔仁尼琴流亡的上世纪七十年代警告时任总统福特不要接见索尔仁尼琴，并于备忘录上写道：“ 索尔仁尼琴是个著名作家，但他的政治主张是一件令追随他的异见者都觉得尴尬难堪的事。接见他不仅会得罪苏联，还会因其政治主张在美国及各盟国中引起论战。 ”
二、中国政府应该放刘晓波出国领奖
如今中国持不同政见的系狱者刘晓波获得诺贝尔和平奖。是否放他出国领奖成了中国政府手里的烫手山芋。我以为可以参考索尔壬尼琴的先例，不但放刘晓波出国领奖，而且禁止其重新入境。当年他坐完六四监后，曾出国访问，并顺利回国。中国政府没有给他设置任何障碍。但他不知改悔，仍是一波接一波地闹事。他在国内是个典型的不安定因素。把他驱逐出境，又说不出口。刘晓波是噎在中国政府嘴里的马粪，吃又吃不下去，吐又吐不出来。如今有个出境领奖的机会，正好可以把这块马粪吐出去。
缅甸的昂山·素姬就多次被动员出国领奖。她就是因怕回不了缅甸而坚决不去。现在海内外一起呼吁中国政府放刘晓波出国领奖，中国政府正好可以借此卖个顺水人情。只要出去，就别想再回来。
六四出逃人员和王丹、王军涛等保外出国者到了海外，没了根基，徒增民运内斗。所有民运宣传的，中国监狱虐待持不同政见者，如王丹得了脑瘤、王军涛肝炎要死、魏京生被暗中下了激素等，一到国外，经西方医生一检查，全都证明是谎言。刘晓波出国，也有澄清谣言的奇效。而且海外民运内斗不已。刘晓波在哪儿都是不安定因素，到了海外，自然也是海外民运的不安定因素。与其让刘晓波留在国内给政府添乱，不如放他出去和民运捣蛋。况且刘晓波手里这近一百五十万美元的现金，更是让海外民运痴迷者眼睛里出血。
911的当时，刘晓波就和包遵信等人给美国总统发信，声称∶今夜我们是美国人。
既然是美国人，就让他们回美国好了。美国一定会给刘晓波政治难民的身分，甚至和索尔壬尼琴一样，给他“美国荣誉公民”的称号。刘晓波手里有近一百五十万美元，买房子置地，象他这种自认生活放荡的人，再娶几房小老婆的钱都有了。
放刘晓波出国领奖享受生活，把节约出来的关押刘晓波的钱用来改善其他犯人的生活和给狱警发奖金，也算是沾了诺贝尔奖金的光嘛。
放刘晓波出境领奖的唯一坏处是要挨一段时间国际上的痛骂。其实只要装听不见，封堵住互联网上的消息，过些时候就没有声息了。然后就放大刘晓波在海外的放荡生活和引起海外民运内斗升级的消息。不出一年，刘晓波就要痛骂民运，不出三年就要痛骂资本主义，不出五年就要痛骂美国。刘晓波绝对耐不住寂寞。
三、刘晓波应该把奖金均分给六四死难者遗属以赎自己的罪过
夫人刘霞传出刘晓波的话，说这个奖是给六四亡灵的。不知刘晓波这话是真是假。他当然不会承认是假了。但如果是真，则这话如何兑现？
很简单，当年造成六四武装驱逐结果的三名现场责任人是出绝食主意的郑义、领队私占公共场地，非法割据的王丹，和最后为了投机出名，不惜再掀波澜，阻止撤退的刘晓波。我曾经著文呼吁这三个人自杀，以谢六四死难者于地下。结果是没一个真有自杀胆量的。刘晓波是压断骆驼脊梁的最后一根稻草。他对六四亡灵有着不可推卸的责任，也因此对六四亡灵遗属有不可推卸的赔偿责任。
当年洛杉矶暴乱也有死于流弹的过路民众。有记者质问时任总统老布什是否应该给以赔偿。老布什说不给。因为事先已经发布了实行紧急状态法的公告，要求民众待在家中，不要上街。政府尽到了发布警告之责，故对不服从者没有赔偿责任。
六四也一样。戒严令已经发布了两星期之久，可比洛杉矶暴乱发布预警的时间要长得多。武装驱逐开始前，政府再度发布要求市民待在家中，不要上街，否则后果自负的公告，在电视、电台和沿长安街大喇叭里不间断地高音重复发布，可谓仁至义尽。故六四亡灵即使不是蓄意抵抗戒严者，至少也是不服从警告者。政府尽到了警告之责，故不再有对不服从者的赔偿责任。
政府对六四亡灵遗属无赔偿之责，反而是刘晓波有赔偿之责。故刘晓波有义不容辞的责任用这笔诺贝尔奖金赔偿六四死难者遗属。小一百五十万美元折合成人民币大约值一千万。平均到两百名六四死难者，每户遗属可分得五万元人民币。
如果刘晓波均分了这笔奖金给六四亡灵遗属，我将不再敦促他自杀以谢六四死难者于地下。
这里顺便呼吁中国政府。六四死难者遗属都是和中国政府有血仇的。他们终生都不可能得到政府信任，不可能有任何政治上升迁的前途。尽管六四死难者都是不服从警告遇难的，但因为这是第一次城市武装平乱，他们没有经验。考虑到这一点，请中国政府法外施仁，放宽六四遗属出国谋生的限制，让他们离开中国，找刘晓波要钱去。
2010年11月7日 满山秋色
以上关于索尔壬尼琴的内容抄袭自维基百科有关条目，特此申明。
苏联作家亚力山大·索尔壬尼琴的《伊凡·捷尼索维奇一生中的一天》受到赫鲁晓夫的推崇，让他从此出名。该书有英译本，是本很薄的小册子。不管从艺术上，还是人文关怀上，都不如帕斯捷尔纳克的《日瓦格医生》。而《日瓦格医生》又比不上萧洛霍夫《静静的顿河》。
1964年赫鲁晓夫下台，“蘑菇云升起红戈壁”。1967年索尔壬尼琴给苏联第四次作家代表大会的代表们散发要求停止书报检查制度的「公开信」；之后他的作品难以在国内发表。1969年他被开除出苏联作家协会。同年四月，他和川端康成一起被选为美国艺术文艺学会的名誉会员。1970年10月“因他在追求俄罗斯文学不可缺少的传统时所具有的道德力量”获诺贝尔文学奖。当年索尔仁尼琴没有去领奖。1974年2月13日他被强行押上飞机，驱逐出境到西德，并被开除国籍。他也顺便前往斯德哥尔摩领取了四年前给他的诺贝尔奖金和奖状。美国政府也于同年授予他“美国荣誉公民”称号 。
1978年6月8日索尔壬尼琴在哈佛大学发表演讲，痛批西方社会的功利主义和自由主义。从此他不断指责西方道德堕落，甚至批评美国现代音乐令人难以忍受，并批评新闻媒体不加节制地侵犯个人隐私。他在《红轮三部曲》中阐述的理想是“以农业和手工业为基础”，依靠东正教，恢复“古老的俄罗斯生活方式”。
上世纪八十年代末期以后，苏联国内陆续出版了索尔仁尼琴原来遭禁的一些作品。1994年5月27日，索尔仁尼琴从美国佛蒙特州抵达海参崴，重返俄罗斯。可这时的苏联已经分裂成十九个国家。索尔仁尼琴回国后开始指责民主化以后的俄罗斯物欲横流和无法遏止的腐败；并对两千万平方公里的前苏联四分五裂痛心疾首。
晚年索尔仁尼琴对当年不遗余力地诋毁斯大林时代似有悔意，含糊承认当年斯大林同志是在带领整个苏联奔向前方。2008年8月3日深夜，索尔仁尼琴在莫斯科逝世，享年89岁。此时，他所愤怒抨击，并因此被开除国籍的苏联已经消失了17年之久。
有人说“索尔仁尼琴是上一代作家中最后一位代表良知的作家”。西方人则视其为与苏联当权者斗争的英雄和伟大文学家。但索尔仁尼琴同时抨击所有的民主派、资本家、个人消费者和自由主义者。美国国务卿基辛格曾在索尔仁尼琴流亡的上世纪七十年代警告时任总统福特不要接见索尔仁尼琴，并于备忘录上写道：“ 索尔仁尼琴是个著名作家，但他的政治主张是一件令追随他的异见者都觉得尴尬难堪的事。接见他不仅会得罪苏联，还会因其政治主张在美国及各盟国中引起论战。 ”
二、中国政府应该放刘晓波出国领奖
如今中国持不同政见的系狱者刘晓波获得诺贝尔和平奖。是否放他出国领奖成了中国政府手里的烫手山芋。我以为可以参考索尔壬尼琴的先例，不但放刘晓波出国领奖，而且禁止其重新入境。当年他坐完六四监后，曾出国访问，并顺利回国。中国政府没有给他设置任何障碍。但他不知改悔，仍是一波接一波地闹事。他在国内是个典型的不安定因素。把他驱逐出境，又说不出口。刘晓波是噎在中国政府嘴里的马粪，吃又吃不下去，吐又吐不出来。如今有个出境领奖的机会，正好可以把这块马粪吐出去。
缅甸的昂山·素姬就多次被动员出国领奖。她就是因怕回不了缅甸而坚决不去。现在海内外一起呼吁中国政府放刘晓波出国领奖，中国政府正好可以借此卖个顺水人情。只要出去，就别想再回来。
六四出逃人员和王丹、王军涛等保外出国者到了海外，没了根基，徒增民运内斗。所有民运宣传的，中国监狱虐待持不同政见者，如王丹得了脑瘤、王军涛肝炎要死、魏京生被暗中下了激素等，一到国外，经西方医生一检查，全都证明是谎言。刘晓波出国，也有澄清谣言的奇效。而且海外民运内斗不已。刘晓波在哪儿都是不安定因素，到了海外，自然也是海外民运的不安定因素。与其让刘晓波留在国内给政府添乱，不如放他出去和民运捣蛋。况且刘晓波手里这近一百五十万美元的现金，更是让海外民运痴迷者眼睛里出血。
911的当时，刘晓波就和包遵信等人给美国总统发信，声称∶今夜我们是美国人。
既然是美国人，就让他们回美国好了。美国一定会给刘晓波政治难民的身分，甚至和索尔壬尼琴一样，给他“美国荣誉公民”的称号。刘晓波手里有近一百五十万美元，买房子置地，象他这种自认生活放荡的人，再娶几房小老婆的钱都有了。
放刘晓波出国领奖享受生活，把节约出来的关押刘晓波的钱用来改善其他犯人的生活和给狱警发奖金，也算是沾了诺贝尔奖金的光嘛。
放刘晓波出境领奖的唯一坏处是要挨一段时间国际上的痛骂。其实只要装听不见，封堵住互联网上的消息，过些时候就没有声息了。然后就放大刘晓波在海外的放荡生活和引起海外民运内斗升级的消息。不出一年，刘晓波就要痛骂民运，不出三年就要痛骂资本主义，不出五年就要痛骂美国。刘晓波绝对耐不住寂寞。
三、刘晓波应该把奖金均分给六四死难者遗属以赎自己的罪过
夫人刘霞传出刘晓波的话，说这个奖是给六四亡灵的。不知刘晓波这话是真是假。他当然不会承认是假了。但如果是真，则这话如何兑现？
很简单，当年造成六四武装驱逐结果的三名现场责任人是出绝食主意的郑义、领队私占公共场地，非法割据的王丹，和最后为了投机出名，不惜再掀波澜，阻止撤退的刘晓波。我曾经著文呼吁这三个人自杀，以谢六四死难者于地下。结果是没一个真有自杀胆量的。刘晓波是压断骆驼脊梁的最后一根稻草。他对六四亡灵有着不可推卸的责任，也因此对六四亡灵遗属有不可推卸的赔偿责任。
当年洛杉矶暴乱也有死于流弹的过路民众。有记者质问时任总统老布什是否应该给以赔偿。老布什说不给。因为事先已经发布了实行紧急状态法的公告，要求民众待在家中，不要上街。政府尽到了发布警告之责，故对不服从者没有赔偿责任。
六四也一样。戒严令已经发布了两星期之久，可比洛杉矶暴乱发布预警的时间要长得多。武装驱逐开始前，政府再度发布要求市民待在家中，不要上街，否则后果自负的公告，在电视、电台和沿长安街大喇叭里不间断地高音重复发布，可谓仁至义尽。故六四亡灵即使不是蓄意抵抗戒严者，至少也是不服从警告者。政府尽到了警告之责，故不再有对不服从者的赔偿责任。
政府对六四亡灵遗属无赔偿之责，反而是刘晓波有赔偿之责。故刘晓波有义不容辞的责任用这笔诺贝尔奖金赔偿六四死难者遗属。小一百五十万美元折合成人民币大约值一千万。平均到两百名六四死难者，每户遗属可分得五万元人民币。
如果刘晓波均分了这笔奖金给六四亡灵遗属，我将不再敦促他自杀以谢六四死难者于地下。
这里顺便呼吁中国政府。六四死难者遗属都是和中国政府有血仇的。他们终生都不可能得到政府信任，不可能有任何政治上升迁的前途。尽管六四死难者都是不服从警告遇难的，但因为这是第一次城市武装平乱，他们没有经验。考虑到这一点，请中国政府法外施仁，放宽六四遗属出国谋生的限制，让他们离开中国，找刘晓波要钱去。
2010年11月7日 满山秋色
以上关于索尔壬尼琴的内容抄袭自维基百科有关条目，特此申明。
Monday 8 November 2010
zt: How could Ai Weiwei POSSIBLY have been the "C0-DESIGNER" of the Birds Nest stadium?
The invitation to bid process began in 2001, bids were submitted, models were made, exhibitions of the models held, votes were cast and the winning birds nest design by Herzog and De Meuron working with leading Chinese architect Li Xinggang of China Architecture Design and Research Group (CADG) was confirmed by end of March / beginning of April 2003 ......... as is confirmed here:
Beijing National Stadium
and on this contemporaneous New York blog where the design was being discussed on 31 March 2003.......
Beijing Olympic Stadium (the "Bird's Nest") - by Herzog & de Meuron
Note the title of the thread: Beijing Olympic Stadium (the "BIRDS NEST") - by Herzog & de Meuron
AND YET
According to various sources - including Wikipedia - Ai Weiwei's role as "Artistic Consultant" began with a meeting in Basel in APRIL 2003 - so I ask again, despite the endless retrospective credits to and claims by Ai Weiwei as either 'designer' or 'co-designer' of the stadium - HOW IS THIS POSSIBLE? Has anyone actually spoken to Herzog & De Meuron or Li Xingang about that?
* * * * * * * *
Some of us are only interested in trying to get at the TRUTH about Ai Weiwei and his motivations. There are plenty of genuine dissidents in China worthy of your praise and sympathy - speak to human rights organisations, they'll give you a list.
However, I strongly suspect that Ai Weiwei is NOT one of them. I think there are good reasons to suspect that he cynically exploits the Western Media's appetite for anti-Chinese government stories for his own purposes. I think there are good reasons to suspect that he also callously exploits other peoples misery (within China) to further his own fame and artistic career.
Many genuine critics of the Chinese government are doing so because they have good reason to believe in their cause - i.e. schoolteachers in Sichuan complaining about the alleged school buildings scandal. Some of them end up falling foul of the authorities but Ai Weiwei has made himself a very rich man.
I believe that there are many claims made by Ai Weiwei which deserve closer inspection, for example:
- His claim (or at least lack of denial) that he was the designer or co-designer of the birds nest stadium, thus boosting his 'art' career in the first place.
- His claim that his brain Haemorrhage in 'Germany in September 2009 was directly linked to what he later described as a "severe beating" by chinese police in Sichuan one month earlier on the 12th August (there is even an article in the Guardian dated 12th August based on an Associated Press report quoting Ai Weiwei as saying that there "was a scuffle" in which he received a "punch on the chin" (the Guardian article is here - read the quotation from Ai further down the page) - how did this "punch on the chin" escalate to the "severe beating" including "heavy blows to the head"?
This link between the punch on the chin and the brain haemorrhage a month later is now reported without question in the media.
- What was Ai Weiwei doing in Sichuan / Chengdu anyway? He said he wanted to show support at the trial of Tan Zuoren but he had had nothing to do with the Earthquake or its victims in spring 2008 or Zuoren. He LATER said he was trying to embarass the Chinese government by publishing the names of child victims on his website but that didn't happen until March / April 2009 and the Chinese government published the names anyway in April 2009? So why would they have been embarassed?
The more you look into Ai Weiwei's activities, the less credible his claims really seem - such a shame for those genuine voices of concern he is blotting out by his continual media shouting.
by PantsOnFire2
shakinwilly, 8 November 2010 7:31AM
Ai Wei Wei - For someone lacking democratic rights you get an awful lot of air time. And your government seems content with that.
Beijing National Stadium
and on this contemporaneous New York blog where the design was being discussed on 31 March 2003.......
