Wednesday, 5 May 2010

China’s seasonal politics


Temtsel Hao, 4 May 2010


The changing shape of China’s cultural calendar raises sensitive questions of politics, class and ethnicity that its authorities can only evade, says Temtsel Hao.

China’s rapid social transformation is reflected in a different order of priority of the country’s various annual festivals and commemorative days. As the communist state continues to seek tight control over what is permissible, yet as official thinking also adapts to and tries to steer the reclamation of “tradition”, the texture of China’s festive calendar is altering. This change increasingly raises problems for a country and a people caught between the “new” China of the post-1949 period (which is also now “old”) and the “old” China of centuries past (parts of which are again becoming “new”).

A small example is that the state council of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) stipulates that young people aged between 14 and 28 can enjoy a half-day holiday every 4 May: “youth day”. In practice, few Chinese can afford to leave school or work on this day, which commemorates the momentous student protests against the provisions related to China in the Versailles peace agreement of 1919. Today, the occasion little celebrated; as indeed is another seasonal occasion every 1 May, “labour day”.

It’s true that that labour day (1 May), youth day (4 May) and women’s day (8 March) have been recognised as national holidays since soon after the foundation of the "new China" in 1949. But the political associations of these “new holidays" in a new era of boisterous capitalism mean that the authorities are anxious to downplay them. Alongside them, more traditional Chinese holidays - such as tomb-sweeping day (5 April), the dragon-boat festival and the moon festival (15 August) – have emerged to become more extravagantly celebrated.

The labour question

The state is obliged to go through the motions. China’s president Hu Jintao, on the eve of labour day on 1 May 2010, praised Chinese working people as "the most reliable class basis for the party" and described workers as "the unquestionable leading class of Chinese socialism". An interesting response comes from Ding Xueliang, a sociology professor teaching in Hong Kong. He says that many Chinese working people would be dumbfounded to hear that they are a “leading class”; and that to tell Chinese peasants that the republic is made of a “peasant-worker alliance” (as the state also declares) amounts almost to a political joke.

In the west, “May day” was inspired by the events of 1886 in Chicago and elsewhere in the United States, when a great strike won the right after a hard and bloody struggle to an eight-hour working day. 120 years later, China passed a "labour-contract law" which gives workers rights of guaranteed payment and working-breaks. But in practice, for many Chinese workers - both white- and blue-collar –an eight-hour working day and associated benefits remain a dream (see Kerry Brown, “China: inside strain, outside spleen”, 10 March 2010).

In many western countries there is no official public holiday on 1 May, but it is an occasion when trade unions and leftwing groups march in the streets to affirm working people’s solidarity. By contrast, Ding Xueliang says that the People's Republic of China is one of the few countries in the world where workers are not allowed to celebrate this day on their own initiative.

The memory of youth

The protests of 4 May 1919, provoked by the humiliating treatment of China at Versailles, featured a march by thousands of Beijing students from Tiananmen Square. On the way some of the their number broke in to the home of then treasury minister Cao Rulin – whom they blamed for selling Chinese interests to an encroaching Japan – and burned it down (see Jeffrey N Wasserstrom, “China’s anniversary tempest”, 25 February 2009).

Some revisionist historians in China regard the house-burning affair in 1919 as a stain on the “patriotic” movement. But however the movement is assessed, it is clear that the republican government of the day lacked the kind of powerful police force or anti-riot capacities now possessed by the Communist Party. Even the warlord-politicians who ruled China were not able to impose martial law and use the army to crush students, as happened in Tinanamen Square seventy years later.

The party reveres the 1919 movement as an embodiment of the so-called “May 4 spirit”: a combination of liberty, science and democracy. Its official propaganda sees this spirit as a weapon against imperialism and feudalism, and the movement itself as a pioneer in awakening the Chinese working class to play an important part in Chinese politics.

But "democracy" is nowadays a political taboo in China - and a word to be filtered by the internet-police (see Johnny Ryan & Stefan Halper, “Google vs China: capitalist model, virtual wall”, 22 January 2010). Ding Xueliang says that the scientific aspect of the May movement is acceptable, but the democracy part has since 1989 become a problem for the authorities. The suspicion of democracy makes it very difficult for officials who deal with young people and students to appear logically consistent in their propaganda work.