Beijing Olympic Stadium (the "Bird's Nest") - by Herzog & de Meuron
Note the title of the thread: Beijing Olympic Stadium (the "BIRDS NEST") - by Herzog & de Meuron
AND YET
According to various sources - including Wikipedia - Ai Weiwei's role as "Artistic Consultant" began with a meeting in Basel in APRIL 2003 - so I ask again, despite the endless retrospective credits to and claims by Ai Weiwei as either 'designer' or 'co-designer' of the stadium - HOW IS THIS POSSIBLE? Has anyone actually spoken to Herzog & De Meuron or Li Xingang about that?
* * * * * * * *
Some of us are only interested in trying to get at the TRUTH about Ai Weiwei and his motivations. There are plenty of genuine dissidents in China worthy of your praise and sympathy - speak to human rights organisations, they'll give you a list.
However, I strongly suspect that Ai Weiwei is NOT one of them. I think there are good reasons to suspect that he cynically exploits the Western Media's appetite for anti-Chinese government stories for his own purposes. I think there are good reasons to suspect that he also callously exploits other peoples misery (within China) to further his own fame and artistic career.
Many genuine critics of the Chinese government are doing so because they have good reason to believe in their cause - i.e. schoolteachers in Sichuan complaining about the alleged school buildings scandal. Some of them end up falling foul of the authorities but Ai Weiwei has made himself a very rich man.
I believe that there are many claims made by Ai Weiwei which deserve closer inspection, for example:
- His claim (or at least lack of denial) that he was the designer or co-designer of the birds nest stadium, thus boosting his 'art' career in the first place.
- His claim that his brain Haemorrhage in 'Germany in September 2009 was directly linked to what he later described as a "severe beating" by chinese police in Sichuan one month earlier on the 12th August (there is even an article in the Guardian dated 12th August based on an Associated Press report quoting Ai Weiwei as saying that there "was a scuffle" in which he received a "punch on the chin" (the Guardian article is here - read the quotation from Ai further down the page) - how did this "punch on the chin" escalate to the "severe beating" including "heavy blows to the head"?
This link between the punch on the chin and the brain haemorrhage a month later is now reported without question in the media.
- What was Ai Weiwei doing in Sichuan / Chengdu anyway? He said he wanted to show support at the trial of Tan Zuoren but he had had nothing to do with the Earthquake or its victims in spring 2008 or Zuoren. He LATER said he was trying to embarass the Chinese government by publishing the names of child victims on his website but that didn't happen until March / April 2009 and the Chinese government published the names anyway in April 2009? So why would they have been embarassed?
The more you look into Ai Weiwei's activities, the less credible his claims really seem - such a shame for those genuine voices of concern he is blotting out by his continual media shouting.
by PantsOnFire2
shakinwilly, 8 November 2010 7:31AM
Ai Wei Wei - For someone lacking democratic rights you get an awful lot of air time. And your government seems content with that.
Thursday 4 November 2010
马悲鸣:我欣赏民运拉杆子打游击搞武装斗争
六四已经过去二十年了，民运还这般没起色。当年的八九民运效法的是「杨志卖刀」里的牛二。共产党是杨志，政权就是那把宝刀。这帮牛二学生想要杨志那把宝刀，又不敢明抢，就逼杨志拿自己的脑袋试刀。牛二料定杨志不敢真砍，那把宝刀就可无尝归他了。没想到那杨志给老钟经略相公干过，在边庭上一刀一枪见识过真家伙，哪吃牛二这一套，真被逼急了，只好应牛二的要求拿他脑袋试了刀。
八九年的学生也是如此，料定政府不敢开枪，便步步紧逼，终于逼得政府实在不得已被迫开枪了。这帮没用学生这一通鬼哭狼嚎。问题是政府已经退到最后一步，除了武装驱逐，就只有交出政权和自己的脑袋了。
学生也挺没意思的，让人家杀成那个样儿，居然二十年来还是不住嘴地喊冤。
有什么好喊的？
要么承认自己非法，活该挨杀。要么抄家伙给政府干！
王震老将军说过∶“共产党的天下是牺牲了两千万人换来的。你们想要，也拿两千万颗人头来换。”
这话说得难听，却是实话。哪有个让人家杀成那样了，还哭哭啼啼逼人家平反的。
中共什么时候逼国民党给四一二平反了？什么时候逼蒋介石给皖南事变平反了？
四一二发生在1927年，二十年之后就是1947年，解放军已经发展了数百万人的武装力量和大片根据地，正在准备大反攻。可这帮废物点心的六四学生，哭了二十年，一条枪的武装也没拉起来，就只会喊冤叫屈。现在又想出了一条证明中共政权非法的胡言乱语。
如果民运想证明政府违宪，则必是承认中共的宪法合法。如果中共的宪法合法，则戒严法就在宪法之内，则戒严合法。
陈小平搜肠刮肚想出了个国务院组织法里有个重大决策要集体讨论这么一条，非说李鹏的戒严令没经过讨论。问题是你陈小平怎么知道没经过讨论？当时的戒严是严格按宪法程序来的。戒严令里都写明了根据的是宪法某条某款。
如果民运说政府违宪，则就等于承认中共的宪法合法，那么政府的被迫武装驱逐就是合法的。如果民运否定中共政权的合法性，那么没有了法律也就无所谓非法。自然政府的武装驱逐就谈不上非法。不管民运是否承认中共政权的合法性，都无法证明政府非法。
中共不管承认不承认国民党政权的合法性，都自己拉杆子和政府干，最后把天下打下来了。国民党不管承认不承认北洋政府的合法性，也自己拉杆子和政府干，也曾把天下打下来过。
民运要想干点让人佩服的事，就只有指着国共两党说，他们两党能武装斗争夺天下，我们也能！
回国拉杆子和政府干去。不管占住广州还是井岗山，发动群众，筹集饷械，斗村干部，杀贪官污吏，多干些大快人心的事迹，在民间广为传诵，吸引广大青年才俊的加入。等你们把天下打下来了，我自然会替你们说话。
当然了，要是被逮着上雨花台刑场也别叫屈。怎么也得来段“我手执钢鞭将你打”吧。还有“二十年后又是一条好汉”。
等民运胜利了，自然会追认你们是民运烈士，让少年儿童向你们的墓碑行礼。
就这么哭哭啼啼二十年，一辈子也别想让人瞧得起你们。
八九年的学生也是如此，料定政府不敢开枪，便步步紧逼，终于逼得政府实在不得已被迫开枪了。这帮没用学生这一通鬼哭狼嚎。问题是政府已经退到最后一步，除了武装驱逐，就只有交出政权和自己的脑袋了。
学生也挺没意思的，让人家杀成那个样儿，居然二十年来还是不住嘴地喊冤。
有什么好喊的？
要么承认自己非法，活该挨杀。要么抄家伙给政府干！
王震老将军说过∶“共产党的天下是牺牲了两千万人换来的。你们想要，也拿两千万颗人头来换。”
这话说得难听，却是实话。哪有个让人家杀成那样了，还哭哭啼啼逼人家平反的。
中共什么时候逼国民党给四一二平反了？什么时候逼蒋介石给皖南事变平反了？
四一二发生在1927年，二十年之后就是1947年，解放军已经发展了数百万人的武装力量和大片根据地，正在准备大反攻。可这帮废物点心的六四学生，哭了二十年，一条枪的武装也没拉起来，就只会喊冤叫屈。现在又想出了一条证明中共政权非法的胡言乱语。
如果民运想证明政府违宪，则必是承认中共的宪法合法。如果中共的宪法合法，则戒严法就在宪法之内，则戒严合法。
陈小平搜肠刮肚想出了个国务院组织法里有个重大决策要集体讨论这么一条，非说李鹏的戒严令没经过讨论。问题是你陈小平怎么知道没经过讨论？当时的戒严是严格按宪法程序来的。戒严令里都写明了根据的是宪法某条某款。
如果民运说政府违宪，则就等于承认中共的宪法合法，那么政府的被迫武装驱逐就是合法的。如果民运否定中共政权的合法性，那么没有了法律也就无所谓非法。自然政府的武装驱逐就谈不上非法。不管民运是否承认中共政权的合法性，都无法证明政府非法。
中共不管承认不承认国民党政权的合法性，都自己拉杆子和政府干，最后把天下打下来了。国民党不管承认不承认北洋政府的合法性，也自己拉杆子和政府干，也曾把天下打下来过。
民运要想干点让人佩服的事，就只有指着国共两党说，他们两党能武装斗争夺天下，我们也能！
回国拉杆子和政府干去。不管占住广州还是井岗山，发动群众，筹集饷械，斗村干部，杀贪官污吏，多干些大快人心的事迹，在民间广为传诵，吸引广大青年才俊的加入。等你们把天下打下来了，我自然会替你们说话。
当然了，要是被逮着上雨花台刑场也别叫屈。怎么也得来段“我手执钢鞭将你打”吧。还有“二十年后又是一条好汉”。
等民运胜利了，自然会追认你们是民运烈士，让少年儿童向你们的墓碑行礼。
就这么哭哭啼啼二十年，一辈子也别想让人瞧得起你们。
Wednesday 3 November 2010
Under the Influence: Overseas Chinese-Language Media
H.W.
A media analyst sheds light on the concessions made by Western media companies in exchange for entry into the Chinese market.
Translated by Dušanka Miščević
Just as the world has favored the China market because of the country’s rapid economic growth, the foreign news media have also attached great importance to China’s media market on account of its large population and enormous potential. Yet for the past 30 years the opening and growth of the Chinese economy has not enabled economic development to bring about political democratization. As the Tsinghua University scholar Qin Hui (秦晖) puts it, China’s economic opening and market reform are a process of two-way influence: China is not just being influenced by the West, but also exerting influence upon Western institutions. Namely, the so-called China factor—China’s low human rights advantage—forms a challenge to the social welfare and rights of workers in Western countries; and China’s economic development affects global capitalism. In the same way, China’s news and public opinion marketplace, which is controlled and monopolized by the state, is also influencing Western media companies attempting to enter the China market. Many Western media outlets are paying the price of sacrificing some of their principles in order to gain entry.
The Internet companies Yahoo! and Google both made compromises with the Chinese government in terms of Internet censorship in order to enter China’s market. The international media mogul Rupert Murdoch, who attempted to break into the China market, recently ceded the controlling stake in Star Greater China1—a tactical adjustment after his great effort to enter China was thwarted. Murdoch’s News Corporation had acquired a majority stake in the Hong Kong-based Star TV satellite network in 1993, and had removed BBC World Service Television (now BBC World News) from the network in 1994, pandering to the Chinese government. This move had led to extensive criticism, but such accommodation of the Chinese authorities’ muzzling of the press apparently did not yield the business opportunities for which he had hoped.
Pan-Nationalism
China’s control of the news and state monopoly of the media market render ineffective the business development tactics of the chiefly market-oriented Western media companies that cater to the demands of their target audiences. But the control and monopoly apparently did not stop Western media, such as the BBC, from attempting to penetrate China’s market through commercial channels. For example, various overseas Chinese-language media, such as BBC Chinese and Deutsche Welle’s Chinese service, cannot help falling under the influence of yet another factor in their reporting on China, namely, the ever-growing Chinese pan-nationalism or pan-patriotism.
This transnational pan-nationalism chiefly expresses itself in the increased identification with and even loyalty to the Chinese state on the part of overseas Chinese, in the broad context of China’s ever-increasing economic power, particularly since the Western financial crisis, which has strengthened their confidence in China’s inexorable growth and power. The upsurge of nationalism on the Internet triggered by the support for—as well as the opposition to—the Tibetan protests before and after the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games demonstrated that Chinese nationalism directed against the West often goes hand-in-hand with conspiracy theories that the West is anti-China and that the Western media demonize China.
This kind of pan-nationalism can interfere with the judgment of news professionals in their reporting on China and even prevent news organizations from performing their proper functions, which are to promote freedom of information, report the truth, and scrupulously abide by the journalistic principles of independence, fairness, and honesty. The 2008 controversy surrounding opinions expressed by Zhang Danhong (张丹红) of Deutsche Welle’s Chinese-Language Radio Department is a prominent example.
On the eve of the opening of the Beijing Olympic Games, Zhang, the deputy director of the Chinese- Language Radio Department at Deutsche Welle, said in an interview with a German TV station that China has lifted 400 million people out of poverty and that this shows that “the Communist Party of China (CPC) has made a bigger contribution to the implementation of Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights than any other political force in the world.” Regarding the question of Chinese authorities’ blocking of the websites of Free Tibet and Falun Gong, she said, “You cannot open child pornography or extreme right-wing political party websites in Germany either.”2
Zhang Danhong’s opinions provoked intense criticism among Chinese dissidents and in German political circles. Under the pressure of public opinion, Deutsche Welle suspended Zhang Danhong’s duties in its Chinese-Language Radio Department. An intense debate ensued among the reporters of the Deutsche Welle Chinese-Language Radio Department itself as to whether Deutsche Welle’s Chinese-language reporting on China had displayed Chinese nationalist tendencies and lost its objectivity and neutrality.
Business Logic
In addition to the political leanings factor, the Western Chinese-language media’s reporting on China also suffers from the pressure of commercialization. For a long time, Western news organizations have been under pressure to become commercial, which has put a constant squeeze on genuine news reporting. After the financial crisis developed, this trend has become even more pronounced. Not even the BBC World Service could escape it.
In 2011, the funding for the BBC World Service will be decreased by one-fourth. The broadcast had already cut service in ten languages in 2005, saving £12 million [$18.6 million]. This year, it had to cut an additional £7.7 million [$12 million] in spending due to a funding shortage and a substantial depreciation of the pound.3
Financial pressures and business performance of news organizations are causing news reporting to be treated as a product aimed at the Chinese market. When the number of clicks and audience ratings become the primary standard for measuring a director’s performance, and even if the department in which that broadcaster works can survive layoffs, the fight to have the Chinese authorities lift Internet blocking and stop jamming shortwave broadcasts has direct bearing on the survival and the chance of promotion of any broadcaster who targets Chinese audiences. The BBC World Service management has set a hard target for the BBC’s Chinese-language website and those in other foreign languages to double the number of Internet users within a year and quadruple that of mobile phone customers.
The Self-Censorship Trend
Faced with the internal pressure of click-counting and the external pressure of China’s site-blocking, combined with insufficient human resources, the BBC Chinese- language website department transferred valuable resources to an apolitical webpage that the Chinese authorities could tolerate in order to increase the volume of clicks. With it, BBC went looking for cooperative partners in China, providing Chinese websites with culture and entertainment trivia, thus increasing the number of clicks on the BBC’s Chinese-language website. According to a staff member, in order to avoid angering Chinese authorities, BBC resorted to deleting sensitive contents from its interviews. Wang Weiluo (王维洛), a water conservation expert who lives in Germany, expressed resentment when the part of his 2006 interview in which he criticized Chinese authorities was abridged.
In addition, the BBC’s Chinese-language website has eliminated “The China Forum” (中国丛谈)—the program of in-depth analysis of China’s current affairs that had long been well-received by listeners and readers but viewed with hostility by Chinese authorities. This kind of self-censorship weakens the reporting on and analysis of sensitive political topics, and, to a certain degree, avoids sensitive subjects, such as political dissent and the Falun Gong.
In order to break into the Chinese market and have Chinese authorities lift Internet blocking, the BBC’s senior managers and editors have become product salespersons, repeatedly heading to China on public relations and sales-promotion junkets. At the same time, China’s propaganda and media officials, including embassy diplomats overseas, are treated as legitimate representatives of Chinese consumers and have become the guests of honor at news organizations, exerting influence on the overseas media reporting on China. At a time when Chinese authorities are suppressing freedom of the press and blocking the Internet, BBC executives repeatedly take part in various foreign propaganda activities organized by the Chinese government, such as the 2009 World Media Summit (世界媒体峰会) in Beijing among other media publicity events. In so doing, they become ornaments in China’s external propaganda and public relations efforts.
Officials in charge of the relevant departments of the Chinese government and diplomats at China’s missions abroad have used cooperation and even the granting of press visas as bait in an attempt to exert influence on the direction of the BBC’s Chinese-language website reporting. The most prominent example is the complaint of Tibetan exiles that the BBC’s Chinese-language website altered the interview with the Tibetan spiritual leader-in-exile, the Dalai Lama, without authorization, so as to accommodate China’s news censorship.
BBC “Mends Its Ways”
Last year, the BBC interviewed the Dalai Lama and quoted him as saying that the Tibetan issue is a Chinese domestic problem, and used this as the headline of its web article.4 At the time, even China’s Global Times (环球时报), which is consistently fond of producing reporting that stirs nationalism, discovered from the BBC report that the Dalai Lama had not taken such a position and raised questions. The nationalist website Anti-CNN.com, which claims to fight against Western anti-China propaganda, went as far as posting an article praising BBC for “mending its ways.” The editor of the BBC’s Chinese-language website himself explained that his website is cautious in its reporting, and that it had sent the sensitive program containing the interview with the Dalai Lama to the Chinese embassy for officials to look over and to seek their opinions, winning praise from the embassy.
Wielding the increasing strength of the national economy, Chinese government authorities not only monopolize domestic public opinion and restrict freedom of the press, but also use economic enticements to influence overseas news media in an attempt to challenge the universal values of democracy and freedom. In attempting to enter the China market, the overseas media, and, in particular, the Chinese-language overseas media—which internally are under economic pressure to produce performance results and externally have to deal with Internet blocking and news control by the Chinese government—are quite likely to yield on the news reporting principles by which they have always abided, in exchange for the Chinese authorities’ lifting Internet blocking.
Endnotes
1. In August 2010, Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation sold a controlling stake in Star Greater China (星空卫视) to China Media Capital, a private equity fund backed by the Chinese government. See Nick Clark, “Murdoch Cedes Control of Chinese TV Channels,” The Independent, August 10, 2010,http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/murdoch-cedes-control-of-chinese-tvchannels-2048034.html. ^
2. Wen Jing [文婧], “Zhong Weiguang: Zhang Danhong bei tingbo hehu yanlunziyou” [仲維光：張丹紅被停播合乎言論自由], Epoch Times [大紀元], September 14, 2008,http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/8/9/14/n2262723.htm. ^
3. While BBC faces cuts, its average employees are facing large-scale layoffs, their pension funds are in the red by large margins, and their retirement and welfare benefits have been substantially reduced. Yet the BBC executives are continuing to devise every possible way to raise their own salaries and are using public money to set up huge additional pensions for themselves. The salary of the BBC’s director-general was ten times that of an average employee 20 years ago, and has now grown to 30-40 times that. The deputy director-general’s pension is famously the highest in the UK public sector. See Jenni Russell, “This is the BBC—ruled by greed at the top,” The Sunday Times, August 1, 2010. That such scandals should be taking place at BBC, which regularly reports on the corruption of Chinese officials, has not only destroyed the confidence of its staff in the BBC leadership but also further weakened public support for this publicly-funded news organization. ^
4. Shirong Chen, “Tibet ‘Chinese Issue’ Says Dalai,” British Broadcasting Corporation, August 10, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/8194138.stm. The article quotes the Dalai Lama as saying, “The Chinese government considers our problem a domestic one. And we also.” ^
Tuesday 2 November 2010
go to Europe instead of India
When God closes a door, he will open another window for you. The door to india looks like closing fast(license Raj), there is always an open road to Europe. An alternative plan/way out ready always helps. Cross channel ferry, sat-navigator, cross europe AA breakdown insurance, my dear old 4-wheeled toyota is more comfortable than my new 2-wheeled honda for long distance tour.
Sunday 31 October 2010
马悲鸣：重贴骂刘晓波的旧文
骂刘晓波的有三个流派。其一是《抓住刘晓波的黑手》作者代表的中国政府。其二是海内外和刘晓波矛盾重重的民运内斗各派。其三就是我。如今刘晓波忽然得了诺贝尔和平奖，让人有点儿哭笑不得。
中国政府提高骂刘晓波的分贝不难理解。海外民运出于嫉妒，接着骂他也不难理解。但这个结果给我出了难题。如果我接着骂他，则很容易被人理解成吃醋。而如果就此不再骂他，则很容易被人理解成被诺贝尔奖的名头吓住了。其实我只相信诺贝尔科学奖项，那多是真功夫，并不大看中文学奖，尤其和平奖。但自从去年科学奖给了光导纤维和今年给了试管婴儿，就已经显示出近年诺贝尔委员会科学鉴赏力的衰退。
诺贝尔科学奖应该奖给理论突破者，比如奖杨振宁、李政道，而不奖吴健雄；奖核磁共振的理论发现者，而不奖核磁共振临床使用技术的发明人。核磁共振仪、光导纤维和试管婴儿都是技术，而搞技术的都能通过技术赚大钱，不缺诺贝尔奖这么点儿钱花。以前的诺贝尔科学奖项常有不被同行认同，研究经费不继，实验室面临关门者因为诺贝尔奖金而救急，而继续项目研究的；比如前几年在科罗拉多大学波德分校一名生物教授发现RNA在一定结构下能有催化获奖作用就属此例。可如今的诺贝尔科学奖多成了锦上添花而少有雪中送炭的了。
我是因为下乡时看了《静静的顿河》而由衷地佩服过诺贝尔文学奖。但改革开放之初买了套《历届诺贝尔文学奖作品汇编》才发现文学奖都是盛名之下，其实难附，几乎没什么可读性。后来日本三流色情小说家大江健三郎获奖，让诺贝尔文学奖在日本大掉其价。等到高行健获奖，我不知道诺贝尔文学奖是否在中国掉价，但至少在我这里是掉到底了。因为我发现诺贝尔文学奖的评委都是四十岁出头者，比我还年轻，历练明显不够。
诺贝尔文学奖获得者都追求怪异的文字表达。大概这些四十来岁的诺贝尔文学奖评委生怕别人说她们看不懂这些怪异文笔似的，故她们都把奖金颁发给这些文笔怪异者。高行健吃准了这套，故写的东西就专门模仿这类怪异笔法。适逢诺委会唯一懂中文的马悦然面临退休前的最后一次推荐。如果再不给一名中文作者，老马这辈子就白干了。该年诺贝尔文学奖委员会铁了心要给一名中文作者。而高行健由于给巴金当翻译混到了马悦然身边，便用上了中国人习以为常的拉关系，走后门，套近乎，居然就把诺贝尔文学奖弄到了手。然后呢？就没有然后了…
中国对这个世界的最大威胁不是有限的几颗原子弹，而是如水银泻地般无孔不入的腐败。我在国外亲眼看到大陆出来的留学生把他们在国内熟悉的那套溜须拍马和挑拨离间的权术用在外国老板身上的百发百中和无往不胜。美国人没见过这么舒服的马屁，受用极了，简直象是中了催眠术，一个个被玩得团团转。这次诺贝尔和平奖给了刘晓波，主要还是诺委会不懂中文。她们所能看到的材料全是推荐者投其所好曲意翻译的，绝对不可能是全貌。再加上中国政府自以为老大，公然威胁挪威政府，逼得诺委会激烈反弹，非要给刘晓波开奖不可。
有人说，中国需要民主，但绝不是刘晓波要的这种民主。这话我不能赞同。我要说的是，我也赞成中国搞自由民主，但绝不是红卫兵、造反派、四五、六四、刘晓波和海内外民运这种搞法。
由于我处于两难境地，既不便再提高骂刘晓波的分贝，也不便就此禁声，只好把以前骂刘晓波的旧文次第重帖，以享读者。
顺便说一句，我以为诺委会在捷克方面应该给米兰·昆德拉那本《生命不能承受之轻》开文学奖，而不是给哈维尔的《77宪章》开和平奖。中国方面则应该给阿城的《棋王》开文学奖，而不是给刘晓波的《08宪章》开和平奖。中国当代文学作品哪有不受环境影响的？唯有《棋王》超脱，不在此例。
中国人思维的最大毛病是太是非。刘晓波、何新、曹长青，这是老三届沉底儿的是非之徒。此三子者只是立场不同，思维方法并无二致。
20101031满山秋色
中国政府提高骂刘晓波的分贝不难理解。海外民运出于嫉妒，接着骂他也不难理解。但这个结果给我出了难题。如果我接着骂他，则很容易被人理解成吃醋。而如果就此不再骂他，则很容易被人理解成被诺贝尔奖的名头吓住了。其实我只相信诺贝尔科学奖项，那多是真功夫，并不大看中文学奖，尤其和平奖。但自从去年科学奖给了光导纤维和今年给了试管婴儿，就已经显示出近年诺贝尔委员会科学鉴赏力的衰退。
诺贝尔科学奖应该奖给理论突破者，比如奖杨振宁、李政道，而不奖吴健雄；奖核磁共振的理论发现者，而不奖核磁共振临床使用技术的发明人。核磁共振仪、光导纤维和试管婴儿都是技术，而搞技术的都能通过技术赚大钱，不缺诺贝尔奖这么点儿钱花。以前的诺贝尔科学奖项常有不被同行认同，研究经费不继，实验室面临关门者因为诺贝尔奖金而救急，而继续项目研究的；比如前几年在科罗拉多大学波德分校一名生物教授发现RNA在一定结构下能有催化获奖作用就属此例。可如今的诺贝尔科学奖多成了锦上添花而少有雪中送炭的了。
我是因为下乡时看了《静静的顿河》而由衷地佩服过诺贝尔文学奖。但改革开放之初买了套《历届诺贝尔文学奖作品汇编》才发现文学奖都是盛名之下，其实难附，几乎没什么可读性。后来日本三流色情小说家大江健三郎获奖，让诺贝尔文学奖在日本大掉其价。等到高行健获奖，我不知道诺贝尔文学奖是否在中国掉价，但至少在我这里是掉到底了。因为我发现诺贝尔文学奖的评委都是四十岁出头者，比我还年轻，历练明显不够。
诺贝尔文学奖获得者都追求怪异的文字表达。大概这些四十来岁的诺贝尔文学奖评委生怕别人说她们看不懂这些怪异文笔似的，故她们都把奖金颁发给这些文笔怪异者。高行健吃准了这套，故写的东西就专门模仿这类怪异笔法。适逢诺委会唯一懂中文的马悦然面临退休前的最后一次推荐。如果再不给一名中文作者，老马这辈子就白干了。该年诺贝尔文学奖委员会铁了心要给一名中文作者。而高行健由于给巴金当翻译混到了马悦然身边，便用上了中国人习以为常的拉关系，走后门，套近乎，居然就把诺贝尔文学奖弄到了手。然后呢？就没有然后了…
中国对这个世界的最大威胁不是有限的几颗原子弹，而是如水银泻地般无孔不入的腐败。我在国外亲眼看到大陆出来的留学生把他们在国内熟悉的那套溜须拍马和挑拨离间的权术用在外国老板身上的百发百中和无往不胜。美国人没见过这么舒服的马屁，受用极了，简直象是中了催眠术，一个个被玩得团团转。这次诺贝尔和平奖给了刘晓波，主要还是诺委会不懂中文。她们所能看到的材料全是推荐者投其所好曲意翻译的，绝对不可能是全貌。再加上中国政府自以为老大，公然威胁挪威政府，逼得诺委会激烈反弹，非要给刘晓波开奖不可。
有人说，中国需要民主，但绝不是刘晓波要的这种民主。这话我不能赞同。我要说的是，我也赞成中国搞自由民主，但绝不是红卫兵、造反派、四五、六四、刘晓波和海内外民运这种搞法。
由于我处于两难境地，既不便再提高骂刘晓波的分贝，也不便就此禁声，只好把以前骂刘晓波的旧文次第重帖，以享读者。
顺便说一句，我以为诺委会在捷克方面应该给米兰·昆德拉那本《生命不能承受之轻》开文学奖，而不是给哈维尔的《77宪章》开和平奖。中国方面则应该给阿城的《棋王》开文学奖，而不是给刘晓波的《08宪章》开和平奖。中国当代文学作品哪有不受环境影响的？唯有《棋王》超脱，不在此例。
中国人思维的最大毛病是太是非。刘晓波、何新、曹长青，这是老三届沉底儿的是非之徒。此三子者只是立场不同，思维方法并无二致。
20101031满山秋色
Saturday 30 October 2010
宋公明：“扩大消费需求”是个伪命题
据人民网消息，10月9日，也就是今天，全国政协经济委员会副主任郑新立将坐客强国论坛，谈“转变经济发展方式与扩大消费需求”。
这“扩大消费需求”一说，玩的是什么滑稽呢？从字面看，是玩了个主体省略的花招。“扩大”前面没有主语，不知道是谁来扩大。“消费需求”前面没有定语，不知道是谁的需求。谁来扩大，怎么扩大，扩大到什么程度，扩大谁的需求？统统的都不知道，全蒙在魔术师的黑布下面。
谁来扩大暂且不说，先来看一下要扩大的是谁的需求。按理说，当然是扩大中国人的需求吧？如果是扩大美国人的消费需求，是不是太过自作多情了？然而对于中国人来说，是不是每个人的需求都要扩大、都应当扩大、都能扩大、都允许扩大呢？似乎不是吧？国务院不是明确提出，要抑制不合理的购房需求吗？如果笼而统之地说扩需，对不合理的需求也去扩大，哪岂不是故意捣蛋吗？难道经济学家就是拿了国家的钱专门来和国家作对的不成？ ...