The traditional revived

Since 2008, other annual occasions - tomb-sweeping day, the dragon-boat festival, the moon festival - have become national holidays in China. The changes to Chinese national holidays in recent years indicate a tendency to neglect – even phase out – those associated since 1949 with class and revolution; and to place more emphasis on those that seem rooted in older Chinese traditions and shared ancestry (especially the imagine common descent of Han Chinese from the emperors Yan and Huang). The influence of overseas Chinese, and those in Hong Kong and Taiwan, has (says Ding Xueliang) played a big part in these revived celebrations.

But to reserve national days for traditional Chinese holidays carries some dangers, and has incurred criticism. Zhang Yiyi, a writer in Hunan province, condemns the conversion of tomb-sweeping day into a national holiday on two grounds: it originates in an imperial ceremony, thus making it a regressive superstition; and it represents the imposition of a Han Chinese holiday upon non-Chinese minorities, thus making it an act of disrespect.

The moon festival, spring festival, tomb-sweeping day and the dragon-boat festival are heralded as the four cardinal Chinese festivals. All of them are now national holidays throughout China, though most are foreign to non-Chinese minority cultures. The moon festival (15 August) is for Chinese a day for family reunion; but it reminds many Mongols of the history of Chinese rebellion against the (Mongolian) Yuan dynasty. Indeed, legend has it that Chinese rebels used moon-cakes to pass a secret massage "to kill Tartars [Mongols] on 15 August".

In China, revolution and class are giving way to capitalism and “tradition”. The most seriously celebrated Chinese national holidays are now all Han Chinese in origin. This brings questions of ethnic sensitivity come into play. True, Han Chinese form the overwhelming majority of the population; and Ding Xueliang says that installing a national holiday with a non-Chinese minority origin would require a very complicated legislative procedure. The Chinese state already has enough problems in adapting the calendar and keeping the people in line.

Sunday, 11 April 2010

蒙克:西藏宣传,靠忽悠还是靠真相

评论:西藏宣传,靠忽悠还是靠真相?

蒙克
BBC中文网记者

中国如何在西藏问题上扩大话语权,大概是中国新闻学的顶级权威与学术名家李希光教授在英国智库发表讲话的本意。他在英国皇家国际问题研究所讲话的题目是:中国在讨论西藏问题中面临的挑战。他在讲话中引用了大量的概念,展示了各种图表,解说中西媒体在西藏问题报道方面的不同和对立,再次为他自己10多年前的成名著《妖魔化中国背后》的观点作注脚。

李希光再次重复了在其成名作中西方媒体丑化中国的观点。虽然他做了些例举,但没有充分的分析,跳跃性 地得出了自己喜欢的结论。就像一个律师在法庭上,用过失杀人的证据企图证明谋杀罪或大屠杀一样,不能令人信服。

他虽然没有分析西方媒体为什么要妖魔化中国, 但对于西方媒体为何关注西藏问题做出了解释。他说西方是解决了温饱的富裕社会,所以更关注精神需求,因此愿意把西藏看作香格里拉。去年中国第五代领导人习 近平曾经说得更直截了当:“有些吃饱了没事干的外国人,对我们的事情指手画脚......。”

“妖魔化”指称(或理论)让李希光在国内新闻界和学术圈一路顺风顺水。据说李希光教授还为中国政府培训发言人。也难怪,中国政府发言人在记者会上那种大义凛然,面对提问动辄蔑视反诘的风格,让你感觉到,“反妖魔化”早就从理论落实到实践。不过李教授如想在国际讲坛上继续有斩获,最好要避免下面列出的常识性错误。

新闻成了忽悠

李希光谈西藏问题的报道和宣传,却回避西藏问题本身,回避相关的社会、政治和经济事实和分析,把西藏问题上的争论说成中西方媒体报道和渲染的结果。他先比较中西媒体报道西藏采取不同取景和视角,然后把中国在西藏问题宣传上的被动归咎于西方媒体和达赖喇嘛“会讲故事”。

达赖喇嘛用英文演讲,措辞简单直白,在李希光看来,显示了达赖喇嘛精明的攻关策略。后来达赖喇嘛办公室的新闻秘书对我说,达赖喇嘛不是不想用丰富的英文表达,可惜他老人家的英文水平只允许他简单直白,有时候他还得现场向身边的人请教英文词。

李希光强调新闻即“讲故事”(可能就是赵本山说的“忽悠”),回避大家都关注的事实,即西藏问题本身,受到英国资深记者和中国问题专家梅兆赞博士和著名记者伊莎贝尔·希尔顿当场质疑。对于不同新闻版本背后是否有真相存在的问题,这位清华大学的新闻学教授说,真相不过像情人眼中的西施(他的原话:Truth is only in the eye of the beholder)。