这里愿意免费为某类经济学家普及一点关于需求方面的基本常识。
第一， 需求是指人的需求，不同的人，需求是有区别的，男人和女人不同，老人和小孩不同。成年人不需要尿布，和尚不需要梳子，盲人不需要点灯。说得专业一点，就是人的需求因性别、年龄、生活环境等因素有所区别。
第二， 第二，人的需求是分层次的。一是基本需求，就是维持生存所必须的条件，例如空气、水、食物等。对于基本需求，是必须保障，而不是什么扩大不扩大的问题。如果对基本需求没有保障或者没有稳定的保障，那么社会成员就不可能去追求更高的消费，也不敢去消费。对于中低收入的人群，有钱也要留着以防万一，无论你怎么促销，他们也不为所动。二是合理需求。就是在基本需求的基础上，想要吃得更好一点，穿得更漂亮一点，生活标准更高一点。对于这类需求，应当根据条件适当加以满足。例如小孩要吃糖，适当给他吃一点是可以的，但是太多就有害了。有人喜欢吃红烧肉，这也是合理的需求，但也不能天天吃。三是不合理的需求。就是超出合理需要的需求，违背道德法律和公序良俗的需求。例如不合理的购房需求。对于这类需求，是抑制，限制，打击的问题，而不是如何扩大的问题。超越生理需要的消费，对个人的身体并无好处，例如有人醉死在酒桌上，更多的人受到各种疾病的困扰，而对社会则更加有害。
第三， 是人的需求有物质上和精神上两个方面。物质需求是满足生理上的需要，精神需求是满足心理上的需要。二者是密不可分的。一个健康的社会不能只满足人们的生理上的需求而忽视心理上的需求。如果利用生理上的基本需求来损害他人的心理健康，也是极其残忍的非人道行为。例如例用肉刑来刑讯逼供，利用就业谋生的压力，逼迫他人放弃信仰和人生追求，贡献肉体、灵魂和贞操。心理需求也有合理和不合理之分。适当满足人们合理的心理需求，可以形成良好的社会风气，极大地地调动人的积极性。如果压制打击合理的心理需求，而对不健康的心理需求不加以控制和打击，甚至反而放纵鼓励，形成笑贫不笑娼的社会风气，则会对社会必然产生巨大的破坏的作用。
第四， 消费分集团消费和个人消费。集团消费中有国家的国防建设和基础设施建设以及文化福利设施建设。例如国防，要不要造航母，要不要更新军队的装备，这要从战略上考虑，分析客观的需要和可能，而不能从拉动经济上考虑。当年饿着肚子也要搞两弹一星，就不是从经济上考虑的。国家的交通大动脉，能源基地，农田水利等等，也都要从战略的高度统筹规划，恐怕不能单纯从拉动经济上考虑吧？
集团消费的另一方面，是行政开支，包括国家公务人员的工资福利和办公设施及开支。例如办公楼，车辆，通讯设备，等等。大建楼堂馆所。大量配备小车、电脑、手机，并不断更新，再加上公款旅游，公款出国，公款培训，公款吃喝，确实可以拉动消费。但是如果脱离了需要，脱离了国情，脱离了群众，滋长了腐败，这种过消度的畸形的消费对社会的安定和对政权的稳固又有什么好处呢？
很显然，一个合理健康的社会，就应当首先保障社会成员的基本需求，在这个基础上，适当满足合理的需求，逐步提高基本需求的标准，而对那些败坏社会风气、破坏资源和污染环境的不合理需求，则应当严加控制和打击。例如汶川和玉树地震之后，首先应当满足灾区人民的什么需求？当然是生存的基本需求，是食物饮水，是帐篷板房，是医疗卫生，道路通讯，等等。而不是九五至尊，皮尔卡丹，高尔夫球场，洗头房，夜总会。而且对灾民的基本需求还要一视仁，不能分高低贵贱。只有当灾区人民的基本需求得到稳定保障之后，才能说到进一步提高和发展。
然而现在的社会现实是，仍然有很多人，连基本需求都得不到满足。上学、就医、住房成为新的三座大山，有人冻死在立交桥下，有人用挖地道来解决住房问题。而更多的人则生活在就业和谋生的压力之下。谁家没有下岗失业和子女就业问题？不是你要求人，就是亲戚朋友要来求你，谁能幸免？几乎每个家庭都承受着巨大的精神压力。所以就业问题，不仅是生理上的需求，更是心理上的需求，是体面和尊严的前提，决不是救济金和低保能解决的。小品《梦幻家园》中的售楼小姐，为何要忍气吞声委曲求全？导游小姐为何要漫骂顾客？还不是因为谋生的压力吗？在这样的生存环境中，体面的工作和有尊严的生活从何谈起？如果不考虑心理上的因素，那么有一地方倒是可以吃大锅饭衣食无忧，基本需求完全有保障，那就是监狱。而确实有人在走投无路时，产生了去坐牢的想法。如果社会发展到这个地步，那不就成了少数人的天堂，多数人的监狱吗？
基本需求和合理需求连保障都没有，谈何扩大？那么所谓扩大消费需求，拉动消费需求，只能是那些超前的、腐败的、奢侈的、畸形的消费需求。例如九五至尊香烟，是“厅局级的享受”，只有周久耕之流才能消费得起。例如梦幻城，是邓贵大之辈出入的场所。至于108元一只的日本苹果，上万元一瓶的洋酒，消费一次万元以上的高乐夫球场，天上人间，一般百姓更是可望不可及了。而这些消费，不能停留在一个水平上，只有不断攀比，不断花样翻新，不断走向畸型极端，才能保持吸引力，五星级不够，要七星级，吃喝不够了，要一条龙全套。所以这类消费才需要不断拉动，不断扩大。而拉动扩大的结果，是能够消费得起的人越来越少，中低收入人群的购卖能力越来越下降，消费更加萎缩，这样就更加需要拉动，于是走向恶性循环。
说到底，一切经济都是人的经济。经济要满足人的需求，而不是人为了经济的需要，为经济而经济。人的需求是有区别的，那么就要看经济是满足哪些人的需求和什么样的需求。是保障人们的基本需求，适当满足合理需求，逐步提高基本需求的水平，使社会和谐发展；还是置多数人的基本需求和合理需求于不顾，只去满足、拉动和扩大少数人超过生理需要的不合理需求，培育和助长这些人的兽性心理？这种不保障基本需求而靠拉动消费的经济发展方式，不仅违反了人的正常生理和心理需求，而且造成资源的巨大浪费，造成社会的严重分裂，纵然能火爆一时，但是决不可能持久，必然要走向分化瓦解崩溃。
请问列位看官，请问经济学家，你们的基本需求有无保障？你们的合理需求能不能得到适度的满足？你们是否有体面和尊严？去问一问农民工，他们一生中可曾进过一回五星级宾馆？普通百姓，一双皮鞋穿十年，一辈子只结一次婚，一年下不了一次馆子，你拉动消费与他们有关吗？而那些能跟着拉动引领消费潮流的人，即使衣食无忧，即使可以花天酒地，三妻四妾，奢侈无度，享尽人间物质繁华，然而心理是否健康？良心是否安宁？夜半醒来，会不会心惊肉跳？如果真的是狼心狗肺，毫无廉耻，那与畜生何异？
孔老二的后代
2008年夏天去曲阜看过，见过几个号称是孔老二的多少多少世孙。我还清楚地记得小时候批林批孔的许多内容，许多东西其实批判得很到位。刚看过一篇相关网文，转过来：
转贴：被奴化的孔子后裔-衍圣公丑态
1644年清军入关，几乎兵不血刃地入主北京。九月初一，孔府衍圣公就奉上了《初进表文》，谀颂满清君主“承天御极，以德绥民”，什么“六宇共戴神君”啦，“八荒咸歌圣帝”啦，“山河与日月交辉”啦；还诚惶诚恐地自称“臣等阙里竖儒”，“今庆新朝盛治”云云。如此急切地向“新朝”献忠输诚，不能不令人吃惊。
想想大明朝老朱家待他们“圣裔”，实在是不薄呵！当年朱元璋称帝伊始，就赐给孔府祭田两千大顷(合六十万亩)，并配拨耕种祭田的大量佃户。朱元璋还特赐龙头藤杖给孔氏族长，令其“主理家政”。……可以说，明王朝对孔府“圣裔”真正是优礼有加，皇恩浩荡。我们且不说什么“民族气节”，不要求“圣裔”们效法顾炎武、史可法、刘宗周、张煌言等抗清志士；单以“知恩图报”的旧道德而言，“圣裔”们对刚刚覆亡的旧朝也理应深怀哀念，至少不必那么急不可待，抢在“第一时间”向“新朝”进表献忠吧。
投桃报李。孔府的献忠“进表”极快得到了回报——九月初四日，清廷就下旨:“先圣为万世道统之宗，礼当崇祀，昭朝廷尊师重道之意。”恩准孔府圣裔仍将享有既有的一切优渥特权。“新朝”顺治帝福临当时只有六岁，因此，这个优礼孔府的圣旨，其实是摄政王多尔衮和降清的范文程等大臣深思熟虑之后作出的。
第二年(1645年)闰六月，孔府圣裔又以实际行动，向“新朝”表示彻底归顺的忠心。这本档案选中有一篇《上剃头奏稿》，该奏稿称:臣(衍圣公)齐集上下众人，于闰六月二十六日，“恭设香案，宣读圣谕。……俱各剃头讫。……臣不胜惶悚战慄之至，为此具本奏闻”云云。
而恰恰就在这个时候，江南的嘉定、松江、昆山、江阴等地，千百万士人和民众正在为抗拒野蛮的“剃发令”而殊死斗争；从这年的闰六月初一至八月二十三日，江阴民众浴血抵抗了整整八十三天！当时有个在华的洋教士就曾为“中国人为保护他们的头发和服装所表现出的悲愤和战斗勇气”而感佩不已。当然，在“身体发肤，受之父母，不敢毁伤”的先圣祖训，和面对“留头不留发，留发不留头”的严酷现实之间，孔府圣裔可以做出他们的选择；他们也不一定要像那些江南人为了头发而不惜丢掉脑袋。时势所迫，性命攸关，剃发就剃发吧，但有必要“不胜惶悚战慄之至”地上奏朝廷吗？用“奴相”一词来形容，有人或许觉得刻薄，但我不知道还有什么词比“奴相”更为适合。
二百七十年后，已是民国时代，在两次不大不小的闹剧中，孔府圣裔又有不甘寂寞的表演。1915年12月袁世凯宣布恢复帝制，次年即为“洪宪”元年。《孔府档案选》里载有衍圣公孔令贻贺袁世凯称帝电文:
“皇帝陛下圣鉴:窃维俯顺舆情，允国民之拥戴；仰承天命，建皇权之谟猷。……令贻等守先圣尊王之意，输瞻云就日之诚，不胜懽忭鼓舞馨香庆祝之至。”
欢欣之色溢于言表。短短十多天里，袁世凯就四次召见孔令贻，并封其为“郡王”。档案选中还有一封族兄给孔令贻的信，族兄喜形于色地写道:“新帝待遇优隆，迭膺荣典，超越前代。……我邑自我弟晋封王爵，族中亲友，人人欢欣鼓舞，屡向兄讨要喜酒吃。”
可惜，袁的称帝闹剧仅八十多天就黯然收场，衍圣公的“郡王”梦当然也随之破灭。
一年多后，“辫帅”张勋帅兵入京，解散国会，拥戴溥仪复辟。孔府圣裔又急忙给张勋致电敬贺，称“日月重光，毅力殊猷，普天同庆”云云。这场闹剧更短命，只十来天就玩完了。圣裔们又空欢喜一场。
在我们看来那都是闹剧，而孔府圣裔当然不这么认为，在其心目中，那可是“守先圣尊王之意”的头等大事。孔令贻在给袁世凯的劝进电中明言“共和国体，既不适用于中华”；唯有“建皇权之谟猷”。游览孔府，至今可见到的对联中，有一句透出了“精义”所在:“与国咸休，安富尊荣公府第”。此所谓“国”就是皇权帝制之“国”，孔府圣裔赖此而安富尊荣。至于那“国”的皇帝，姓赵，姓孛儿只斤，姓朱，姓爱新觉罗，姓袁……都可以，他们很懂得与“氏”(不同姓氏的皇帝)俱进。
Friday 29 October 2010
花木兰和迪士尼乐园式的历史
2010英国木兰奖结果揭晓, “木兰奖”（Mu-Lan Awards）创始人是英国华人工党主席梁辛尼（Sonny Leung）。
历史作品当中替父从军的花木兰，出自半农半牧的北方民族，肯定不是汉族。所谓“华人”，基本对应“汉人”、“炎黄子孙”这类概念。
不过历史被“迪士尼”化（Disneyland history），倒符合英国中餐馆老板和英国华文媒体的水平和口味。
Thursday 28 October 2010
中国的"美国朋友"不可共患难
英国金融时报
由于中国已经将其估值过低的货币人民币与美国挂钩，因此美国金融危机后，美元每次贬值都意味着人民币对其他世界货币贬值。但是中国真的是全球货币战争爆发的罪魁祸首吗？
韩国、巴西、台湾、日本、瑞士以及其他许多央行，正在购买美元来防止它们本国货币的升值，以此来保护他们的出口。对于欧元汇率超过1.4美元，欧洲也是紧张不已。这远远超出了1.17美元的购买力平价率。
如今，美国正在采取严厉措施对付中国，也准备着一场贸易战。（美国）国会已授权总统，如果中国仍旧不愿大幅提高人民币对美元的价值，那么就对中国商品强加进口税。
但是人民币的估值过低——目前低了45%——已经存在许多年了。为什么美国突然采取富有侵略性的措施呢？为什么美国早前不采取措施呢？
原因在于资本的流动。以前中国用中美商贸中赚得的美元来填补美国的财政赤字，因此美国接受人民币的低估值。而今，中国人喜欢把资本投入到非洲和其他地方的原材料上，这让美国决策者愤怒不已。
美国得了便宜还卖乖
中国的投资转变非常剧烈。在2008—2009年间，中国以每月170亿美元的速度购买美国政府债券。但是在2009年9月，中国改变了投资方向。在 2010年的头7个月，中国不仅不再买入美国政府债券，甚至还开始出售手中的债券。中国每个月净出售70亿美元的美国政府债券。美国现在神经紧绷也是完全可以理解的。
伦敦市插入了中国留下的投资缝隙，提高了对美政府债券的购买量。在2008—2009年期间，伦敦的购买量是每月10亿美元左右，在今年头7个月增至平均每月280亿美元。由于英国本身是一个资本输入国，因此我们可以猜测，伦敦并不是自己持有这些债券，而是通过简单地重新包装这些债券，然后为这些债券取个印有伦敦盖章的新名字，然后转售到世界其他地方。
尽管不再为美国政府提供资金，但是中国仍旧是世界上最大的资本净输出国，自2006年以来，中国一直保持这个地位。在2007—2008年，中国平均每年输出4000亿美元的资本。当时，美国每年需要 8000亿美元的资本输入，来抵消几乎完全中断的私人储蓄，中国的大部分资本输出流到了美国。中国人的不愿消费，使得美国人能在许多年间依靠借来的资金建造新房，维持一个美国经济无力维系的消费水平。
当然，中国人一般不为美国的私有房地产提供资金。他们一般只购买政府债券，以及由半国有机构房利美和房地美发行的证券化的房地产工具。直接的房地产私人资本融资主要来自其他国家，比如德国。尽管如此，中国人通过为美国政府提供了原本要从美国纳税人中收取的资金，帮助美国达到更高的生活水准。
就这段历史来看，如今指责中国的汇率政策是有点卑鄙的。中国的汇率政策使美国人能在这么长的时期内，享受超出自己收入的生活水平。美国经常称人民币的低估值损害了美国利益，其实正是人民币的低估值，让美国人能做全民有房的美国梦。廉价中国产品的进口，使美国能腾出资本和人力，来大规模增加房产数量，由此急剧提高了美国人的生活水准。
如今，中国人不愿意继续在美国投资，这是可以理解的。他们曾尝试购买优尼科，进入美国能源市场，但是美国的政治人士阻止了这一并购举措。国会同样还以国家安全为借口，阻止了中国其他的直接投资。
人们只要回想光纤公司Emcore和金矿公司Firstgold的竞标案就明白了。美国想要中国人的资金，但是却只愿意提供信誉无保障的结构化证券，以及如今有通胀和贬值危险的政府债券。
如果美国停止频频对中国做卑鄙的道德指责，那么世界和平将会受益。事实比赤裸裸的政治利益更加微妙。
作者Hans-Werner Sinn是慕尼黑大学经济学和公共财政学教授，也是德国Ifo经济研究所主席。
原题：China's Fair-Weather American Friends
美军在伊拉克到底杀了多少平民
充满争议：美军在伊拉克到底杀了多少平民(组图)
著名的维基解密网站22日晚公布了近40万份美军伊拉克战争秘密文件。这些文件显示，伊战造成了大量平民死亡，此外，美军对伊拉克安全人员的大量残忍虐囚行为不闻不问。
报道这条新闻的时候，一些媒体都用了“美军杀害了大量伊拉克平民”，甚至“美军在伊拉克大屠杀”这样的标题。
2003年3月以来，美军在伊拉克已经“奋战”了七年的时光，这场战争中到底有多少伊拉克平民死亡，其中有多少是美军造成的，美军在伊拉克战争中都做了什么？
七年来，伊拉克因暴力死亡最多的就是平民
不同数据都显示平民身亡人数占了大头
要了解到底有多少伊拉克平民被美军杀害，第一步当然是要知道到底有多少伊拉克平民因这场战争身亡。包括维基解密在内，目前一共有两组数据可供参考：
1.66081人（来源：维基解密公布的文件）
这个数据来自本次维基解密的文件，据说这是美军下层士官所作的报告。这份文件将死亡人群分为了四类：①66081名平民；②23984名“敌军”；③15196名伊拉克安全部队士兵；④3771名美军和联军士兵。
2.98585-107594人（伊拉克罹难人数统计组织）
伊拉克罹难人数统计组织（IBC）是一家总部位于英国的非官方组织，伊拉克战争爆发以后，他们就开始统计遇难的平民人数，也是唯一一家公布相关数据的组织。这家组织的数据来源于媒体的报道，他们对媒体的信息进行交叉验证，而后再去医院、殡仪馆、NGO组织、官员等处进行核实。因此这个统计非常有参考价值。
此外，美国军方和伊拉克人权部都曾经公布过伊拉克战争的死亡人数，但是公布的数据并未将平民单独列项。可以肯定的是，在伊拉克战争中，死亡最多的是平民。
美军并非造成伊拉克平民死亡的主因
04年以后，军队并非主因
上图来源于伊拉克罹难人数统计组织的数据，前文已经说明这虽然并不是个官方组织，但它对伊拉克因暴力死亡的平民的数据统计非常严谨，也很被国际社会认可。从数据中可以看到以下的趋势：
1.03年，被驻伊联军杀害的伊拉克平民是因暴力死亡的平民中最多的。这也是战争进行当年。
2.04年开始，反美和反政府武装的力量持续上涨，超越了驻伊联军，成为主要元凶。
3.06、07两年因暴力死亡的伊拉克平民人数是最多的，这也和伊拉克的政局很符合，《美军走了，伊拉克会崩溃吗》这个专题中曾经提到过,“2006—2007年伊拉克的混乱局面，几乎是一场准内战，交战的一方是美军和伊拉克新政府军队组成联军，另一方为各色恐怖组织，这是伊拉克人的第二场战争（第一场战争是推翻萨达姆政权的战争）。”
数据显示，恐怖主义才是罪魁祸首
2006-2008被军队杀害和因街头爆炸的平民人数比较
伊拉克罹难人数统计组织2009年的数据和分析最为详细，因此我们以这一年为样本来分析。这一年是03年以来伊拉克平民因暴力死亡人数最少的一年，总共有4680名平民死亡，死亡原因概括如下：
1.军队。截止09年12月25日，驻伊联军一共造成了64名平民死亡（其中空袭为0，2008年这个数字是599），伊拉克军队造成了103名平民死亡。伊拉克军队和驻伊联军的联合造成了151名平民死亡。
2.反美和反政府武装是导致伊拉克平民、警察等死亡的最主要原因。伊拉克的恐怖主义分子很猖獗，09年一共发生了709起爆炸事件导致3005名伊拉克平民丧生，而死亡人数在50人以上的恐怖袭击，一共发生了8起，造成了750名伊拉克平民的死亡。
3.伊拉克警察也是造成伊拉克平民因暴力死亡的重要原因。去年一共有1193名伊拉克平民被警察杀害，占统计人数的25.5%。
这个数据和维基解密所公布的数据也是吻合的，根据维基解密公布的文件，总共有不少于31780名死者是死于路边爆炸，还有高达34814名的死者死于宗教派别之间的杀戮。宗教派别的杀戮造成的死亡人数很多是因为：伊拉克最糟糕时期是2006年中至2007年中。当时伊拉克教派分歧严重，而新的军队和警察还没有准备好，恐怖分子乘虚而入，制造恐惧和混乱，激化各派矛盾，混水摸鱼。
怎么样看美军杀害伊拉克平民
最近150年以来，产生了一系列有关战争的国际法规和公约，其中最有代表性的是《日内瓦战争公约》。四次《公约》分别确立了保护受伤士兵、保护受伤水兵、保护战俘和保护平民这四大原则。这是因为大家不管引致战争的分歧是什么，但是正义的目标是不能用非正义的手段来实现的。这就是规则。美国当然也是加入了《公约》的国家。
但是，《公约》是死的，具体到每次战争当中去，各个国家都根据自己的利益来修改对自己有用的规则。美国的“反恐战争”就被学者称之为“边走边定规则”。在对待平民、俘虏的时候，都不断地改变规则。比如，对待囚徒，在衣食住行和宗教信仰上都遵循了《公约》，但是在对关押者的秘密审讯和关押地点迁移的随意性上则又不符合公约的规定。
武装分子混在平民中，平民很容易就被误杀
在维基解密的材料中提到，一名叛乱分子躲在大楼屋顶，结果整座大楼被炸毁；一个妇女由于没有接受停车检查，结果被美军杀害。这样的记录还有很多。当武装分子大量混迹于平民中时，平民遭到误杀的可能性很大。所以在美国对塔利班的反恐战争中，由于基地组织试图藏身于百姓之中，造成了大量的平民身亡。当然，按照国际公约也好，人道主义精神也罢，都不该如此不分区别地杀害平民的，但是在战争状态，规则却是边走边定的，诸多因素的叠加之下，平民就平白牺牲了。当然，也不排除嗜血动物，为“娱乐”而杀害平民，但是这样的情况比较罕见。
最触目惊心的是，国际红十字组织在2001年做过一项研究，结果表明，一战的时候，每战死9名士兵才战死1名平民，但是从20世纪40年代中期开始，每战死1名士兵就要战死10名平民。也就是说虽然公约越来越多，但是平民的死亡人数却在上升。
误杀这些平民的士兵很少被追责
一般情况下，射杀这些无辜平民的士兵，如同对待虐囚的士兵一样，很少会被追责。但是，以“杀人玩”为目的的冷血动物在被曝光后会受到严厉的法律制裁。曾经发生过不少在舆论压力之下，美国政府对杀害无辜平民的士兵进行判刑的例子。例如有美军士兵在阿富汗想要“娱乐”，所以杀害平民，结果这12名士兵都遭到了逮捕。另外，按照相关规定，被害平民的家属可以向美国政府要求赔偿，但是这样的赔偿往往完成不了，因为需要当事一方的士兵提供一份书面报告，迫于战争的压力，士兵往往不会提交。
“游击队”、“人肉炸弹”，国际公约也不保障他们安全
很多恐怖组织都会采取兵民不分的战术，把平民动员成“拿起枪是兵，放下枪是民”的游击队员甚至是人肉炸弹。这部分平民的安全不仅没有保障，还会让别的平民也有危险。
根据现代战争规则，战争中的人员被分为战斗员和非战斗员，战斗员成为战俘的时候是会受到人道主义保护的。但是这样的“游击队员”“人肉炸弹”却不享有战斗员的身份。平民在战争中享受的保护高于战斗员，但是如果平民拿起了武器，这时候待遇就比战斗员还低了，一般而言，这部分平民即使被杀害也无法追责的。
美军还有一罪状：“纵容”伊安全人员虐囚行为
美军对伊警察的虐囚行为只记录，不干涉
在这次维基解密公布的文件中，还有一个关键点就是里面充斥着大量的伊拉克警察、安全人员的残忍的虐囚行为。文件曝光伊拉克安全力量在美军的纵容下对被捕的伊拉克人采取的刑讯逼供，数百名伊拉克人死在美国黑水保安公司雇佣人员的手中。
在大量文件被披露之后，五角大楼一名发言人23日对英国媒体说，美军已把掌握的有关伊拉克警察和军人虐待囚犯的文件转交给伊拉克政府。总之，美军肯定不会插手管。
美军的做法合理不合情
五角大楼的发言人还说，当伊拉克平民被伊拉克军警虐待折磨时，美国士兵的职责只是“观察和汇报”，这是国际通用做法，因此美军士兵隐瞒伊拉克平民遭受虐待的事实并无过错， 五角大楼不会做进一步调查。
这样说也不算是狡辩，美军管就属于是人道主义干涉，这个问题一直都存在着很大的争议。有人认为人权及其国际保护，本质上属于一国国内管辖事项，人权原则尚未成为国际法的基本原则。但是联合国宪章最主要的两个目标就是：维护世界和平与安全和保护人权。
所以对于伊拉克军警的虐待平民和囚犯的行为，美军观察、记录、让伊拉克政府解决，从国际法上也说得过去。只是显然这又不太合乎情，不太合乎人道主义精神。
结语：无论如何，从数据可以看出，伊拉克因暴力死亡的平民人数在09年显著下降，这是一堆文件、报告、数据中让人眼前一亮，觉得欣慰的。
Wednesday 27 October 2010
gloating executioners and bloody managers
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I just do not understand why the bbc bosses love to explain over and over how the spending cut is going to affect bbc and its staff, it kinda makes me want to puke , it looks like an executioner loves to explain the mechanism of a guillotine to the poor people on death roll. If one's head is going to be cut off, does he give a damn about how the guillotine works? If he could survive the mass culling, he would not give a damn either.
After that toff Tory chancellor revealed his spending cut plan, bbc big boss made his speech, then the medium level bosses, followed by lower level things... One would expect some off work time and rest after more than 8 hour hard working, but no, you have to endure all those meetings like the condemned have to facing their executioners before the execution.
Maybe there is not too much reason for them to be gloating.
Tuesday 26 October 2010
Monday 25 October 2010
剁手的伊斯兰刑罚本身并没什么大不了
中国日报网报道说，伊朗一名惯偷因抢劫糖果店 被当众执行剁手刑罚。我到觉得这条爱憎分明的法律没什么不好，美国和英国不妨搞个试点，看能不能推广。
该报道引美国国媒体报道，伊朗中部城市亚兹德一名32岁的盗窃犯10月24日被当众执行剁手刑罚，不过报道没有公布这名罪犯的姓名以及他所偷何物。这是伊朗本月第二起被判剁手刑的案件。
本月18日，一名伊朗男子因抢劫糖果店，被法官判处剁手的重刑，还要坐一年牢。他在抢劫后逃跑，但很快就被警方抓获。警察在他车上找到三双手套和大量糖果店的巧克力，可谓人赃并获。
根据伊朗法律，只有惯犯才会被判处如此重的刑罚，且通常公开执行。伊朗法官在过去很长时间内没有宣判此刑。
美国媒体报道这类消息，不过是要传达伊朗这个邪恶国家有多邪恶。
剁手刑法的问题不是没有，但跟伊朗关系不大，而是处罚犯罪，不应该对小偷小摸严厉打击，对窃国大盗网开一面。这恐怕是所有包括伊朗和英美国家都面临的问题。
前星期在火车上看到一则广告，大意是： “People from bad areas steal your mobile phone, People from good areas steal your pension”。
中国古代的庄子也说过：“彼窃钩者诛，窃国者为诸侯；诸侯之门而仁义存焉。”
因此，跺小偷的手，并没什么，只要能把华尔街的大盗们的胳膊、腿儿、脑袋5的也多使劲剁剁（还有某广播公司的高管王8蛋们），那天下才太平呢。
Apple is a cult, i-fans are faithful followers
apple and i-fans are becoming a cult. I would not be surprised if one day Apple start making expensive fashion clothes, bags and other accessories.
Last Friday (22 Oct.)I went to the Covent Garden Apple store, it is huge and expensive. I have to register an on-line account to reserve i-phone set i want to buy and then go upstairs get the i-phone sets and paid for them. You have to become a member to have the product, like a cult. It cost me almost 1200 GBP for 2 i-phone 4 of 32 G. Then I went to DHL in King's Cross to post them to a friend in Europe, which costed me 70 GBP inlcuding insurance of 800 GBP value.
The DHL office was operated by an Arab, they shared the shop with an currency exchange agent. I just thought the DHL operation was a bit casual comparing with post office, hence less trust worthy. I paid insurance for the DHL delivery, hoping my friend in Europe would get his i-phone sets on Monday. Today I phoned my friend, it was a relief to know the 2 i-phones sets have been delivered to him.
got my visa to Thailand last Friday morning. coming out of the embassy, i went to a nearby tg max to buy a ridiculous large pullover.
ZT雨夹雪：告诉你一个不为人知的刘晓波
（注：转帖者与此文观点无关）
7号我在《中国不必 为没有诺贝尔奖遗憾》一文中结尾说：“据法新社报道，今年诺贝尔奖的提名中‘疆独’的头子热比娅和鼓吹中国应该‘做300年殖民地’的刘晓波榜上有名，而 且这两人今年获奖的呼声很高。如果他们两个人中有一个继达赖喇嘛之后为中国再添一个诺贝尔奖，难道是中国的光荣吗？”结果不出意料，第二天刘晓波果然获得 了诺贝尔奖。诺贝尔奖的别名就是“反共产主义”奖金，不给刘晓波这种人又给谁呢？（参见附一）
关于刘晓波，人们一般仅仅知道此公是著名“民主斗士”，《蛋八宪章》执笔人之一，现在狱中服刑，有名言“300年殖民地”，对于其其余的事迹知道不多。笔者就自己所知，简单给大家介绍一下。
80 年代，中国掀起了一阵以反毛反共，鼓吹“全盘西化”为中心的“思想解放”狂飙，谁喊几嗓子“社会主义不如资本主义”，马上一夜成名。李泽厚就成了这场“思 想解放”运动的旗手，大谈所谓“五四以来救亡压倒启蒙”，鼓吹走资本主义道路。刘晓波为了成名，猛烈批判李泽厚的自由主义“不彻底”：“中国人在物质上可 以承认自己落后，机器不如人家，衣服不如人家，但精神上不承认落后，道德世界第一！如梁漱溟、李泽厚、林语堂这些学者都持这种论调，李泽厚就要求以东方天 人合一补充西方的天人对立，以东方的群体性、人际关系补充西方人的空虚感……但这两种东西是根本不能互补的！是决然不同的两种文化体系，不能调和的。 ”（《解放月报》1988年第12期）从而一夜成名。
刘晓波有两大基本理论。一为“支那劣种”论，即中国落后的根本原因是中国人种劣等。他说：“我觉得新时期文学丝毫没有什么值得骄傲的东西，相反却暗伏着重重危机，而摆脱这些危机，鉴于很多原因，有些不仅是民族性的东西，我甚至感到与人种不无关系的”（《深圳青年报》 1986年10月3日 ），“我承认对中国文化的研究，最后走投无路。如果你把问题归结为政治腐败，再及文化腐败，就会问：‘为什么孔子的思想能统治中国这么多年，至今阴魂不散？’我没法回答。我说过可能与人种有关”（《解放月报》1988年第12期）。二为“乌合之众”论，即广大人民群众是一帮乌合之众，天生就应该被一帮“天才”的精英统治。他说：“我蔑视人群，视社会为乌合之众，崇尚天才个人的创造力，终生的目标就是想看看究竟是一个有创造力的孤独天才强大，还是芸芸众生强大。”（《末日》七十七页）。在那个疯狂的年代里，刘晓波的这些理论受到了不少人追捧，其被誉为＂黑马＂、＂狂人＂、＂大陆的柏杨＂、＂当代中国的尼采＂……（附带说一句，近年来他的一个“粉丝”周亚辉又把其“300年殖民地”理论发展为“杀绝支那劣种” 理论，可谓青出于蓝。）
1989年，随着改革中的问题日益暴露，国内部分群众要求纠正改革中的失误。刘晓波对群众运动是十分鄙视的，但是为了搞乱运动的方向，把矛头指向共产党和社会主义制度，又希望通过参加运动窃取运动的领导权，内心一度十分矛盾。他 说：“一个我是理智的、清醒的，只想旁观，不想卷入，因为我崇尚自由的天才的个人，而鄙视大规模的群众运动，认为在中国搞大规模的群众运动不会有积极的意 义。而另一个我是情绪化的，盲目的，急切介入运动的每个环节，想在运动中占有突出的位置，贪婪地注视着狂热的人群，认为如此空前的运动怎么能不留下刘晓波 的痕迹。” （《末日》六十九页）最终，他处于投机的目的参加了这场运动：“……不管别人如何议论，我都坚信，‘八九抗议运动’之机太值得投了，能够投上此机，确乎上帝有眼，赐福于我，即使被指责为政治投机者，也心地坦然，无怨无悔。”（《末日》七十四页）最终，刘晓波等一批反共反人民的投机分子成功窃取了运动的领导权，把群众纠正改革中失误的要求指向了共产党和社会主义制度，即“改革出现的问题都是改革不彻底造成的，只能靠进一步深化改革来解决”，使运动蜕变成了一场反共反人民的动乱，给国家和人民造成了很大损失。
当 动乱平息以后，刘晓波作为罪魁祸首之一见势不妙，马上来了个180度的大转弯，以亲历者“现身说法”，猛烈抨击这次动乱，还出版了参加动乱的＂忏悔录＂ ——《末日》。在书中，他有意混淆社会主义的群众运动和反共反人民的动乱，把动乱的责任统统推给了群众，并得出了一切群众运动都是不好的结论。结果刘晓波 这次却失算了，由于弯子转的太快，既没有得到拥护社会主义的群众信任，又失去了原来的支持者。不久，刘晓波又写了第二个“忏悔录”，对他的“忏悔”表示“ 忏悔”。如是反复数次。
90年代以来，刘晓波曾经参加多个海外反华势力控制的极右组织，还担任过臭名昭著的极右组织＂独立中文笔会＂的会长。在这些组织中，刘晓波大搞一言堂、家长制，极力排斥异己，打击一切和他有不同意见的人，只留下少数其“粉丝”。渐渐的，刘晓波在右派中名声也臭了。
2008 年，资改官僚又吹起了一场“普世价值”的妖风，众所周知，苏联的资改官僚戈尔巴乔夫等就是通过这种妖风搞垮苏联的。刘晓波认为时机已到，联合一批极右分子 抛出了《蛋八宪章》，继续鼓吹“改革出现的问题都是改革不彻底造成的，只能靠进一步深化改革来解决”之类的垃圾，其本意是拍资改官僚的马屁，并扭转自己名 声每况愈下的局面。也正因为如此，刘晓波多次表示自己不会被捕。可是没有想到，刘晓波宣传《蛋八宪章》是为了效法“七七宪章”的言论反而触怒了资改官僚。 因为 “七七宪章”不仅导致了捷克斯洛伐克的解体，给捷克斯洛伐克人民带来了深重灾难，也没有让捷克的资改官僚捞到多少好处，只是让起草人哈韦尔当上了总统。这 样说来，资改官僚策划的“死路一条”岂不是还要让刘晓波当总统，那现有的资改官僚往哪里摆？结果，刘晓波拍马屁拍到了马腿上。
刘 晓波被逮捕以后并不惊慌，仍然强调有人保他，最多两三年就会出来。的确，今天的中国人享有的权利是极不对等的。例如，赵东民同志在没有任何证据的情况下被 非法超期羁押一年多，也不容许家人探视；而分裂国家罪证确凿的热比娅却于2005年3月17日被释放赴美国“保外就医”，至今也没有提何时通知热比娅结束 保外就医，回国继续服刑。刘晓波显然和热比娅这个诺贝尔奖的另一热门属于同一类人。他以“贵族犯人”自居，也的确享受了贵族犯人的待遇，不仅在狱中的生活 并不亚于陈良宇，美国全国民主基金会每月还支付其人民币1.3万元的工资（参见附二），仍然属于高薪阶层。
今年三 月，刘晓波被提名诺贝尔奖。对于这一提名，右派也出现了分歧。一种意见认为，刘晓波作为一个著名的软骨头、变色龙，有严重的历史问题，其“支那劣种”论和 “乌合之众”论等理论又十分恶心，没有资格得奖。另一种意见赞成刘晓波得奖，主要理论是刘晓波和资改官僚是一个鼻孔出气的，而资改官僚大多是软骨头、变色 龙，向刘晓波示好就是向资改官僚示好。一位刘晓波的“粉丝”为其辩护时说：“连戈尔巴乔夫都能得奖，刘晓波这点问题又算什么呢？”经过几个月的争论，除了 以受到过刘晓波打击迫害的人为代表的少数人，绝大多数右派支持刘晓波得奖，其理由是“中国民主化需要党内改革派支持”。例如，臭名昭著的极右组织“中国民 主党”主席张英表示：“八六学潮、八九民运失败的主因在民运自身，因为盲目激进、拒绝和党内改革派互动，八六学潮、八九民运导致胡耀邦、赵紫阳下台，客观 成为两次延误中国民主化进程重大行动，这个教训一定要汲取。”宣传“台湾优等民族将杀绝支那劣种以谢天下”的周亚辉说的更加直白：“在共产党内部，有大量 反共人士。这些共产党内的反共人士，大多数是1978年后，加入共产党的，他们加入共产党，并不是相信共产党的说教和马列教条，而是为了反共，或者为了事 业发展顺利。”“中国的自由民主运动，面对的是10亿愚民和几千万的共产党一党独裁派。”“推翻中共一党独裁，是一项巨大的工程。不仅要靠民间的反共力 量，而且，也要靠共产党内部的反共力量，要靠官方内部的反共力量。”刘晓波获奖以后，极右势力弹冠相庆。达赖等发给刘晓波的贺电中，几乎无一例外的大谈政 改，让人闹不清是谁获奖。
加上诺贝尔奖，刘晓波坐了不到一年牢，收入超过千万人民币，正式跻身32万千万富翁的行 列，下一步或许仿效热比娅“保外就医”了吧。经过这次镀金，刘晓波或许就成了“民主领袖”，他的“支那劣种”论、“乌合之众”论、“300年殖民地”论大 概也要成为“民主斗士”们的指导思想了吧。
7号我在《中国不必 为没有诺贝尔奖遗憾》一文中结尾说：“据法新社报道，今年诺贝尔奖的提名中‘疆独’的头子热比娅和鼓吹中国应该‘做300年殖民地’的刘晓波榜上有名，而 且这两人今年获奖的呼声很高。如果他们两个人中有一个继达赖喇嘛之后为中国再添一个诺贝尔奖，难道是中国的光荣吗？”结果不出意料，第二天刘晓波果然获得 了诺贝尔奖。诺贝尔奖的别名就是“反共产主义”奖金，不给刘晓波这种人又给谁呢？（参见附一）
关于刘晓波，人们一般仅仅知道此公是著名“民主斗士”，《蛋八宪章》执笔人之一，现在狱中服刑，有名言“300年殖民地”，对于其其余的事迹知道不多。笔者就自己所知，简单给大家介绍一下。
80 年代，中国掀起了一阵以反毛反共，鼓吹“全盘西化”为中心的“思想解放”狂飙，谁喊几嗓子“社会主义不如资本主义”，马上一夜成名。李泽厚就成了这场“思 想解放”运动的旗手，大谈所谓“五四以来救亡压倒启蒙”，鼓吹走资本主义道路。刘晓波为了成名，猛烈批判李泽厚的自由主义“不彻底”：“中国人在物质上可 以承认自己落后，机器不如人家，衣服不如人家，但精神上不承认落后，道德世界第一！如梁漱溟、李泽厚、林语堂这些学者都持这种论调，李泽厚就要求以东方天 人合一补充西方的天人对立，以东方的群体性、人际关系补充西方人的空虚感……但这两种东西是根本不能互补的！是决然不同的两种文化体系，不能调和的。 ”（《解放月报》1988年第12期）从而一夜成名。
刘晓波有两大基本理论。一为“支那劣种”论，即中国落后的根本原因是中国人种劣等。他说：“我觉得新时期文学丝毫没有什么值得骄傲的东西，相反却暗伏着重重危机，而摆脱这些危机，鉴于很多原因，有些不仅是民族性的东西，我甚至感到与人种不无关系的”（《深圳青年报》 1986年10月3日 ），“我承认对中国文化的研究，最后走投无路。如果你把问题归结为政治腐败，再及文化腐败，就会问：‘为什么孔子的思想能统治中国这么多年，至今阴魂不散？’我没法回答。我说过可能与人种有关”（《解放月报》1988年第12期）。二为“乌合之众”论，即广大人民群众是一帮乌合之众，天生就应该被一帮“天才”的精英统治。他说：“我蔑视人群，视社会为乌合之众，崇尚天才个人的创造力，终生的目标就是想看看究竟是一个有创造力的孤独天才强大，还是芸芸众生强大。”（《末日》七十七页）。在那个疯狂的年代里，刘晓波的这些理论受到了不少人追捧，其被誉为＂黑马＂、＂狂人＂、＂大陆的柏杨＂、＂当代中国的尼采＂……（附带说一句，近年来他的一个“粉丝”周亚辉又把其“300年殖民地”理论发展为“杀绝支那劣种” 理论，可谓青出于蓝。）