新闻的目的是“讲故事”而真相本身并不重要的新闻理论是否为清华学子,或者国务院发言人培训班的学员接受,不得而知。但将此理论拿到西方,绝对能独树一帜。精英主义的新闻学一般会比较夸大记者的作用,强调记者报道在精英和大众之间起沟通作用,但还没有哪家理论把记者抬高到可以忽略客观事实的地步。

即使那种把新闻和舆论视作“党的喉舌”的新闻观点,从道理上讲,也离不开客观事实。列宁眼中的无产阶级先锋队(共产党)无论多么先知先觉,都要反映某种客观存在和社会规律。先锋队代替无产阶级搞专政后,要通过“党的喉舌”教育人民。而“党的喉舌”的教育和宣传的内容,毕竟还是要反映所谓的“客观事实”和“规律”。

中国和西方对立

新闻成了忽悠,新闻学成了忽悠的技巧,背后则是价值真空和玩世不恭。如果说李希光教授的新闻观里面有什么原则或价值观的话,那就是反复提到的中西对比,中国和西 方的对立。当然李教授也不是一概排斥西方,美国的批判学者乔姆斯基就一再被他引用,批判西方主流媒体的虚伪。不过乔姆斯基是从个人角度批判美国的国家强权,而李教授的侧重是通过媒体维护国家,而不是批判国家侵犯个人权利。

据李希光教授讲,将中国视为一个民族国家是西方媒体对中国的误解。李教授似乎对另外一位学术大师的论述没有了解。中国 1949年后的新国家建立在阶级理论之上。改革开放后,“中华民族”的提法取代了过去有阶级含义的“中国人民”,费孝通先生特意为此量身打造出“中华民族多元一体化”的理论。

近20-30年来中国一直在宣传民族国家的理念,在西藏问题上,中国当局援引历史也主要是用民族国家的理论说明,西藏自古是中国的一部分,藏人自古以来是中华民族的一部分。

西藏问题无知

除了中国国家理论方面的常识,李希光教授的西藏问题常识也略显不够。他没有谈西藏的社会和经济存在什么问题,西藏社会随着中国社会的巨变发生了哪些变化,所有这些同目前的西藏问题有什么联系。

2008 年西藏发生大规模抗议和骚乱引发中国学者对西藏问题的空前关注。2009年中国民间学者(公盟)通过独立调研完成了《藏区314事件经济社会成因》的调研报告,引起海内外关注。报告指出了诸多当局一直回避的问题,比如经济发展对藏区的冲击、以及藏区的教育、官员腐败、社会保障等问题促进了当地民族情绪和诉求等等。

参与撰写国务院西藏问题白皮书,并且组织“新闻大篷车课堂”西藏之行的李希光教授似乎没听说过以上广受关注的西藏调研报告。在西藏问题的舆论宣传上,《藏区314事件经济社会成因》报告建议要以积极宣传改革开放成就取代对农奴制渲染。而李教授则一再强调,西方媒体对所谓的“农奴 制”视而不见。

中国的英文称呼

李希光教授的另外一个高论就是,英文中指中国的China应该用Zhongguo代替。他认为China这个词不准确,原因是China源自外国对“契丹”的称呼, 而历史上的契丹国是非汉民族建立的政权,不足以代表历史上的中国。不知道李教授是否了解,在俄罗斯人,蒙古人和中国西北的中亚国家现在仍然以“契丹 ”(Khitai)称呼中国。

据牛津字典解释,指中国的China在16世纪出现在英文当中。一般认为英文的China源自波斯文,而波斯文则源于印度古梵文Cina。“契丹”(Khitai)的称呼也传入英文,英文的对应词是Cathay,也指中国。

李教授还反对英文报道中用Tibet称呼西藏,反对把Tibet和China并列,造成西藏和中国平起平坐的印象。

李希光的讲座引起的疑问远多于对问题的解答。尽管如此,应该说清华大学名师的演讲仍然十分成功。因为他通过现身说法,从另一面提醒人们,在为中国争取话语权的时候,要避免常识性错误;另外更重要的是提醒人们,新闻的目的不仅仅是“讲故事”,最重要的是要接近真相。

Sunday, 4 April 2010

中国社会同国际接轨

中国社会同国际接轨,主要同西方社会接近,一个主要的方面,就是主流社会排除了道德是非论.反对派,异议派都是在从法律和程序方面的缺陷出发作批评.西方社会反对派和自由知识分子基本如此.从根本上质疑西方社会内部政治结构以及外交政策的异议,加上无政府主义和社会主义主张,都被媒体和舆论边缘化.