1989年，随着改革中的问题日益暴露，国内部分群众要求纠正改革中的失误。刘晓波对群众运动是十分鄙视的，但是为了搞乱运动的方向，把矛头指向共产党和社会主义制度，又希望通过参加运动窃取运动的领导权，内心一度十分矛盾。他 说：“一个我是理智的、清醒的，只想旁观，不想卷入，因为我崇尚自由的天才的个人，而鄙视大规模的群众运动，认为在中国搞大规模的群众运动不会有积极的意 义。而另一个我是情绪化的，盲目的，急切介入运动的每个环节，想在运动中占有突出的位置，贪婪地注视着狂热的人群，认为如此空前的运动怎么能不留下刘晓波 的痕迹。” （《末日》六十九页）最终，他处于投机的目的参加了这场运动：“……不管别人如何议论，我都坚信，‘八九抗议运动’之机太值得投了，能够投上此机，确乎上帝有眼，赐福于我，即使被指责为政治投机者，也心地坦然，无怨无悔。”（《末日》七十四页）最终，刘晓波等一批反共反人民的投机分子成功窃取了运动的领导权，把群众纠正改革中失误的要求指向了共产党和社会主义制度，即“改革出现的问题都是改革不彻底造成的，只能靠进一步深化改革来解决”，使运动蜕变成了一场反共反人民的动乱，给国家和人民造成了很大损失。
当 动乱平息以后，刘晓波作为罪魁祸首之一见势不妙，马上来了个180度的大转弯，以亲历者“现身说法”，猛烈抨击这次动乱，还出版了参加动乱的＂忏悔录＂ ——《末日》。在书中，他有意混淆社会主义的群众运动和反共反人民的动乱，把动乱的责任统统推给了群众，并得出了一切群众运动都是不好的结论。结果刘晓波 这次却失算了，由于弯子转的太快，既没有得到拥护社会主义的群众信任，又失去了原来的支持者。不久，刘晓波又写了第二个“忏悔录”，对他的“忏悔”表示“ 忏悔”。如是反复数次。
90年代以来，刘晓波曾经参加多个海外反华势力控制的极右组织，还担任过臭名昭著的极右组织＂独立中文笔会＂的会长。在这些组织中，刘晓波大搞一言堂、家长制，极力排斥异己，打击一切和他有不同意见的人，只留下少数其“粉丝”。渐渐的，刘晓波在右派中名声也臭了。
2008 年，资改官僚又吹起了一场“普世价值”的妖风，众所周知，苏联的资改官僚戈尔巴乔夫等就是通过这种妖风搞垮苏联的。刘晓波认为时机已到，联合一批极右分子 抛出了《蛋八宪章》，继续鼓吹“改革出现的问题都是改革不彻底造成的，只能靠进一步深化改革来解决”之类的垃圾，其本意是拍资改官僚的马屁，并扭转自己名 声每况愈下的局面。也正因为如此，刘晓波多次表示自己不会被捕。可是没有想到，刘晓波宣传《蛋八宪章》是为了效法“七七宪章”的言论反而触怒了资改官僚。 因为 “七七宪章”不仅导致了捷克斯洛伐克的解体，给捷克斯洛伐克人民带来了深重灾难，也没有让捷克的资改官僚捞到多少好处，只是让起草人哈韦尔当上了总统。这 样说来，资改官僚策划的“死路一条”岂不是还要让刘晓波当总统，那现有的资改官僚往哪里摆？结果，刘晓波拍马屁拍到了马腿上。
刘 晓波被逮捕以后并不惊慌，仍然强调有人保他，最多两三年就会出来。的确，今天的中国人享有的权利是极不对等的。例如，赵东民同志在没有任何证据的情况下被 非法超期羁押一年多，也不容许家人探视；而分裂国家罪证确凿的热比娅却于2005年3月17日被释放赴美国“保外就医”，至今也没有提何时通知热比娅结束 保外就医，回国继续服刑。刘晓波显然和热比娅这个诺贝尔奖的另一热门属于同一类人。他以“贵族犯人”自居，也的确享受了贵族犯人的待遇，不仅在狱中的生活 并不亚于陈良宇，美国全国民主基金会每月还支付其人民币1.3万元的工资（参见附二），仍然属于高薪阶层。
今年三 月，刘晓波被提名诺贝尔奖。对于这一提名，右派也出现了分歧。一种意见认为，刘晓波作为一个著名的软骨头、变色龙，有严重的历史问题，其“支那劣种”论和 “乌合之众”论等理论又十分恶心，没有资格得奖。另一种意见赞成刘晓波得奖，主要理论是刘晓波和资改官僚是一个鼻孔出气的，而资改官僚大多是软骨头、变色 龙，向刘晓波示好就是向资改官僚示好。一位刘晓波的“粉丝”为其辩护时说：“连戈尔巴乔夫都能得奖，刘晓波这点问题又算什么呢？”经过几个月的争论，除了 以受到过刘晓波打击迫害的人为代表的少数人，绝大多数右派支持刘晓波得奖，其理由是“中国民主化需要党内改革派支持”。例如，臭名昭著的极右组织“中国民 主党”主席张英表示：“八六学潮、八九民运失败的主因在民运自身，因为盲目激进、拒绝和党内改革派互动，八六学潮、八九民运导致胡耀邦、赵紫阳下台，客观 成为两次延误中国民主化进程重大行动，这个教训一定要汲取。”宣传“台湾优等民族将杀绝支那劣种以谢天下”的周亚辉说的更加直白：“在共产党内部，有大量 反共人士。这些共产党内的反共人士，大多数是1978年后，加入共产党的，他们加入共产党，并不是相信共产党的说教和马列教条，而是为了反共，或者为了事 业发展顺利。”“中国的自由民主运动，面对的是10亿愚民和几千万的共产党一党独裁派。”“推翻中共一党独裁，是一项巨大的工程。不仅要靠民间的反共力 量，而且，也要靠共产党内部的反共力量，要靠官方内部的反共力量。”刘晓波获奖以后，极右势力弹冠相庆。达赖等发给刘晓波的贺电中，几乎无一例外的大谈政 改，让人闹不清是谁获奖。
加上诺贝尔奖，刘晓波坐了不到一年牢，收入超过千万人民币，正式跻身32万千万富翁的行 列，下一步或许仿效热比娅“保外就医”了吧。经过这次镀金，刘晓波或许就成了“民主领袖”，他的“支那劣种”论、“乌合之众”论、“300年殖民地”论大 概也要成为“民主斗士”们的指导思想了吧。
Sunday 24 October 2010
美军驾直升机杀降兵、无差别杀平民、酷刑、耸人听闻
(图) 环球网
曾因公布阿富汗战争秘密文件让美国尴尬的维基解密网站又有了新动作，该网站在美国当地时间 22日公布了近4万份美军在伊拉克战争文件，披露了美军在6年伊拉克战争期间的机密文件。环球网23日接到总部位于伦敦的“新闻调查专局” （The Bureau of Investigative Journalism）所提供的对这40万份泄密文件所做的详尽调查与报道，揭示了自2003年美国开始进行伊拉克战争开始以来所发生的包括酷刑、虐囚和滥杀平民等等内幕，美军和美国政府更是被曝对此并未采取应有措施阻止。
2005年11月12日，武装分子和美国海军陆战队在哈迪塔进行交火时被打死的伊拉克平民尸体，尸体已被布包裹。
曾因公布阿富汗战争秘密文件让美国尴尬的维基解密网站又有了新动作，该网站在美国当地时间 22日公布了近4万份美军在伊拉克战争文件，披露了美军在6年伊拉克战争期间的机密文件。环球网23日接到总部位于伦敦的“新闻调查专局” （The Bureau of Investigative Journalism）所提供的对这40万份泄密文件所做的详尽调查与报道，揭示了自2003年美国开始进行伊拉克战争开始以来所发生的包括酷刑、虐囚和滥杀平民等等内幕，美军和美国政府更是被曝对此并未采取应有措施阻止。
酷刑手段耸人听闻
此次被公布的美军机密文件显示，美军高层在知道伊拉克什叶派武装人员对逊尼派囚犯进行虐待的情况下，却并未采取任何行动。据“新闻调查专局”统计，此次被泄密的美军机密战争日志揭露了1365例耸人听闻的酷刑和虐待手段，例如，美军在2006年记录的一个囚犯遭受两个月酷刑的情景： “他被吊在天花板上，双手被反绑在背后；他的背部后腿上都有被钝器（水管）袭击的印迹，腿上还有电钻留下的洞眼”。另一则记录则显示出伊拉克当局在审讯时如何企图用酷刑剥掉犯人的手指甲。
这些时间都曾在美军内部被上报，但这些信息汇报之后却大都没有什么作用，相关资料显示，美军对其批示“该事件无须进一步调查”。
此外，据战争日志记录，酷刑在伊拉克安全部队中几乎是“家常便饭”：监狱、军队基地和警察局甚至都有特别用于执行酷刑的房间。除了这些常见的酷刑，这些机密文件还揭示了非同寻常的酷刑手段——性侵犯、强奸和鸡奸等。美军2006年10月19日的日志中就记录过一起此类案例，“犯人被蒙上双眼，双腿和脚掌都受到钝器的打击，头部和脸部都遭到殴打。他的脚和裆部都受到电击，还被审讯者用瓶子进行了性侵犯”，此外在同样发生在巴格达的另一例案子中，一名男性被审讯者用软管实施了性侵犯。
奥巴马政府不顾囚犯人身安全执意将其移交伊政府
“新闻调查专局”指出，奥巴马政府在对伊拉克拘留所内频发的酷刑全然知情的情况下，仍不顾关押犯的人身安全执意将其交给伊拉克当局。“新闻调查专局”在资料中写道，联合国和许多人权机构已警告过华盛顿，伊拉克拘留所中酷刑虐待事件泛滥，但美国政府仍执意将囚犯转交给伊当局。并在2010年7月将所有9250名囚犯全部转交给伊当局。
共600多名伊拉克平民被杀害
此外，美军的战争日志记录显示，在2004至2009年战争期间，有众多伊拉克平民被无辜杀害。据战争日志记录，在伊拉克与联军军队和边境关卡冲突相关的伤亡事件共有13963起，其中“多数无严重后果，而一旦发生冲突则多是伊拉克平民遭到射杀”。
据新闻调查专局的统计，共有680多名伊拉克平民在类似事件中丧生，其中包括至少30名儿童。
美军用直升机射杀本已投降的伊士兵
此次文件还揭露了众多美军部队向已经投降的敌军开火的案例。据美军日志记录，2007年2月，一架通信代号为“Crazyhorse”的美军直升机控制了一批曾向联军发动袭击的伊拉克叛乱分子，在向后者进行攻击后，这些叛乱分子表示他们要投降，直升机上美军也随后将这一信息立即汇报上级指挥官。然而，上级所给出的回应却是粗鲁的：“Crazyhorse请展开攻击……”美军律师表示“他们并不能向飞机投降”。
维基解密披露伊拉克平民遭美军等不加区别射杀
2005年11月12日，武装分子和美国海军陆战队在哈迪塔进行交火时被打死的伊拉克平民尸体，尸体已被布包裹。
据美国广播公司10月22日报道，因屡屡披露美军机密文件名声大噪的网站“维基解密”又披露了大量有关伊拉克战争的机密报告。这些文件显示伊拉克战争造成至少10.9万人丧生，高出美国先前承认的数字。文件还披露了联军实施酷刑折磨和其它虐待行为的案例。
“维基解密”在公布这些文件时发表声明称：“报告详细列出了109032人在伊拉克丧生的详细情况，其中包括66081名‘平民’，23984名‘敌人’(武装分子)、15196名所在国部队成员(伊拉克政府军)、3771名‘友军’(联军成员)。大多数死者是平民，约66000人，超过了死亡总数的60%。在六年战争期间，每天死于战争的平民人数达31人。在记录期间，每天死于战争的伊拉克人约有50人，这其中除平民外还包括美军所统计的伊拉克安全部队人员或美国所认定的武装分子。”
报道表示，美军长期以来一直声称没有就人员死亡人数进行过官方统计。但是根据美国信息自由法的一项请求，美国国防部本月早些时候公布一项项数据，称有约7.7万名伊拉克人在2004年到2008年年中这段时间里丧生。但是有消息指出，“维基解密”统计的时间跨度比国防部的统计要久，而且其中有的死者还被重复计算。
“维基解密”这次公布大量伊战文件的行动与其早些时候公布阿富汗战争文件的行动类似。五角大楼已预料到它将公布伊战文件。五角大楼警告称，公布这些文件将危及美军安全。五角大楼新闻秘书杰夫·莫雷尔在伊战文件被曝光前称：“我们强烈谴责未获批准就公布机密信息的行为。曝光这些机密信息的文件将使我们的部队在未来更易遭到袭击。正如被泄露的阿战文件，我们知道我们的敌人将仔细研究这些信息以搞清楚我们的运作方式、培养资源、在战斗情况下的应对方式，甚至我们的装备性能。这种泄密情况将使我们的部队和友军成员丧生。”
“维基解密”称，它今天将公布391832份文件。它将这些文件称作“伊拉克战争日志”，这是史上美军机密军事文件最大规模的泄露事件。“维基解密”称，这些文件中包括先前不被外界所知的材料。“里面有平民在检查站遭不加区别射杀的报告，也有伊拉克犯人遭联军酷刑折磨的报告。文件还描述了有次仅仅因为怀疑建筑物内有一名可疑武装分子美军就炸毁整座民用建筑物的事件。这些文件包括300起有关联军对犯人实施酷刑和284起虐待的报告。1000多份报告称，伊拉克安全部队犯下了类似的罪行。文件中列举的多个行为有看起来很清楚是战争罪行行为，例如蓄意射杀想投降的个人。”
维基解秘揭伊战被隐瞒内幕 酷刑手段耸人听闻
曾因公布阿富汗战争秘密文件让美国尴尬的维基解密网站又有了新动作，该网站在美国当地时间 22日公布了近4万份美军在伊拉克战争文件，披露了美军在6年伊拉克战争期间的机密文件。环球网23日接到总部位于伦敦的“新闻调查专局” （The Bureau of Investigative Journalism）所提供的对这40万份泄密文件所做的详尽调查与报道，揭示了自2003年美国开始进行伊拉克战争开始以来所发生的包括酷刑、虐囚和滥杀平民等等内幕，美军和美国政府更是被曝对此并未采取应有措施阻止。
酷刑手段耸人听闻
此次被公布的美军机密文件显示，美军高层在知道伊拉克什叶派武装人员对逊尼派囚犯进行虐待的情况下，却并未采取任何行动。据“新闻调查专局”统计，此次被泄密的美军机密战争日志揭露了1365例耸人听闻的酷刑和虐待手段，例如，美军在2006年记录的一个囚犯遭受两个月酷刑的情景： “他被吊在天花板上，双手被反绑在背后；他的背部后腿上都有被钝器（水管）袭击的印迹，腿上还有电钻留下的洞眼”。另一则记录则显示出伊拉克当局在审讯时如何企图用酷刑剥掉犯人的手指甲。
这些时间都曾在美军内部被上报，但这些信息汇报之后却大都没有什么作用，相关资料显示，美军对其批示 “该事件无须进一步调查。”
此外，据战争日志记录，酷刑在伊拉克安全部队中几乎是“家常便饭”：监狱、军队基地和警察局甚至都有特别用于执行酷刑的房间。除了这些常见的酷刑，这些机密文件还揭示了非同寻常的酷刑手段——性侵犯、强奸和鸡奸等。美军2006年10月19日的日志中就记录过一起此类案例，“犯人被蒙上双眼，双腿和脚掌都受到钝器的打击，头部和脸部都遭到殴打。他的脚和裆部都受到电击，还被审讯者用瓶子进行了性侵犯”，此外在同样发生在巴格达的另一例案子中，一名男性被审讯者用软管实施了性侵犯。
奥巴马政府不顾囚犯人身安全执意将其移交伊政府
“新闻调查专局”指出，奥巴马政府在对伊拉克拘留所内频发的酷刑全然知情的情况下，仍不顾关押犯的人身安全执意将其交给伊拉克当局。“新闻调查专局”在资料中写道，联合国和许多人权机构已警告过华盛顿，伊拉克拘留所中酷刑虐待事件泛滥，但美国政府仍执意将囚犯转交给伊当局。并在2010年7月将所有9250名囚犯全部转交给伊当局。
共600多名伊拉克平民被杀害
此外，美军的战争日志记录显示，在2004至2009年战争期间，有众多伊拉克平民被无辜杀害。据战争日志记录，在伊拉克与联军军队和边境关卡冲突相关的伤亡事件共有13963起，其中“多数无严重后果，而一旦发生冲突则多是伊拉克平民遭到射杀”。
据新闻调查专局的统计，共有680多名伊拉克平民在类似事件中丧生，其中包括至少30名儿童。
美军用直升机射杀本已投降的伊士兵
此次文件还揭露了众多美军部队向已经投降的敌军开火的案例。据美军日志记录，2007年2月，一架通信代号为“Crazyhorse”的美军直升机控制了一批曾向联军发动袭击的伊拉克叛乱分子，在向后者进行攻击后，这些叛乱分子表四他们要投降，直升机上美军也随后将这一信息立即汇报上级指挥官。然而，上级所给出的回应却是粗鲁的：“Crazyhorse请展开攻击……”美军律师表示“他们并不能向飞机投降”。
Friday 22 October 2010
i-pad, i-phone, i-pod, i-robot... they are becoming everyting
apple and i-fans are becoming a cult. I would not be surprised if one day Apple start making expensive fashion clothes, bags and other accessories.
I went to the Covent Garden Apple store, it is huge and expensive. I have to register an on-line account to reserve i-phone set i want to buy and then go upstairs get the i-phone sets and paid for them. You have to become a member to have the product, like a cult. It cost me almost 1200 GBP for 2 i-phone 4 of 32 G. Then I went to DHL in King's Cross to post them to a friend in Europe, which costed me 70 GBP inlcuding insurance of 800 GBP value. The DHL office as operated by an Arab, they shared the shop with an currency exchange agent. I just think the DHL operation is a bit casual comparing with post office, hence less trust worthy. Hopefully my friend will get his i-phone sets on Monday.
got my visa to Thailand this morning. coming out of the embassy, i went to a nearby tg max to buy a ridiculous large pullover.
Thursday 21 October 2010
A NWO History of Mongolia
Situated between Russia and China, Mongolia is the least densely populated country in world, with three million people living in a country the size of Western Europe.
Over thousands of years, the Mongol people have perfected a nomadic lifestyle to thrive in Siberian winters, acrid deserts and barren steppes. Despite recent urbanization, half the population continues to live a nomadic lifestyle.
The warring tribes of the region were once merged under the leadership of Genghis Khan and used their innovative military tactics to create the great Mongol empire.
Yet despite their famed indigenous culture, the United Nations classifies Mongolia as a developing country. By 'development', the UN means the integration of Mongolia into a world government.
THE SOVIET ERA
The start of Mongolia's 'development' was a Soviet invasion in 1921, which radically altered Mongol culture and laid the foundations for a modern international state.
After an initial settling in period, the Soviets went about destroying Mongol identity to bring in the new. Buddhism was top of their hit list. They murdered 30,000 monks and liquidized over 750 monasteries.
Their next target was nomadism. Stalin's forces worked to destroy any independence from government. They even went in search of Kazakh groups in the Western mountain regions who hunt prey with eagles, but couldn't track them down.
The plan was to replace nomadic lifestyle with collective agriculture, with all proceeds going to the state.
This was not easy, as Stephen Bodio writes, 'nomads have always valued freedom, and Mongolia has always been a society of nomads. Soviet puppet leader Choibalsan's attempt at collective agriculture failed when rural residents killed their livestock rather than submit.'
The Soviets developed their capital city Ulaanbaatar and brought in the key elements of an international state: a central bank, large bureaucracies and a standardized education system.
The Soviet era was characterized by enormous infrastructure projects building power stations, bridges and highways.
In the 1960's though, Mongolia was still lacking in the facilities to house foreign dignitaries. There were only a few embassies (all Soviet satellites), and significantly, a British envoy. His name was Reginald Hibbert whose job was to chronicle how the people were reacting to Communism
Reginald's observations are found in the book, 'Letters From Mongolia' in which he bemoans the harsh conditions and the inefficiency of the country. He writes the locals are 'accustomed to rhythms of life and work that have nothing in common with those of urban communities, and their way of life is primitive.'
In a passage on Mongol kin values, he elucidates: 'they retain many of the virtues of simple people, especially loyalty and mutual help among family and friends. They will work extraordinarily hard on the impulse of helping a friend or acquaintance but seem to be completely without conscience when it is working for a living or for the general good.'
In other words, working for friends and family is primitive, while working for an impersonal Soviet state is civilized.
"DEMOCRACY"
With the fall of the Soviet Union, Mongolia became a democracy in 1992 but was still crippled by $11 billion of Soviet debt.
Where poverty reigns, the IMF sweeps in like vultures, handing out further loans with strings attached that benefit the global power elite. In 1992, 80% of state enterprises were privatized sinking a population made dependent on government into poverty.
To fill the void left by the removal of Soviet subsidies, loan sharks prowl the frozen wastelands luring nomads into debt.
Even 'charities' like New Zealand's VisionFund offers loans to nomadic people with interest of 2.5%-3.5% a month! VisionFund work to emasculate the men: 85% of loans are given to women.
Through the creation of debt on both a state and personal level, the Mongols are enslaved to alien forces by a paper currency emblazoned with their hero Genghis Khan.
With a central bank, bureaucracies and infrastructure developed by Communism, foreign corporations can now enter Mongolia and mine its vast resources of copper, gold, coal and uranium.
The country is expected to fuel China's growth. Perhaps this was the role planned for the country all along.
WESTERN "CULTURE"
Democracy also brings in the Western culture industry which is designed to erode traditional family values. The intention is to create an atomized populace obsessed with consumerism and entertainment, obediently serving their economic masters.
MTV is very popular in Mongolia and the youth mimic what they see. Take Lumino, a Mongol hip-hop group. Their early songs were light-hearted and innocent, but now inside their videos are sleazy and dominated by gyrating girls dressed like whores.
International governmental agencies also work towards breaking the traditional family. Take a UNESCO scheme called, 'The Gobi's Women's Project,' an educational project designed to emasculate men.
The program 'empowers women' by teaching them, 'livestock rearing techniques; family care (family planning, health, nutrition and hygiene); income generation using locally available raw materials and basic business skills, for a new market economy.'
Haven't these people survived for thousands of years without the United Nations?
The project also aims to direct the social agenda of women by giving a radio to every female. 'Programs are broadcast at times convenient to the women, mostly at evening time. They cover topics of general interest, whilst others are more specific and directly related to the needs of the Gobi women.'
The programs are laced with feminist lesbian propaganda. Safe to say there is no Gobi's men project.
Funded by the taxpayers of the world, UNESCO is global socialism. It creates a scenario where the tax dollars of a Wal-Mart worker in Cincinnati are used to emasculate nomadic herdsmen in Mongolia!
The fall-out of poverty and the take down of traditional Mongol society is reactive. In 2008, rioting followed the general election with cries of a fix. The Mongol parliament was set on fire; five people died and 700 were put in prison.
Grass roots fascism is rising. Tsagaan Khass (White Swastika) is a Mongolian Neo-Nazi group. They portray themselves as patriots standing up for ordinary citizens in the face of foreign invasion and rampant inequality. They respect Hitler for 'preserving racial identity'.
Their empty posturing masks the horror that the roots of traditional Mongol culture have been killed. They wish to destroy the system but if they do what will be left? A void.
CONCLUSION
The story of Mongolia's 'development' shows Communism, democracy and NGO's working towards the same end: a regional plantation under the flag of the United Nations.
In a 2009 trip to Mongolia, UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon praised the country for being a role model for developing countries, and 'making progress in the fight against poverty.'
And yet, if you visit the bright lights and technological advancement of Ulaanbaatar you will see thousands of gers, the traditional Mongol nomadic house, scattered about the outskirts of the city. Their inhabitants are starving.
In a land with a tradition of self-sufficiency, a third of people now live below the poverty line. Such is the fallout of 'development.'
by David Richards
20 Oct. 2010
(for henrymakow.com)
(for henrymakow.com)
马悲鸣：恢复帝制的艰难
【作者按∶此文乃戏作，读者不可当真，且近闻西藏流亡政府支持印度核实验消息，有悖诺贝尔和平奖精神。但人家藏人有毁家亡国，惨遭屠杀之恨，个把情绪化的语言也不为太过。】.
《中 国时代》98年五月号刊登了孟玄先生“不是开玩笑”的高论，主张中国恢复帝制，再行“三从四德”。当年在普林斯顿的“文化中国”讨论会上，孟先生也曾提出 此论，并立刻招来与会妇女的抗议。此议恐怕难以争得半边天妇女的选票。君不见当今台湾妇女已经敢走上街头示威游行，高喊“要性高潮，不要性骚扰！”还有竞 选议员的女性袒露自己的乳房，高呼“要奶头，不要拳头！”以抗议立法会里那些男性议员大打出手的肢体语言。更有大学教授提倡妇女性主动∶“脱衣半小时，前 戏半小时，干不干由你。”。再加上妇女经济自主地位的实现和提高，恐难再把她们圈回“三从四德”的观念牢笼里去。.
其实我对孟玄先生恢复帝制的见解并不感到惊奇。因为中国自从废除帝制以来，确实再也没有恢复到当初的元气。笔者曾经讲过，皇帝是最大的爱国者，因为皇帝是以寄在项上的头颅做社稷的担保，所以他不敢不爱国。帝制接班人有遗传资格的严格限制，故少有后来不择手段的广泛内斗。.
中国文化是在两千年帝制之下形成的。一切礼乐典章都与帝制紧密相关。没了帝制，中国文化就去了太半，还妄谈什么继承？要想发扬中华文化，就得恢复帝制。
社 会主义在中国的实验看来是失败了。但资本主义在中国也难以行得通。中国认真放开来自由竞争的时间只有从袁世凯之死到北伐成功这之间大约十年。后来的蒋毛邓 都是没有帝号的帝制，看来还是帝制更适合中国国情。当然笔者所说的帝制是指君主立宪，而非随便可以砍别人脑袋的那种帝制。瑞典、挪威、荷兰、英国、卢森 堡、丹麦、比利时、摩那哥、西班牙、日本都是君主制。这些旧文明国家和平走入民主都保存了皇室。法国没有保存君主制，却打了上百年连绵不断的内外战争。人 民流离失所，战士暴尸疆场，惨不忍睹。后来在宫廷里以说法语为时髦的俄罗斯也仿效法国杀了沙皇，搞十月革命。俄国人在苏联时期过的什么日子不再赘述。这里 特别值得一提的两个君主国家是瑞典和西班牙。.
当 年瑞典国王在战争中被拿破仑手下名将贝尔那多特俘获。两人在关押中互相认识。等到瑞典王位出现继承人空缺的时候，这位国王提议并说动贝尔那多特将军来继承 瑞典王位。现任瑞典国王古斯塔夫就是法国名将贝尔那多特的后代。在翻越阿尔卑斯山长途奔袭意大利俄军的战争中，是贝尔那多特率军侧应了自认比阿尔卑斯山还 高的拿破仑才取得了标炳史册的辉煌战绩。后来又是贝尔那多特率领的联军首次击败了拿破仑。.
西班牙推翻国王统治的革命几十年后，遵照佛郎哥遗嘱又恢复了君主制，使西班牙重新回到欧洲民主大家庭中来。想当年国际纵队的马德里保卫战何等豪杰！曾几何时，西班牙人民再也不要推翻君主制了。可是国际纵队老战士铁托、霍查各自在自己的国家里又是何等的专制！.
后人评论德国走上纳粹的道路，重要的原因就是德国在第一次世界大战战败后被废除了君主制。倘使王室犹在，希特勒端是当不了国家元首？.
孟玄先生提出在中国恢复帝制的主张恐怕是困难重重。先不要说革了八十多年命的中国人还有几个认真思考过恢复帝制的问题，就是这皇帝的人选也成问题。谁更有资格当中华帝国的皇帝？.
洪 宪皇帝袁世凯的后代怕是没有资格了。当年《讨袁檄文》的第一句–“天祸中华，元首谋逆”，护国军明言∶“袁世凯以下三世褫夺公权”。连公权都没有，还怎么 当皇帝？宣统皇帝当过日本卵翼下的满州国康德皇帝，和中国作过战。即使这些都排除的话，溥仪先生没有孩子，也就无人能继承皇位。最近刚刚去世的八千岁溥杰 先生也只有女儿，还都入了日本籍，连中国话都不会说了。再加上中日之战的仇恨未消，请来一个虽然有一半满族遗传基因，却分明是一个日本人来当中国的女皇， 想来也不合适。.
明朱的后代现在还能确认出来。但明朝皇帝多是昏君暴君，不知爱惜黎民，竟至于被推翻，远不如异族统治的满清诸君。他们的后代又有什么资格再坐龙廷呢？.
成 吉思汗的直系后代还能找到。但当年蒙古人曾嫌汉人太多，占有太多的土地耕种而无法放牧；于是他们就对中原一带的汉人实行了一项大规模的集体屠杀政策，每年 都要把成千上万的汉人驱赶到江河里活活淹死；后来还多亏藏族宗教领袖八思巴以“元帝师”的身分要求忽必烈汗废止用汉人填满江河的野蛮做法，才算止住了这一 民族灭绝的大屠杀。而且现在蒙古人有他们自己的国家，成吉思汗的直系后代又何必要当中国的皇帝？.
赵宋、李唐、杨隋、司马晋、刘汉、赢秦家的人现在已经难以确认。即使能确认出来，他们的祖先既然已经把江山社稷丢掉了，还有什么资格再坐龙廷？.
如今孙家只坐了一代总理，台湾的蒋家只坐了两代总统，就没有人再继承了。
大 陆毛家世子死于朝鲜战争，次子有精神病，唯有一孙还不知是否能成气候。且其祖父发动土改、镇反、反右、大跃进、文化大革命一系列政治运动，弄得国无宁日， 方死方休；害得黎民百姓遭了大殃，死人无算；真个是“庆父不死，鲁难未已”。后人不清算他就是好的，他的子孙还凭着什么资格坐龙廷？
如今邓家世子已成瘫痪，唯次子还算健康。但以太上如此巨头的革命家怎么好意思让自己的后代坐龙廷？.