在中国也朝这个方向发展.中国异见人士之革命和无敌派之争,就是在此背景下的争论.而中国政治反对的重心,由道德理想主义转向具体维权的活动人士,就代表了这个中外社会趋同的趋势.

西方社会中,在庞大的中产阶级当中的主流舆论是压倒性的,异端被严重窒息.而在中国中间阶层并没有压倒性多数,社会思潮和舆论更加无序,缝隙更大,更多样化,在这个意义上,思想更自由.

Thursday, 1 April 2010

标题党

刚看朋友在博客中提到某新闻网,我说那里标题党太多,已经不严肃了。说起标题党,咱看过最牛的标题党要算是“我是怎样做鸡的”,其实里面不过是写了某女白领教人如何作红焖鸡,结果引来无数英雄好汉的点击。

估计最初“标题党”是英文“BBS Spammer” 或 “Forum Spammer”的中文翻译,指那些只写标题,不花工夫写内容的灌水贴。查了下,网络上“标题党”被定义为“网络上一小撮利用各种颇具创意的标题吸引眼球,以达到各种个人目的网民们的自发性组织。”

也有人说,中文的“标题党”里面的“党”的意思并不重要,这个词的侧重不在组织上,而是侧重某种原则和倾向,是主义的意思。所以“标题党”就是“标题主义”(headliners? sensationalism?),指写文章过分注重标题而忽略内容,用标新立异,大而无当的题目吸引读者。

可想而知,雄心勃勃的标题,并没有内容上的支持,读者失望是啃腚的。

Wednesday, 24 February 2010

去埃及看金字塔

骑阿拉伯马沙漠上遛弯,咱教儿子如何保持重心和平衡时候,那阿拉伯人以为咱精骑射,所以捅了马屁股一下,那马好快,四蹄撒开猛跑。沙漠上尽是硬石块,差点要了我的命。

在金字塔墓室里,居然看到某某刻写的“xx到此一游”.那里中国游客真多,阿拉伯人对中国人十分友好。能讲汉语的埃及人真不少,而且都讲得十分地道那种。

在亚历山大一个希腊罗马古墓室里,没几个外国游客那种地方,黑灯瞎火地,突然听里边有人说:冉庄的地道如何如何...一看,里面又一拨中国客,呵呵

Arab horse, Pyramids阿拉伯马,大金字塔

蒙古大军为什么没有报复马目鲁克征服埃及?

除了政治原因外,估计还要生态原因。你去埃及的沙漠看看,就会有亲身体会。政治原因就是旭列兀的查和台汗国和巴图的金帐汗国长期不和,所以不敢贸然倾巢出动军队进剿埃及。

生态原因就是古代蒙古大军出征,仍然是大规模游牧的方式,边生产,边战斗。那时候蒙古军人出征,一个人5匹马,30只羊。10万大军出动,那就是50万匹马,300万只羊的大规模迁徙。蒙古大军远征西亚,攻城略地,6-7百公里的距离,需要小半年。既然是游牧方式,就需要冬天进入低草场,夏天使用高地草场。

现在的中东地区以东一直到中国的广大亚洲内陆为蒙古大军及随行的牲畜群提供了充足的草原支持。但埃及这个地方,除了尼罗河沿岸的狭长农业地带,就是沙漠中的零星绿洲,没有支持蒙古大军的草场。即使短期武力征服后,长期治理,蒙古人在那里非得改变传统的游牧方式,那样就丧失了军事上的先进性,很容易被同化掉。

估计蒙古人在西亚穆斯林地区整套和治理就是这样,比如后来的铁木尔帝国及其后代征服印度建立的莫卧儿帝国。蒙古人在那些地方,伊斯兰化突厥化以后就消失在当地人里面了。

Saturday, 6 February 2010

a busy day on saturday

上午去换摩托车前轮胎,周一取
邮局买车辆税,从上月开使得去附近的交通举办,草
邮局去包裹,howard zinn书,美国历史
开车去中国超市,半路返回,怕来不及做晚饭,改去附近的超市
晚饭,牛肉,萝卜,土豆,饺子,蔬菜沙拉
看法国惊险片,读英文字幕

前一天春节前聚餐,中国城醉琼楼
饭前集体打保龄球,是我第3次摸保龄球,超水平发挥