看来是无人再有资格当皇帝了，所以帝制也就万难恢复。
现在唯一一线希望的人选确实还有一个。就是诺贝尔和平奖获得者，西藏宗教领袖达赖喇嘛。如果能请出达赖喇嘛当整个中国的皇帝，其才识、人望，国际间的地位和影响力都足堪此任。.
请出达赖喇嘛当中国皇帝还有许多意想不到的好处。第一，藏人自从唐宪宗以后就没有打过中国，这与匈奴，突厥，契丹，女真、蒙古、瓦刺和日本人大不相同。中国人对藏人没有历史的仇恨。只是近年由于中共用兵西藏，反倒引起藏人对汉人的仇恨。.
第二，中国目前最头疼的问题就是西藏的独立要求正在日益受到国际间的广泛同情。如今强人身后，国际间的同情甚至支持藏人的呼声越来越高，恐怕难以留住西藏在中国版图内等待自由民主的到来。但如果请出达赖喇嘛当中国的皇帝，则西藏自然不再闹独立。.
第三是达赖喇嘛不结婚，没有子嗣。以前各代达赖喇嘛都是选灵童选出来的，故西藏没有各君主国家常见的那种兄弟之间的夺位之争，这也是西藏政治安定的一大要素。如果现在这位达赖喇嘛当了中国皇帝，又没有子嗣，那么他身后也就不会有夺位之争。.
第四，达赖喇嘛已经宣布，他圆寂之后将不再转世。因此这种灵童转世的制度也就到此为止。所以现任达赖喇嘛之后，不会有再选灵童，而又无法预测其是否能得诺贝尔和平奖的困境。.
总之，请出现任这位诺贝尔和平奖获得者的高僧达赖喇嘛当中国的皇帝，以便实行君主立宪制，确是一个从七十年党争和平过渡到民主的绝妙人选。就如当年英国皇室绝后，请出德国汉诺威选帝候乔治•路德维希出任英国国王，其皇室延续至今一样。
当 然这其中还有许多问题。比如，虽然中国人不恨藏人，但由于中共的恶意宣传，对藏人的歧视是普遍和明显的。不过既然这是宣传造成的结果，也可以再宣传回来∶ 如果说西藏是中国领土的话，那么藏人就是中国人。达赖喇嘛是藏人，所以也是中国人。那么由他出任中国皇帝也就是中国人坐龙廷。.
最后，也是最困难的问题在于流亡近四十年的达赖喇嘛本人极难答应出任中国皇帝的邀请。所以说，恢复帝制，万分艰难。
《中 国时代》98年五月号刊登了孟玄先生“不是开玩笑”的高论，主张中国恢复帝制，再行“三从四德”。当年在普林斯顿的“文化中国”讨论会上，孟先生也曾提出 此论，并立刻招来与会妇女的抗议。此议恐怕难以争得半边天妇女的选票。君不见当今台湾妇女已经敢走上街头示威游行，高喊“要性高潮，不要性骚扰！”还有竞 选议员的女性袒露自己的乳房，高呼“要奶头，不要拳头！”以抗议立法会里那些男性议员大打出手的肢体语言。更有大学教授提倡妇女性主动∶“脱衣半小时，前 戏半小时，干不干由你。”。再加上妇女经济自主地位的实现和提高，恐难再把她们圈回“三从四德”的观念牢笼里去。.
其实我对孟玄先生恢复帝制的见解并不感到惊奇。因为中国自从废除帝制以来，确实再也没有恢复到当初的元气。笔者曾经讲过，皇帝是最大的爱国者，因为皇帝是以寄在项上的头颅做社稷的担保，所以他不敢不爱国。帝制接班人有遗传资格的严格限制，故少有后来不择手段的广泛内斗。.
中国文化是在两千年帝制之下形成的。一切礼乐典章都与帝制紧密相关。没了帝制，中国文化就去了太半，还妄谈什么继承？要想发扬中华文化，就得恢复帝制。
社 会主义在中国的实验看来是失败了。但资本主义在中国也难以行得通。中国认真放开来自由竞争的时间只有从袁世凯之死到北伐成功这之间大约十年。后来的蒋毛邓 都是没有帝号的帝制，看来还是帝制更适合中国国情。当然笔者所说的帝制是指君主立宪，而非随便可以砍别人脑袋的那种帝制。瑞典、挪威、荷兰、英国、卢森 堡、丹麦、比利时、摩那哥、西班牙、日本都是君主制。这些旧文明国家和平走入民主都保存了皇室。法国没有保存君主制，却打了上百年连绵不断的内外战争。人 民流离失所，战士暴尸疆场，惨不忍睹。后来在宫廷里以说法语为时髦的俄罗斯也仿效法国杀了沙皇，搞十月革命。俄国人在苏联时期过的什么日子不再赘述。这里 特别值得一提的两个君主国家是瑞典和西班牙。.
当 年瑞典国王在战争中被拿破仑手下名将贝尔那多特俘获。两人在关押中互相认识。等到瑞典王位出现继承人空缺的时候，这位国王提议并说动贝尔那多特将军来继承 瑞典王位。现任瑞典国王古斯塔夫就是法国名将贝尔那多特的后代。在翻越阿尔卑斯山长途奔袭意大利俄军的战争中，是贝尔那多特率军侧应了自认比阿尔卑斯山还 高的拿破仑才取得了标炳史册的辉煌战绩。后来又是贝尔那多特率领的联军首次击败了拿破仑。.
西班牙推翻国王统治的革命几十年后，遵照佛郎哥遗嘱又恢复了君主制，使西班牙重新回到欧洲民主大家庭中来。想当年国际纵队的马德里保卫战何等豪杰！曾几何时，西班牙人民再也不要推翻君主制了。可是国际纵队老战士铁托、霍查各自在自己的国家里又是何等的专制！.
后人评论德国走上纳粹的道路，重要的原因就是德国在第一次世界大战战败后被废除了君主制。倘使王室犹在，希特勒端是当不了国家元首？.
孟玄先生提出在中国恢复帝制的主张恐怕是困难重重。先不要说革了八十多年命的中国人还有几个认真思考过恢复帝制的问题，就是这皇帝的人选也成问题。谁更有资格当中华帝国的皇帝？.
洪 宪皇帝袁世凯的后代怕是没有资格了。当年《讨袁檄文》的第一句–“天祸中华，元首谋逆”，护国军明言∶“袁世凯以下三世褫夺公权”。连公权都没有，还怎么 当皇帝？宣统皇帝当过日本卵翼下的满州国康德皇帝，和中国作过战。即使这些都排除的话，溥仪先生没有孩子，也就无人能继承皇位。最近刚刚去世的八千岁溥杰 先生也只有女儿，还都入了日本籍，连中国话都不会说了。再加上中日之战的仇恨未消，请来一个虽然有一半满族遗传基因，却分明是一个日本人来当中国的女皇， 想来也不合适。.
明朱的后代现在还能确认出来。但明朝皇帝多是昏君暴君，不知爱惜黎民，竟至于被推翻，远不如异族统治的满清诸君。他们的后代又有什么资格再坐龙廷呢？.
成 吉思汗的直系后代还能找到。但当年蒙古人曾嫌汉人太多，占有太多的土地耕种而无法放牧；于是他们就对中原一带的汉人实行了一项大规模的集体屠杀政策，每年 都要把成千上万的汉人驱赶到江河里活活淹死；后来还多亏藏族宗教领袖八思巴以“元帝师”的身分要求忽必烈汗废止用汉人填满江河的野蛮做法，才算止住了这一 民族灭绝的大屠杀。而且现在蒙古人有他们自己的国家，成吉思汗的直系后代又何必要当中国的皇帝？.
赵宋、李唐、杨隋、司马晋、刘汉、赢秦家的人现在已经难以确认。即使能确认出来，他们的祖先既然已经把江山社稷丢掉了，还有什么资格再坐龙廷？.
如今孙家只坐了一代总理，台湾的蒋家只坐了两代总统，就没有人再继承了。
大 陆毛家世子死于朝鲜战争，次子有精神病，唯有一孙还不知是否能成气候。且其祖父发动土改、镇反、反右、大跃进、文化大革命一系列政治运动，弄得国无宁日， 方死方休；害得黎民百姓遭了大殃，死人无算；真个是“庆父不死，鲁难未已”。后人不清算他就是好的，他的子孙还凭着什么资格坐龙廷？
如今邓家世子已成瘫痪，唯次子还算健康。但以太上如此巨头的革命家怎么好意思让自己的后代坐龙廷？.
看来是无人再有资格当皇帝了，所以帝制也就万难恢复。
现在唯一一线希望的人选确实还有一个。就是诺贝尔和平奖获得者，西藏宗教领袖达赖喇嘛。如果能请出达赖喇嘛当整个中国的皇帝，其才识、人望，国际间的地位和影响力都足堪此任。.
请出达赖喇嘛当中国皇帝还有许多意想不到的好处。第一，藏人自从唐宪宗以后就没有打过中国，这与匈奴，突厥，契丹，女真、蒙古、瓦刺和日本人大不相同。中国人对藏人没有历史的仇恨。只是近年由于中共用兵西藏，反倒引起藏人对汉人的仇恨。.
第二，中国目前最头疼的问题就是西藏的独立要求正在日益受到国际间的广泛同情。如今强人身后，国际间的同情甚至支持藏人的呼声越来越高，恐怕难以留住西藏在中国版图内等待自由民主的到来。但如果请出达赖喇嘛当中国的皇帝，则西藏自然不再闹独立。.
第三是达赖喇嘛不结婚，没有子嗣。以前各代达赖喇嘛都是选灵童选出来的，故西藏没有各君主国家常见的那种兄弟之间的夺位之争，这也是西藏政治安定的一大要素。如果现在这位达赖喇嘛当了中国皇帝，又没有子嗣，那么他身后也就不会有夺位之争。.
第四，达赖喇嘛已经宣布，他圆寂之后将不再转世。因此这种灵童转世的制度也就到此为止。所以现任达赖喇嘛之后，不会有再选灵童，而又无法预测其是否能得诺贝尔和平奖的困境。.
总之，请出现任这位诺贝尔和平奖获得者的高僧达赖喇嘛当中国的皇帝，以便实行君主立宪制，确是一个从七十年党争和平过渡到民主的绝妙人选。就如当年英国皇室绝后，请出德国汉诺威选帝候乔治•路德维希出任英国国王，其皇室延续至今一样。
当 然这其中还有许多问题。比如，虽然中国人不恨藏人，但由于中共的恶意宣传，对藏人的歧视是普遍和明显的。不过既然这是宣传造成的结果，也可以再宣传回来∶ 如果说西藏是中国领土的话，那么藏人就是中国人。达赖喇嘛是藏人，所以也是中国人。那么由他出任中国皇帝也就是中国人坐龙廷。.
最后，也是最困难的问题在于流亡近四十年的达赖喇嘛本人极难答应出任中国皇帝的邀请。所以说，恢复帝制，万分艰难。
Tuesday 19 October 2010
顺水逆风：阿嘉活佛揭秘金瓶掣签
BBC中文网 蒙克 
阿嘉活佛这位宗教领袖1998年出走前在中国的官场生涯可谓顺风顺水。他曾经是藏区黄教六大寺院之一青海塔尔寺的住持、全国政协委员、中国佛教协会副主席。而且阿嘉活佛提前获悉当局即将让他接替赵朴初担任中国佛教协会主席，并且担任官方指定的11世班禅的经师。
但 阿嘉活佛说，在中国世俗和物质的成功的背后，他付出巨大的感情和精神的代价。中共当局对西藏和宗教事务的高压和控制，令身居高位的阿嘉活佛常常重新感受到 极左时期被强迫劳动改造时候经历过的同样的屈辱感。阿嘉活佛今年在美国出版了自己的自述，取名为“顺水逆风”（Surviving the Dragon）。
江泽民赠诗
1993年当时的中国国家主席江泽民去塔尔寺参观，寺院主持阿嘉活佛用汉语致词欢迎。江泽民听后赞扬道：“你汉语讲得比我好。”估计爱讲英文的江泽民不会想到，他的英文也比不了在美国生活了12年的阿嘉活佛。
阿 嘉活佛在接受BBC中文网采访前，在英国皇家国际问题研究所用英文演讲并同专家自如地交流。我很难相信，一个接近50岁开始学英文的人能够在10年多时间 内竟能够如此熟练地用英文表达和交流。长期在海外流亡的中国人我见过不少，流亡时间比阿嘉活佛更长的也不少，但英文能讲得像他一样流利的人却并不多。
阿嘉活佛1998年逃亡美国后同中共当局沟通，试图为达赖喇嘛和中国政府对话充当桥梁。时任中共统战部长的王兆国给阿嘉活佛回信，劝他回国。当时的中国国家主席江泽民赠诗给阿嘉活佛作为回复：
塔尔三绝明月圆，如来十万聚坛前。知归故土芳园在，最美莲花湟水边。
戊寅中秋夜忆塔尔寺，赠阿嘉活佛，江泽民
赠诗给转世活佛打谶语，似乎符合江泽民附庸风雅的风格。不过江泽民在诗中给佛教转世高僧讲佛家归宿，似乎也表现某种出居高临下，甚至以帝王自居的心态。
“坚赞诺布选中了坚赞诺布”
据阿嘉活佛透露，中共主持的班禅转世确认的程序和仪式违法了藏传佛教仪轨。
藏传佛教第二大宗教领袖10世班禅喇嘛1989圆寂6年后选定其转世灵童的仪式在1995年11月29日凌晨时分在西藏拉萨的大昭寺秘密举行。当时的国务委员罗干和国务院宗教局长叶小文代表中央政府参加了选定转世灵童候选人的金瓶掣签仪式和册封仪式。
江泽民赠诗规劝阿嘉活佛
阿嘉活佛和其他西藏高僧当时也参加了抽签仪式。阿嘉活佛回忆说，他们当天凌晨3点到达大昭寺。波米活佛跪拜后直接从金瓶中抽出一支写着一个候选人名字的象牙签交给在场的罗干。
罗 干看过又把象牙签转交给时任西藏自治区主席的江村罗布（Gyaltsen Norbu），认定嘉黎县坚赞诺布（Gyaltsen Norbu）中签，为第十世班禅的转世灵童。此事后来成了在藏人中流传的一个笑话：坚赞诺布（Gyaltsen Norbu）选中了坚赞诺布。
“金瓶掣签作弊”
阿嘉活佛在凌晨5点从大昭寺返回下榻的饭店。第二天上午官方电视新闻称金瓶掣签上午十点在大昭寺举行。阿嘉活佛当时在电视新闻的近镜头中看到三个象牙签并不一般长。阿嘉活佛的这个怀疑后来在返回北京的专机上得到证实。
班禅喇嘛转世灵童选定和11世班禅册封坐床仪式在拉萨举行后，阿嘉活佛和嘉木样活佛随同国务委员李铁映和中央政府特派专员、国务院宗教事务局局长叶小文一起乘坐专机返回北京。
班禅转世灵童选定和册封仪式按照当局的计划顺利进行，并没有出现所谓来自达赖集团的破坏。叶小文在飞机上当着李铁映、嘉木样活佛和阿嘉活佛的面说夸耀他们在达赖喇嘛宣布选定另外一名转世灵童后，他们如何努力应变。
叶小文说： 达赖喇嘛已宣布他选定的（11世班禅转世灵童）候选人，政府就立即采取行动，派出3架通常只给政治局成员乘坐的专机，去藏区转世灵童3个最后候选人的家乡把转世灵童及其家人接到秘密地点隐藏起来。
我们在选定灵童过程中力求做到万无一失，（我们）在一个装写有候 选人姓名的象牙签的锦套中塞了棉花，让这个候选人的签高出一截，因此才顺利的选中了合适的候选人。
原国家宗教局局长叶小文
叶小文“泄天机”
阿 嘉活佛今年3月初版了英文自述Surviving the Dragon(中文版书名拟定为《顺水逆风》)，他在自述中也引述了叶小文当时在飞机上讲的原话：“我们在选定灵童过程中力求做到万无一失，（我们）在一 个装写有候 选人姓名的象牙签的锦套中塞了棉花，让这个候选人的签高出一截，因此才顺利的选中了合适的候选人。”
《人 民日报》驻西藏记者刘伟1995年11月29日也亲临金瓶掣签现场进行了报道。刘伟事后发表的报道说，金瓶掣签举行前最后验看名签的是叶小文，“他验完签 后，拿起托盘中细长的黄缎封套，将名签套上。可能黄缎套过于细瘦，封装每只签，叶小文都用了很长时间”，“终于，叶小文镇定地将三支名签都装进了黄缎封 套，他抬起头来，神色明显轻松了许多。”
据阿嘉活佛讲，官方指定的11世班禅喇嘛至今难以被广大藏人接受，许多寺院不摆放他的照片。
阿嘉活佛说，金瓶掣签象征着满清皇帝对西藏事务的权威，西藏活佛转世选定中是否有金瓶掣签的传统一直存在争议。按照西藏传统，转世灵童候选人的名单被裹在糌粑丸里，把几个糌粑丸放在碗中不停地摇晃，直到剩下一个糌粑丸为止。
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